Laws of Religion, Judaism and Islam

Isserles: According to some authors, it is permissible to use a pagan to transport wine, even if contained in a wooden barrel, and there is no need to fear that the pagan will make an opening between the staves. This is the adopted practice. But care must be taken to ensure that the opening is sealed with wax and that the bondon is cut flush with the stave; in addition, a small piece of skin must be placed over the bondon, wax poured over both it and the piece of skin, and a few letters printed on the wax. In this way, if the heathen were to remove the skin, the letters would prevent him from removing the trace of his crime. When a knife has been found in a barrel from which wine could have been drawn through an opening made between the staves. (V. § 124)

130:2 – If a barrel of wine bearing only one seal has been deposited with a pagan, it is forbidden to drink the wine; but it is permitted to profit from it, provided that the barrel has been placed in a special corner of the pagan's house.

Isserles: According to some authors, such wine is permitted, even if the barrel bears only one seal, when one is in the presence of a fait accompli. The person receiving the wine does not need to know the seal; if on receiving the wine the seal is found damaged, the wine is forbidden, but it is not necessary to examine it. This is the adopted practice. (Y. § 118.)

130:3 – When any wine has been boiled with honey, oil or vinegar, it may be deposited in a pagan's home with a single seal.

130:4 – What is meant by a double seal? Closing a wine barrel with clay alone, as is customary, is considered a single seal; but if the closure is made with a bung that hermetically seals the opening and is itself covered with a layer of clay, there is a double seal. In the same way, when the opening of a wineskin is firmly sealed, only one seal is made; a double seal is made when the end of the wineskin is folded back on itself and sealed a second time. A mark made on the opening of a barrel, different from the one usually used, is also counted as only one seal; but if this mark has been covered or attached with clay, then there is a double seal.

130:5 – Two knots, each made in a different way, count as a double seal.

130:6 – Two Hebrew letters traced by hand on the bung of a wine barrel are counted as two stamps; but two or more printed letters only count as one stamp, as their imprint can easily be reconstructed. However, in places where there are converted Jews or pagans who know how to write, you can only rely on the two hand-drawn Hebrew letters when you know the handwriting of the person who wrote them.

130:7 – Locking the opening of a wine barrel with a seal on it is considered a double seal.

130:8 – A wine is forbidden when it is impossible to recognize the two seals placed on the barrel that contained it, or when these seals have been damaged.

Isserles: We are only talking here about the case where the seals have been damaged by a man; but when we suppose that this accident happened because of their very fragility, or by the act of an animal, or that of a child, who damaged them without intention, the wine is permitted, if moreover we find ourselves in the presence of a fait accompli. It is not necessary to inform the recipient of the wine of the form of the seals; one can simply tell him the number, and when this number has been found, the wine is permitted. However, it is preferable to make the shape of the seals known, so that they can be checked. When two Hebrew letters have been traced on a barrel of wine, it is not necessary to announce this, as the pagan cannot read Hebrew. If the heathen says that the barrel has leaked and that he has corked it, thus touching the wine, the latter is nevertheless permitted; for the heathen's statement is not to be believed, even if his account appears to be true.

130:9 – An Israelite has rented or bought a house in the courtyard of a pagan and has left his wine there; if the Israelite occupies this dwelling, the wine is permitted, even though he has left his wine in the pagan's courtyard, unsealed and unclosed, and even though the pagan occupies an apartment opening onto the same courtyard. If the Israelite does not live in this house, but has the key to the courtyard and the wine is sealed, the wine is permitted, and even more so if there are two seals; otherwise the wine is forbidden, when it has been left in a house rented or bought by an Israelite, but inhabited by a pagan. This is the case if the pagan also lives in the courtyard; but if he does not, the wine is permitted. However, wine is forbidden if the pagan is found standing near the barrel.

130:10 – We are talking here only about the case where the Israelite has rented or bought a house situated in the courtyard of a pagan; but if the courtyard belongs to the Israelite the wine is permitted, even if the pagan has his dwelling in this courtyard and the Israelite does not live there. If the wine is neither sealed nor locked, it is also permitted, since its owner has no relationship with the pagan. The same applies when the Israelite finds the heathen near the wine barrel, because for the Israelite the heathen is a thief. This applies only to cases where the pagan was found near the barrel during the day; but if the fact occurred at night, wine is forbidden.

Isserles: This last prohibition only applies insofar as the heathen does not fear the Israelite; but if the heathen dreads the latter's arrival, it makes no difference whether the event took place during the day or at night (see §§ 128 and 129). ) But if the heathen has a relationship with the Israelite, who does not live in the house, while the heathen does, the latter certainly closes the door of the courtyard at night, and no longer has to fear the arrival of the Israelite; so wine is forbidden; The same applies if the heathen is found near the barrel during the day, unless there is a slit in the door allowing the wine to be seen inside; in this case, wine is permitted if the above-mentioned event takes place in broad daylight, and is forbidden if the same event occurs in the middle of the night.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

131 – Wine made on a pagan's estate

131:1 –If a pagan has taken an Israelite into his service to make his wine, either the pagan has already sold his wine to the Israelite, without having yet received the price, or he has done so with the intention of selling it to the Israelites, the wine is permitted; the liquid need not even be sealed, if the Israelite lives in the same courtyard as the pagan. In all other cases, wine is forbidden. Wine is also permitted even if the Israelite does not live in the same house as the heathen, if it is kept in sealed barrels, placed in a store opening onto the street and to which the Israelite has the key.

Gloss: In the case of a fait accompli, a single seal is sufficient. (V. § 130.)

[Shulchan Aruch:] If the store does not open onto the street, or if it is located in a town inhabited exclusively by pagans, wine is forbidden, even if the barrels bear two seals one on top of the other, unless they are guarded by an Israelite. This applies only to wine belonging to the pagan and in his home. When the wine is placed with another Gentile, and the latter is not under the owner's dependence, the locking of the store and a single seal are sufficient. If the heathen is under the owner's dependence, this circumstance is equivalent to a deposit with the owner. If Israelites frequently and freely visit a pagan town, they are considered to live there. If the house opens onto the sweepers' place, or if the enclosing wall on the side of the public thoroughfare has an opening opposite the door of the house, or if a date tree belonging to an Israelite stands in front of the door, this house is regarded as a premises opening onto the public thoroughfare.

Gloss: Y. end of § 130: A window may be used during the day, but not at night.

[Shulchan Aruch:] If, in writing, a heathen gives an undertaking to an Israelite not to object to the Israelite selling the heathen's wine to his co-religionists, the Israelite is considered to be the owner, and the wine is permitted, provided it is sealed and locked, even if the town is inhabited exclusively by heathens.

Isserles: In the case of a fait accompli, a single seal is sufficient. But when, after the commitment, the Israelite, on coming to take possession of the wine, encounters a refusal from the pagan who wants to be paid before delivery, the commitment is considered null and void. One author states that wine sealed with two superimposed seals is always permissible; this opinion may be accepted, and it is permissible to take advantage of this wine, but not to drink it.

131:2 – When pagans buy wine from an Israelite that is sealed with two overlapping seals, and transport this wine on a vessel where they remain alone for several days, the wine is permitted.

Isserles: When an Israelite and a pagan deal together in wine belonging to the latter, this wine is permitted, if the Israelite possesses the key to the room where the wine is deposited, and if this is closed with a seal, for it is considered to be closed with two superimposed seals, and there is nothing to fear from the association of the pagan and the Israelite.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

132 – On the prohibition of profiting from wine destined for idols

132:1 –When a pagan has touched any wine, although the Israelite owner is forbidden to profit from this wine, he is nevertheless permitted to accept from the pagan the price of the wine he has touched, or the sum the pagan has received if he has been able to sell this wine. If the Israelite, having sold the wine to another pagan, received the price before delivery, he is forbidden to profit from the money. If he was paid after delivery, another author declares that the owner cannot profit from the money, but the others are allowed to.

Isserles: This refers only to pagans who are in the habit of offering wine to idols; but as this custom no longer exists today, it is permissible to profit from wine touched by a pagan who is unaware of idol worship.

132 – On the prohibition of profiting from wine destined for idols

132:2 – When an Israelite has sold his wine to a pagan, he may profit from the money received if the wine has not yet been delivered, since the wine is forbidden only from the moment the pagan has touched it, which he could not do before delivery. But if the pagan has taken the wine before the final conclusion of the deal, the Israelite is forbidden to profit from the money received; the pagan having touched the wine before payment, this sale is likened to that of wine destined for idols.

Isserles: As soon as the wine belongs to the pagan, the Israelite no longer has any right to control the liquid, and there is reason to fear that the idolater may have touched it. We're talking here only about the case where the Israelite has measured the wine in his vessel, or in that of the pagan who has no stumbling blocks. But if the Israelite has measured the liquid in the pagan's vase fitted with a device that can slow down the transfer of the wine, or in his own vase held and shaken by the pagan in order to encourage the flow of wine, if the Israelite wishes in this case to profit from the price of his merchandise, he must receive the money before measuring the wine, either by the pagan shaking the vase left on the ground, or by taking it in his hands. However, if the Israelite has measured the wine in the vase belonging to the heathen, and wearing a device that allowed a small portion of the liquid first poured by the heathen to remain in the vase, a mixture was formed in which the heathen's liquid renders the wine subsequently poured by the Israelite forbidden; however, in the event of a fait accompli, it is permissible to profit from all the wine poured into the vase, minus an amount equal to that of the liquid belonging to the heathen that had remained in the vessel. But, by design, the heathen's wine makes the Israelite's forbidden when the liquid belonging to the heathen is in the vase itself but if it is on the rim, whether the vase is in the heathen's yard or in the hands of its owner, or if the Israelite, with the wine in his yard, asks the heathen to sell him his vase, then the wine that the Israelite pours into the vase is permitted, because it belongs to him as soon as he has touched the liquid at the rim of the vessel. Similarly, if the Gentile, while the Israelite was measuring wine for him, lifted the vessel to show that it belonged to him, the wine is permitted, because the Gentile touched it before it was measured: but if the Gentile did not lift the vessel containing the wine that the Israelite was to measure, the same law applies to this liquid as to any other wine coming from a Gentile. These laws were in force in the days when pagans offered wine to idols; but as there are no pagans today, it is still permissible to profit from wine touched by a pagan who does not practice his religion. This is the generally accepted practice, and these laws are no longer applied.

132:3 – When Israelites working for a pagan receive a barrel of wine as payment, they can take advantage of it, if they have not yet accepted it, because they can tell their boss that they are taking the wine while waiting for their cash payment. If they have accepted this method of payment, they are forbidden to take advantage of it.

Gloss: Nowadays, they are allowed to profit from the wine they have accepted.

132:4 – When an Israelite has hired pagan workers whom he must feed, he is forbidden to give them wine intended for idols to drink. If he has ordered them to fetch wine from a merchant, he is forbidden to give this wine to the workers, if he has paid the merchant in advance; otherwise, he may give them this liquid to drink. This refers only to the case where the Israelite has given the merchant a certain sum representing approximately the price of the merchandise to be taken, subject to making an exact account afterwards of the quantity of wine purchased; but if the Israelite has made the merchant a personal advance for the needs of his business, he may give the wine to his workers.

Gloss: An Israelite with pagan guests may have his pagan servant buy the wine and, if the latter has taken wine intended for idols, the Israelite is still permitted to offer this drink to his guests.

132:5 – When an Israelite wine merchant must give his lord a portion of his wine, he is allowed to ask a pagan to be his interpreter with the lord to obtain the favor of being relieved of his tribute, if to bend the lord the pagan offers him wine destined for idols, the Israelite may subsequently compensate the pagan; but it is forbidden for the Israelite to instruct a pagan to give, on his behalf, wine destined for idols.

132:6 – If a lord distributes wine to the people with the intention of obtaining money, it is forbidden for an Israelite to give a certain sum to a Gentile so that the latter may fetch wine from the treasury on behalf of the Israelite; however, it is permissible for the latter to have the Gentile carry a sum of money, as a contribution, to avoid prosecution by the lord.

132:7 – If a heathen, summoned by an Israelite to pay back the hundred ecus he owes him, hastens to sell his wine destined for idols in order to pay off his debt, the Israelite is permitted to accept payment, even though the money comes from the sale of forbidden wine. But if the pagan asks his creditor to wait for the sale of his wine to pay his debt, the Israelite is forbidden to accept the money, otherwise he would have taken advantage of the sale to be paid sooner.

Isserles: Some authors say that the Israelite is forbidden to accept the money from the sale of the forbidden wine only if the pagan has no other way of freeing himself; but if the pagan has another resource, it is permissible for the Israelite to accept the money from the sale, especially if the pagan's solvency is well known. However, since today there are no pagans serving idols, it is permissible to accept the money from the sale of wine belonging to a pagan who does not practice his religion.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

133 – On the prohibition of profiting from wine destined for idols and trafficking in such wine

133:1 – Just as it is forbidden to sell any wine belonging to a pagan, or even to make a profit from it, it is also forbidden to accept wine from a pagan as a reward. Therefore, if a pagan has hired an Israelite to make his wine, or if he has hired him to transport or store the product of his making his donkey, his vessel or his cellar, the Israelite is forbidden to accept money for his hire; if he has received any, he must throw it into the sea. If the pagan has given him fruit as a reward, the Israelite must throw it into the sea, or burn it and take the ashes to the cemetery. In the same way, the Israelite is forbidden to take advantage of any land or animal he may have received from a pagan, and which may be forbidden because of its destination for idols.

Isserles: As it is permissible nowadays to profit from a wine when one is not certain of its destination to idols, one must be moderate in the application of all the laws relating to this case, except however when the destination of the wine to idols is absolutely certain.

133:2 – If an Israelite has hired out his vessel or donkey to a pagan, either to travel or to transport his merchandise, and if the pagan has used the vessel or animal for his wine, it is permissible for the Israelite to accept payment from the pagan, since such a hire was not made for the special purpose of transporting wine destined for idols.

133:3 – When a pagan hires an Israelite to transport a hundred barrels of beer for an agreed price of a hundred pedoutahs, if a barrel of wine is found among the barrels of beer, the Israelite does not have to receive his wages, as the transport of the barrel of wine destined for the idols is included in this wage. When the price of transporting a barrel of wine is less than a pedutah, the Israelite can receive his wages in the event of a fait accompli. But when the heathen tells the Israelite to transport all his barrels of beer and agrees with him to give a pedoutah for each barrel, if among the barrels of beer there is a barrel of wine, the Israelite may still receive the price of his work minus the pedoutah due for transporting the wine. However, it is forbidden to do this deliberately.

133:4 – When an Israelite has provided his labor free of charge for wine destined for idols, he is liable to a fine equal to the wages he could have received.

133:5 – It is forbidden for an Israelite to help a pagan in the making of forbidden wine, and to act as an interpreter in debates concerning the sale of wine destined for idols; it is also forbidden to pour wine into a vase held by a pagan who praises the quality of a wine, since the pagan, by touching the liquid, makes it forbidden, and the Israelite must not profit from forbidden wine.

133:6 – It is forbidden for an Israelite to keep, even free of charge, a barrel of wine destined for the idols, although if the wine were to be lost (without even the Israelite's responsibility being engaged) he would deplore his negligence; but if, as a result of his supervision, any accident is averted, he experiences satisfaction, a feeling that is forbidden, since it is produced by an act that consists of keeping forbidden wine.

133:7 – When a pagan hires an Israelite to break a barrel of wine destined for idols, the Israelite can accept a wage, even though he enjoys performing a task that reduces the amount of wine destined for idols.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

134 – Mixing permitted wine with wine destined for idols

134:1 –If a drop of wine destined for idols has been mixed with permitted wine, it is forbidden to take advantage of the mixture thus obtained. This refers only to permitted wine that has been poured over a drop of forbidden wine; but if wine destined for idols is poured with a jug into a cistern containing permitted wine, the mixture is permitted, even if the fact occurred several times during the day, since the liquid in the cistern dissolves each drop of wine from the jug as it arrives. But if the wine is poured from a barrel, either the forbidden wine is poured over the permitted wine or vice versa, the mixture is forbidden because the wine flowing from a barrel is too abundant to be dissolved by the second liquid.

134:2 – When forbidden wine is mixed with permitted wine, if the volume of the latter is sixty times that of the forbidden wine, the mixture is permitted. When a drop of wine belonging to a pagan has fallen into permitted wine, the resulting mixture must not be drunk; however, the Israelite may sell his wine and profit from the money he receives, with the exception, however, of the sum representing the value of the forbidden wine that has fallen into the permitted liquid. Similarly, if a barrel of wine destined for idols has been lost among other barrels of wine belonging to Israelites, it is forbidden to drink the wine from all the barrels; but one may sell them and profit from the money, with the exception, however, of the price of the barrel of forbidden wine, which must be thrown into the sea.

Isserles: This refers only to the case where the wine barrels have a considerable volume; if they are small, they are permitted, when the wine barrels belonging to the Israelites are in relation to those of the pagans in the proportion of two to one. Even if the mixed barrels have a good capacity, if one of them has fallen into the sea or been burnt, the rest is permitted; the same applies in such a case to all forbidden things. According to some authors, as pagans are rare these days, if any wine, the owner of which is unknown, has been mixed with permitted wine, the mixture is not forbidden, if the second liquid represents a volume sixty times greater than that of the first. Indeed, it is customary to be lenient in such cases.

134:3 – When forbidden water has been mixed with permitted wine or vice versa, the resulting mixture is forbidden if it acquires the flavor of the forbidden liquid; otherwise it is permitted. This refers only to the case where the permitted drink has fallen into the forbidden wine; but when the opposite has occurred, the mixture is permitted, provided, however, that the forbidden wine has fallen from a jug little by little; if it has fallen in large quantities at once, the mixture is forbidden. Forbidden water means water that has been used for idols.

Isserles: The author's words are contradictory with regard to the law according to which mixing is permitted, when the wine destined for the idols has fallen into the second liquid in small quantities, and forbidden, when this wine has fallen in large quantities at a time; consequently we conform to the second case of this law.

134:4 – When the contents of a jug filled with water have fallen into a wine tank, and then the contents of a second jug filled with wine intended for idols, all the wine in the tank is permitted, if a mixture containing the same proportion of water and wine does not retain the flavour of the forbidden wine. Similarly, when any wine belonging to a pagan has been mixed with a permitted wine, and the contents of a jug filled with water have subsequently fallen into the mixture, all the wine is permitted, if in a mixture containing the same proportions of water and forbidden wine, the water retains no flavor.

134:5 – If a forbidden wine has been mixed with water of six times the volume, it is permissible to drink the resulting mixture, as the flavor of the wine is lost in such a quantity of water.

Isserles: If the water is not six times the volume, it is forbidden to drink the mixture, but it is permissible to sell it to a pagan and profit from the money, except for the value of the forbidden wine. A large quantity of the mixture must not, however, be disposed of at once, lest the pagan buyer resell the liquid to an Israelite. In this case, the law concerning wine is the same as that for permitted foods, which become forbidden by contact with a small quantity of forbidden food.

134:6 – When vinegar belonging to a pagan has fallen into wine belonging to an Israelite, or when forbidden wine has fallen into vinegar belonging to an Israelite, the mixture is forbidden if it has contracted the flavor of the liquid belonging to the pagan, otherwise it is permitted.

134:7 – When vinegar belonging to a pagan has fallen into sour beer, the mixture is forbidden, as the two liquids, being both acidic, are of the same nature.

134:8 – If old or new wine belonging to a pagan has fallen on grapes belonging to an Israelite, it is permitted to eat the grapes after washing them; the fruit must be in good condition, but if it is spoiled or has contracted the flavour of wine destined for idols, it is forbidden. However, the Israelite may sell it to a pagan and profit from the sale price, less the value of the forbidden wine spilled on the grapes. However, the Israelite must not deliver to the pagan the grapes packaged in the usual way, lest the pagan resell them to another Israelite. When the grapes have not taken on the flavour of the forbidden wine, it is sufficient to wash them, and then it is permissible to eat them.

134:9 – When wine belonging to a pagan has fallen on figs belonging to an Israelite, it is permissible to eat the figs, as the wine alters the flavor of the fruit.

134:10 – When wine belonging to a pagan has fallen onto lentils, barley or any other similar substance, it is sufficient to wash them for them to be permitted to be eaten. But if the barley or lentils, for example, have been left for a long time before being washed, they have absorbed some of the forbidden liquid; in order for them to be permitted, we must then examine whether they may have contracted the flavor of the pagan's wine; if so, they are forbidden, and if not, they are permitted.

134:11 – When a pagan's wine has fallen on wheat belonging to an Israelite, it is forbidden to eat the wheat, as the grains have taken on the flavour of the forbidden wine after having surely absorbed some of it through their cracks. It is also forbidden to sell this wheat to a pagan, lest he sell it to an Israelite. What can be done with it? You may grind the wheat, make bread from it and sell it to a pagan, but not in the presence of another Israelite. But in places where Israelites eat bread prepared by pagans, it is forbidden to use this wheat to make bread.

Isserles: This bread may be sold when cut into pieces, for in all places it is forbidden for an Israelite to buy bread cut into pieces from a pagan.

134:12 – When vinegar belonging to a pagan has fallen into hot, cooked semolina, it is permissible to eat this food, because the liquid in question takes away all its flavor. But if the vinegar has fallen into cold semolina, the latter is forbidden, because in this case the liquid enhances its flavor. It is also forbidden to eat it, when the preceding fact has occurred, when by heating it one has managed to make it lose the flavor it had contracted.

Isserles: When spices, after having absorbed a certain quantity of wine destined for idols, have fallen into a foodstuff while it is being cooked, the mixture is permitted, if the foodstuff represents a quantity sixty times greater than the forbidden wine; it matters little whether the spices give it flavour, since they themselves are not forbidden by their nature. If the forbidden wine has altered the flavor of the food, it need not be sixty times as much.

134:13 – All beverages belonging to a pagan, which he or she is in the habit of mixing with wine and vinegar, are forbidden.

Isserles: This only applies if the wine or vinegar improves the drink, or at least does not alter it. But if a liquid used in painting or ink, belonging to a pagan and containing wine or vinegar, falls into a foodstuff, the latter is permitted, as its flavour is altered. It is customary to use food into which vinegar belonging to a pagan has fallen, because this liquid generally alters the flavor.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

135 Vessels that may become forbidden for having been used for wine destined for idols

135:1 – When forbidden wine has been poured into vessels made of skin, wood, crystal, stone or iron, which have not been coated with pitch and have been used either by a pagan or an Israelite, but in which the wine never remains for long, it is sufficient to wash these vessels so that they can be used. But if the pitch-coated vases have contained wine destined for idols, and if in addition they have already done a lot of use, the pitch must be scraped off and the vases thoroughly washed. If you can't scrape off the pitch, you can fill them with water for three days, taking care to change the water every day. The same law applies to a vase touched by a pagan when the wine is poured.

Isserles: According to some authors, moderation is required in the event of a fait accompli, and especially when the loss is likely to be substantial, as in the following case: a pagan has touched a wooden, iron or stone vase when the liquid was being poured out, and then, through negligence, another wine has been poured into the same vase; even though the vases are coated with pitch, it is sufficient that they have been thoroughly washed.

135:2 – When a vase with perforated walls has its holes sealed with pitch, it is not considered to be coated with pitch if it has been used for forbidden wine; the same applies to a bucket whose rim is also coated with pitch.

135:3 – If forbidden wine has been poured into a vase coated with wax, the vase is not considered as if it were coated with pitch, because wax does not absorb any liquid.

135:4 – An earthen vessel, which has been used by a pagan and which has not absorbed a large quantity of forbidden wine, must be filled with water and changed three times; it is then permitted, even if it is not coated with pitch. If, after the water has been changed three times and the vase has been washed, a pagan arrives and touches the vase containing wine, it is sufficient in this case to rinse the vase. But if the same thing happens and the water has only been changed twice, some authors claim that the vase must be refilled with water and changed three times. When the vase has remained filled with water for a quarter of a day, it is assumed that the effect is the same as if the water had been changed three times. When the vase is coated with pitch, this substance must be scraped off, the vase filled with water and changed three times.

Gloss: In the event of a fait accompli, the vase is considered as if it were made of stone or wood.

135:5 – When a plaster vase has contained wine intended for idols, it is forbidden for ever, because it has absorbed a large quantity of the liquid and it is impossible, whatever is done, to make it suitable for use again.

135:6 – An earthen vessel, coated with clay, which has a greenish appearance indicating that this substance has not yet bonded with the earth, is considered a plaster vessel. When the clay is uniformly white or black and without cracks, the vessel is considered an iron vessel; if the coating shows cracks, the vessel is considered an earthen vessel not coated with a layer of wax.

Isserles: This refers only to the earthen vessel, which need only be washed when the forbidden wine has been poured into it cold; but when the wine is hot, the vessel is forbidden forever. As for metal vessels into which hot wine has been poured, they need only be rinsed.

135:7 – When you have bought wine vessels from a Gentile, either because they have not been used for a long time or because the Gentile has only poured wine into them once, they must be soaked in water; this simple condition is also sufficient for pitch-coated vessels.

135:8 – One author states that the laws concerning wine vessels should not be applied too strictly, with the exception, however, of those concerning earthen utensils. Others, on the contrary, claim that the same strictness should be applied to vessels made of wood, skin, stone or iron as to those made of earth. This is the generally accepted practice, but all agree that the same severity does not extend to glass utensils.

135:9 – wineskins are not considered to be vessels designed to contain wine continuously, because they are generally only used to transport the liquid from the press to the barrel; the same does not apply to the shepherd's wineskin, which contains wine constantly. A cup is also not considered a vessel intended to contain wine continuously, because it is only poured into it when it is to be drunk.

Gloss: When forbidden wine has been left in a vessel for three days, it must be soaked in water for three days before it can be used.

135:10 – When a wineskin has contained forbidden wine, to make it fit for use again, fill it with water and put a skin over its opening so that the water rises to the top, and leave it for three days. Alternatively, you can fill it with water, plunge it, opening downwards, into another vase full of water and leave it there for the same number of days.

135:11 – Whenever it is prescribed to fill a forbidden vessel with water in order to make it fit for use again, it is also prescribed to wash it three times.

Gloss: But the vessel must be rinsed with water and not with wine, even if the intention is to throw the wine away; however, in the event of a fait accompli, leniency must be shown.

135:12 – Whenever it is necessary to fill a vase with water in order to make it permissible again, the height of the liquid must reach the extreme edge and the water must be left in the vase for twenty-four hours; it is then changed, the new water is left for the same length of time and the process is continued three times. The water used is permitted.

Gloss: Some authors claim that this water is forbidden. The vase is permitted, even if the operation is not carried out over three consecutive days. But when the same water has remained in the vase for several days in a row, this prolonged stay still only constitutes one third of the operation. When the water has been changed before twenty-four hours, the day does not count. When one third of the salt water has been dissolved in the vase, one day is sufficient.

135:13 – For a vase which has contained forbidden wine for some time, and which has only absorbed liquid in the part of the wall which needs to be removed, it is sufficient to scrape it with some kind of instrument to make it fit for use again.

Gloss: For a vase coated with pitch, this substance must be completely removed, as well as a certain thickness of the vase wall.

135:14 – If the outside of an earthenware vase that has contained wine intended for idols has been heated in a furnace in such a way that the heat inside cannot be strong enough to separate the pitch from the walls of the vase, which continues to adhere only weakly, the vase is permitted. If it has been heated inside, the vase must again be made fit for use; the heat must then be strong enough to make it impossible to touch the outside, otherwise the vase is forbidden.

135:15 – Wooden, skin or earthen vessels that have contained wine belonging to a pagan are made fit for use again by rubbing them with boiling water taken from the vessel in which it was heated. The same applies to pitch-coated vessels in which forbidden wine has been left for a long time.

Isserles: Some authors authorize the use of a vase that has only been immersed in hot water. Alternatively, hot stones can be deliberately placed in the vase, hot water poured over them and the whole thing shaken; this operation has the same value as that ordered by article 15.

135:16 – If vases, after having been used for a pagan's wine, have remained empty for twelve months, they are permitted, because it is certain that all the material absorbed has evaporated; likewise, the water that would have remained in these vases during the twelve months, does not count.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

136 – A vessel intended to contain wine and sent through a pagan must be sealed.

136:1 – When a vase destined to contain wine is sent through a pagan, it must be sealed, lest the pagan himself introduce any wine into it; one author claims that two superimposed seals are necessary.

Isserles: When an unsealed vessel intended for wine has been brought by a pagan, it must be made fit for use according to the prescriptions of the law before being used. But if the Israelite has used the vessel without fulfilling the formalities prescribed by the law, the wine is permitted as a fait accompli. It is permissible to leave large barrels under repair in a pagan's home for one or two days, because one is not accustomed to using this size for a short time.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

137 – Permitted wine poured into a vessel that has not been made fit for use

137:1 – Permitted wine poured into a vessel that has not been made fit for use

When permitted wine has been poured into a vase that has contained wine intended for idols, and that has not yet been washed, it is forbidden to drink the previously permitted wine, but one may benefit from it, even if this wine has been poured into a dry vase that has not remained twelve months without use.

Isserles: When wine has been poured into a vessel that has long been used by a pagan, that wine is forbidden. But when permitted wine has been poured into a vessel which the pagan has not used much, that wine is permitted, if it has not remained twenty-four hours in that vessel. When the water contained in a jug has fallen into a forbidden vase, into which you have then poured permitted wine, you may drink this mixture, if the water represents a volume six times greater than that of the material that would be obtained by scraping the pagan's vase.

137:2 – When an Israelite has pressed his grapes in a press that belongs to a pagan and has not been cleaned, the wine that comes out is permitted, because the seeds and skins of the grapes represent a quantity sixty times greater than that which would be obtained by scraping the press. However, the Israelite must not allow the juice from his grapes to flow through the same channel used for the pagan's wine.

Isserles: In the event of a fait accompli, wine is permitted.

137:3 – If, after pouring permitted wine into jugs belonging to a pagan, another wine is added, it is permissible even to drink the mixture, on condition that the second liquid has a volume sixty times greater than that of the first. If the second contains a volume of water six times greater than that of the materials that would be obtained by scraping the forbidden vase, the mixture is permitted, even if the first wine contains no water.

137:4 – Vessels that have contained a pagan's wine may be used to hold water, beer or other beverages, once they have been simply washed; they may even be used to salt food.

137:5 – When you have poured permitted wine into a vessel belonging to a pagan, it is forbidden to add another wine until the vessel has been cleaned.

137:6 – A pagan who tells us he saw a vase being cleaned after pouring wine destined for idols is not to be trusted, even if he is unaware of the importance of what he is saying.

Gloss: V. § 122, how to act.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

138 – Cleaning vessels that have contained wine destined for idols

138:1 – If grapes have been pressed in a stone press coated with pitch by a pagan or by an Israelite, and if a pagan has touched the press while the grape juice was coming out, the press must be dried before it can be used again. If the pagan made his wine in the press while he was smearing it with pitch, you must dry the apparatus after scraping it; you can even clean it without scraping it, or not use it for twelve months. But when wine has been put into a wooden press coated with pitch by a pagan, before he has used the device, or when he has pressed the grapes while coating the press with pitch, or when an Israelite has coated the press with pitch and a pagan has touched it when the wine is poured out, the device must be scraped and dried, or cleaned without scraping. If there is oakum or rags between the planks of the press, it must be cleaned twice; the same procedure applies to earthen presses. Only pitch-coated presses are mentioned here, but if the press has not been coated with pitch, and a pagan has used it, it must be dried.

Gloss: When the press is made of earth, it must be cleaned if the pagan pressed his grapes first. When the pagan used it first, it must be dried. Finally, for a press made of wood or stone, washing is sufficient when the Israelite used it first; but if the apparatus is made of earth, it must be dried.

138:2 – A press made of brick, lime or kaolin is treated as if it were made of clay.

138:3 – Instead of drying presses and vases, it is permissible to clean them with hot water poured directly from the utensil where it was boiled, into the vases you wish to make fit for use.

138:4 – The same law applies to large presses and anything else made to hold wine.

138:5 – Washing is enough to make the beam used to press the grapes and the boards used to cover the press permissible.

138:6 – When a press is surrounded by date branches, as with a net, it should be dried; but if it is surrounded by wicker, it should not be used for twelve months, as wicker absorbs a greater quantity of liquid. If you want to use it immediately, clean it with hot water; you can also put it in water soaked with olives, or even in an aqueduct or fountain with fast-flowing water.

138:7 – When you have a pagan's filter at your disposal, you must wash it if it's made of horsehair, dry it if it's made of wool, and not use it for twelve months if it's made of linen.

138:8 – In order to use a pagan's wicker filter, it is sufficient to wash it if it is sewn with strings; if it is solidly made, it must be dried; finally, if it is sewn with linen, it must not be used for twelve months.

Isserles: If wine belonging to a pagan falls on a filter such as those made today, it is sufficient to wash it, even if the wine was hot.

138:9 – All filters that only need to be washed need to have their knots loosened, but those that need to be dried or not used for twelve months do not require this precaution.

138:10 – When you want to dry a press or any other vessel used for making forbidden wine and make it suitable for use, if the press is still wet, rub it with ash, then wash it with plenty of water and repeat this operation twice; if the press is dry, wash it with plenty of water, then rub it with ash and repeat this operation twice.

138:11 – When an Israelite wants to make fit for use a press that a pagan has used, he must clean the apparatus thoroughly; but there's no need to look for seeds that may have remained in the corners.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

139 – Idols, the prohibition of their worship and accessories for idol worship

139:1 – The idol, the objects used for its worship, its embellishment and its burnt offerings are forbidden, whether they belong to a pagan or an Israelite. However, objects belonging to the latter are only forbidden from the moment they are used, while objects belonging to the pagan are forbidden even if they have not yet been used for idol worship. On the contrary, the use of sacrificial objects is forbidden as soon as they have been placed before the idol with the intention of being used in the ceremonies of worship.

Gloss: When a pagan prostrates himself before a stone placed in a place by an Israelite, that stone is forbidden.

139:2 – It is forbidden to profit from objects made by a Jew and used for idolatrous worship, even if these objects have been mixed with other objects not serving the same purpose. But when the objects used for worship and its embellishment have been made by a pagan, it is permitted to profit from them when they are mixed in with other objects that cannot be used for pagan worship. Burnt offerings for idols are always forbidden, even when mixed with others not intended for the same purpose.

139:3 – How can we distinguish burnt offerings from objects intended to embellish worship? Anything that has not been offered as a sacrifice, such as candles, precious fabrics, etc., is classed as an embellishment; all foodstuffs offered as sacrifices on the altar, such as meat, oil, water and salt, are regarded as burnt offerings. However, substances not usually offered to idols remain permitted until the offering ceremony has been completed: as soon as it is over, these objects are forbidden.

139:4 – When a grasshopper has been killed for the idols, it is forbidden to take advantage of it, although it is not customary to offer these insects to them.

139:5 – If an object is found in a temple or outside its enclosure, which pagans are accustomed to offering to idols, it is forbidden to take advantage of it, as it was probably intended for idolatrous worship. If, however, the object is found outside the temple gates, it is forbidden if it was placed there to embellish the place; otherwise, it is permitted. If a stone used as an idol is found afterwards, it is forbidden in all cases.

139:6 – When a pagan is seen carrying an object to the idols, that object is permitted if its possessor has not entered the temple, because the offering has not yet become a burnt offering.

139:7 – When silverware, ornaments or other objects have been found on the head of an idol, they are forbidden if they were intended to adorn the statue; otherwise, they are permitted.

139:8 – The bread offered to the priests is permitted, because it is a fixed gift that is not intended for idols, but for their ministers.

139:9 – Wax candles lit before idols are forbidden, because they serve to embellish them; but if a pagan extinguishes them to give them back to an Israelite, they are permitted again, because the embellishment ceases as a result of the extinguishing of the candles and all trace of its existence disappears.

139:10 – Pieces of wax placed before idols are permitted, because they serve neither as embellishment nor as a burnt offering.

139:11 – The vestments that priests put on to officiate are permitted, because they are made to embellish themselves and not their idols. However, one author claims that in order to use these garments, they must first be stripped of their original form.

Gloss: But the garments with which idols are adorned are forbidden, because they serve to embellish them.

139:12 – An object used by a pagan for the worship of idolatry is permitted, provided its original form is removed; otherwise, it is forbidden. When a pagan has sold this object to an Israelite, it is not necessary to deform it. Other authors, on the contrary, claim that this formality is indispensable.

139:13 – It is forbidden to burn in the Synagogue candles that have been lit before idols; it is also forbidden to make sacred objects from the vestments that priests wear when officiating.

139:14 – It is forbidden for an Israelite to use for Holy Scripture a volume that has been used by an idolater, before he has completely erased any letters traced by the pagan's hand. One author maintains that the book is forbidden even after the disappearance of the letters traced by the pagan, because, according to him, one does not generally make use of an object that has remained in the hands of an enemy bent on one's ruin.

139:15 – One author says that it is permissible for an Israelite to sell any books on pagan doctrine that he may possess.

Isserles: According to some authors, it is forbidden to sell these books to idolaters. Others forbid placing them in the hands of pagan priests, but allow them to be sold among the people. Bless those who are stricter and do not resell these books!

[Shulchan Aruch:] One author forbids lending pagans money to build a temple dedicated to their gods, to buy clothes for their idols or other objects for their worship; the sale of objects used for idols is even more strictly forbidden. It is also forbidden to bind volumes belonging to pagans, with the exception of those relating to science or law. This prohibition does not apply, however, if it is likely to arouse hatred against the Israelite.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

140 – Pagan burnt offerings mixed with other objects

140:1 – When burnt offerings and idolatrous objects have been mixed with other objects, the whole is forbidden, even if the permitted objects outnumber the forbidden ones by a thousand to one. If, after mixing, one of these forbidden objects has been mixed with two other permitted objects, then if one of these three objects has been mixed with two new permitted objects, the latter three are permitted. In the same way, if an object from the first mixture falls into the sea or is completely burnt, one can take advantage of the rest, as long as one uses both objects at the same time, but not each of them separately, and gives the enjoyment to several people. Another author says that the first mixture is permitted, if two objects have fallen into the sea or been burnt.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

142 – On the prohibition of profiting from objects used in pagan worship

142:1 –Just as it is forbidden to profit from objects used for idolatrous worship, it is also forbidden to enjoy any profit derived from these objects; thus it is forbidden to use the coal and ashes from these objects, when they have been consumed by fire. It is permitted, however, to enjoy the flame.

142:2 – A knife used for idolatrous worship can be used to slaughter a healthy animal, because this is a destructive act.

Isserles: Such a knife can be used deliberately, if it is heated to white before use.

[Shulchan Aruch:] But it is forbidden to use such a knife for the slaughter of a sick animal in danger of death, because in this case it is a profitable act and it is forbidden to derive any benefit from objects used in the worship of idolatry. It is also forbidden to cut meat with this knife, because it is still a profitable act; but it is permitted to use it when the act is harmful.

142:3 – When an Israelite has taken a shuttle used for pagan worship, to weave a garment and if it has been mixed with other garments, among which it is impossible to distinguish, the sum representing the value of one of them must be thrown into the sea; then only those that remain are permitted.

142:4 – When an Israelite has taken wood intended for idols to heat his oven, he is forbidden to use the heat thus obtained. If, after burning this wood, he continued to heat with permitted wood without first allowing the oven to cool, he is forbidden to enjoy the bread he baked, because the heat of the forbidden wood contributed to the baking of the bread. If the forbidden loaves have been mixed with other loaves, the sum representing the value of the former must be thrown into the sea, and those remaining are then permitted. But if, after removing the fire from the oven, one has taken advantage of the heat acquired to bake a food item, it is permitted, since the prohibition against wood no longer exists.

Isserles: The above-mentioned prohibition applies only to a thing from which it is forbidden to take advantage, but not to a thing that must not be eaten; therefore, when a permitted food has been cooked alongside a forbidden food, it is not forbidden to eat the permitted food.

142:5 – If you have cooked dishes, bowls, pots or bowls in an oven heated with wood destined for idolatrous worship, you are forbidden to take advantage of these utensils.

142:6 – When bread has been baked on coals made from wood destined for pagan worship, the bread is permitted, because the defense against the wood no longer exists, even though the coals are still burning.

142:7 – When a dish has been cooked over a fire fueled by both forbidden and permitted wood, it is forbidden if, at the time it was put on the fire, the permitted wood had not yet been placed in the hearth, although this wood subsequently activated the cooking process; in this way, the food began to cook thanks to the heat of the forbidden wood and its use is therefore forbidden.

142:8 – Birds born in a nest placed in the middle of a wood consecrated to idols and able to raise themselves are permitted; but eggs found in a similar nest and young that cannot raise themselves are forbidden; the nest alone placed at the top of the same wood is permitted, because the birds use for its construction the wood they bring from another place.

Gloss: You don't have to climb trees to find birds; you only have to shake them to make them fall to the ground.

142:9 – It is forbidden to sit in the shade of a tree considered an idol, either because pagans have already worshipped under it, or because they have placed an idol under it; it is also forbidden to pass near it when you can take another path.

Gloss: It is only forbidden to cross it, but it is permitted to pass over the shadow cast by these trees.

142:10 – It is forbidden to pass within four cubits of a temple dedicated to idols, but it is permitted to pass behind such a temple. If the temple has been built on a road, the prohibition of which would cause the people to lose a great deal of time, it is permitted to pass along that road; but if the road has been made for the purpose of serving the temple, it is forbidden to pass along it. Some authors claim that the defense is applicable in all cases.

142:11 – It is permissible to grow vegetables under the trees of a grove, even when the shade of these trees is forbidden, for the following reason: forbidden shade and permitted earth make vegetables grow together, we are in the presence of two elements, one forbidden, the other permitted, both of which encourage growth; the products resulting from their joint action are permitted. This is why it is permissible to sow fields that have been manured with manure belonging to idolaters; it is also permissible to eat the flesh of a cow that has been fattened with barley belonging to idols and so on.

142:12 – It is forbidden to drink the beverage made from the fruit of a tree that the pagans have kept for the purpose of celebrating their festival, because it is certain that this tree is part of a grove dedicated to idols.

142:14 – When the statue of an idol has been placed in the pool of a bathing establishment, it is permissible to immerse oneself in the water it contains, because the statue has been placed there solely as an ornament and not for the purpose of worship; but if its destination for worship is certain, it is forbidden to bathe in the pool.

142:15 – It is forbidden to listen to music made in honor of idols, or to admire their beauty, if the ear or sight is charmed.

Gloss: This prohibition does not exist when one acts without intention.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

143 – On the prohibition of building a house near a temple dedicated to idols and on cases where it is permitted to profit from objects used in pagan worship

143:1 – When a house belonging to an Israelite and built near a temple dedicated to idols collapses, it is forbidden to rebuild it. If it is to be rebuilt, a greater distance must be left between the house and the temple, and the gap filled with thorns, so that the pagans cannot enlarge the temple. When the wall of a house belonging to an Israelite and adjoining a temple consecrated to idolatry collapses, the Israelite can profit from half the materials; but the other half belongs to the temple and is forbidden to him.

Gloss: If it's impossible to distinguish each person's share, it's forbidden to take advantage of all the materials. This is the opinion of the Tur. But the author of the Gloss declares that it is permissible for the Israelite to sell his share.

143:2 – It is forbidden for an Israelite to build a pedestal for an idol with a pagan; but if he has done the work, he is allowed to profit from the money he has earned. It is permissible to deliberately build a palace or castle to house the idol's pedestal.

143:3 – When a pagan owns an orchard or a bathing establishment, the income from which is given up to idolatrous priests, an Israelite may exploit it, if the price of the exploitation is given up to the priests only on an exceptional occasion; but if this abandonment is habitual, the Israelite is forbidden to exploit it, even if the price he pays is shared between priests and laymen. If the profits accrue not to the priests, but to the laity, the Israelite may enjoy the orchard and bathing establishment, even if he effectively obliges the pagan.

Isserles: According to some authors, and their opinion may be accepted, the prohibition of profiting from a bathhouse or orchard belonging to a pagan, when the revenues are abandoned to idolatrous priests, is only applicable in cases where religious ceremonies are celebrated on their site, otherwise one may profit from the advantages provided by their exploitation. However, when the bathing establishment or orchard is located near a temple, it is forbidden to exploit it, if the profits derived by the owner are destined for idols.

143:4 – It is forbidden to use pagan flutes at a funeral.

143:5 – It is forbidden to rent a store attached to a house belonging to the cult of idolatry.

Gloss: However, it is permissible to rent such a store, if the rental price goes to the city as tribute.

143:6 – When the guardian of a temple makes a collection for the idols, the Israelite is forbidden to give.

Gloss: This applies only to cases where the proceeds of the collection are intended exclusively for the idols. But if even a very small part is destined for the state or the city, the Israelite must give, even if the sum collected is destined to buy idols.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

144 – Money from the sale of idols

144:1 – When an Israelite has sold an idol, he is forbidden to profit from the sale price. But when this sale has been made by a pagan, it is permissible for an Israelite to accept this money, but only in the case where he is sure that the pagan has sold the idol in order to buy what he needs; But if the Israelite does not know for certain the purpose of the money, he is forbidden to accept it; he may, in fact, presume that the sale was made in order to buy other fetishes, and, as the money is in this case destined for idols, he is forbidden to profit from it.

144:2 – According to some authors, an Israelite who, possessing idols and wine intended for them, sells these objects on credit to a pagan who in turn sells them to another pagan before paying the first seller, can then accept payment of what is owed to him, but in the event of a fait accompli.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

145 – Objects used for idolatry that have been made by a pagan and from which it is permitted to profit

145:1 – It is permissible to profit from things that do not come from the hands of men and that are worshipped by pagans. Thus, it is permissible to profit from the products of a mountain dedicated to idols, from the stones extracted from it, even when these are transported from one place to another to serve the needs of pagan worship. The same applies to a spring, canal or pond belonging to several people. When a tree, which has not been planted for idol worship, is subsequently worshipped as a god, it is permissible to enjoy it, with the exception, however, of branches, fruit and trees that exist at the time it is worshipped.

145:2 – It is permitted to take advantage of things created by nature, which later serve as idols; but the embellishments made to them and the cloths with which they are covered are forbidden.

Gloss: Objects used to worship a mountain are considered to be embellishments and are therefore forbidden; as for burnt offerings made to it, they are permitted.

145:3 – A house built for the purpose of worship is forbidden, as is any dwelling built for another purpose, but before which pagans prostrate themselves. When a house has been restored and embellished in order to be transformed into an idol, it is forbidden to profit from it; but this house is permitted as soon as the restoration work and embellishments have been removed; the materials used for these are, however, forbidden. If an idol has been placed in any building, this is forbidden, but it is permitted as soon as the idol has been removed.

Isserles: This article refers only to the case where the house containing the idol has not been built specifically for this purpose; otherwise, the building is permitted only as long as the idol has been permanently removed.

145:4 – When a stone has been carved to make an idol, that stone is forbidden: but if any stone has been painted for the purpose of worship, it becomes permissible as soon as the paint and embellishments have been scraped off. Dust from scraping is forbidden.

Gloss: When a stone belonging to a pagan and scraped by him retains traces of the embellishments made to it, it is still permitted.

145:5 – The pedestal on which an idol is placed is forbidden for as long as it supports the false god, but is permitted as soon as the latter has been removed.

145:6 – When a tree has been planted for worship, it is forbidden; when it has been pruned into the shape of an idol that pagans worship in prostration, the entire pruned part is forbidden, the rest is permitted. When an idol has been placed under a tree, the tree is forbidden as long as it shelters the idol, and is permitted as soon as it has been removed, because it is not the tree itself that has been worshipped.

145:7 – A plot of land worshipped by pagans is permitted, but it's forbidden if you've dug cellars for idols.

145:8 – A deified animal is not forbidden, but if it has been sacrificed in honor of false gods, it is forbidden to enjoy it, even though it does not belong to the pagan who immolated it. When the animal has been killed by an Israelite who does not own it, it is not forbidden, because the Israelite committed his act with the intention of being disagreeable to his neighbor and not with the aim of offering a sacrifice. Some authors claim that the same is true when the Israelite owns only part of the animal; but if it has been immolated in honor of idols by a Jew converted to paganism, it is forbidden.

Gloss: Animal burnt offerings and the products that may be obtained from them are forbidden.

145:9 – Animals before which pagans prostrate themselves are permitted; but when a pagan in possession of such an animal exchanges it for an idol made by the hands of men, the animal is forbidden. On the contrary, when a pagan has exchanged an idol with another pagan for any object, and a third has in turn exchanged an animal for that object, the beast is permitted. However, some authors claim that such an exchange is forbidden.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

146 – Objects that are permitted after being deformed and those that are always forbidden

146:1 – An idol object deformed by a pagan is permitted; but it is forbidden if the deformation has been made by an Israelite, and all the more so when the object belongs to an Israelite. When an object used for idols belongs half to a pagan and half to an Israelite, the value of the part belonging to the Israelite must not be taken advantage of after deformation, but the value of the part belonging to the pagan is permitted.

146:2 – When an idol comes into the possession of an Israelite who accepts it, he is forbidden to take advantage of it, even after he has distorted it. This applies only to the idol itself, but if it is an object used in pagan worship or an embellishment, it is permitted if the pagan distorts it after offering it.

146:3 – When an Israelite has bought scrap metal from a pagan, he can refuse it if he finds an idol in it after paying for the merchandise before delivery; the same applies if he has received it without paying for it immediately, because the Israelite did not believe he had found an idol in his purchase. But if the scrap has been delivered and paid for, the Israelite no longer has the right to refuse it, and is obliged to throw it into the sea.

146:4 – When a father dies and leaves his property to his two sons, one of whom has converted to Judaism, if an idol is found in the inheritance, the convert can ask his brother to accept it and give him a sum of money representing the value of the idol in return; but if the convert has found the false god in his share after coming into possession of his legacy, he can no longer make an exchange and is obliged to throw away what is his.

146:5 – When a pagan has deformed an idol, it is permitted, even if it is not one of the false gods he worships, or if it belongs to another pagan; he must, however, know the nature of the object and the worship paid to it; but if the idol has been deformed by a child, or by a man deprived of reason, or by a pagan who does not believe in the teachings of paganism, it remains forbidden.

Gloss: Since Muslims do not honor idolatrous worship, if one of them deforms an idol, it remains forbidden.

146:6 – What is meant by the words “deforming an idol”? When a pagan tears off a leaf from a tree representing an idol, or cuts off one of its branches, the tree is said to be deformed, and is therefore permitted. The same applies when a pagan cuts off the branches that form trees. But when he prunes it with the intention of embellishing it, then the tree is not considered deformed and is forbidden; however, the cut branches are permitted, because they are not made false gods and are not worshipped.

146:7 – When a pagan has removed the tip of an ear, nose or finger from a statue representing an idol, or scratched the face without cutting anything, the statue is considered deformed, and is therefore permitted. But if the pagan has only scratched the body, without removing any other part, and even if he has been guilty of a contemptuous act towards the statue, the statue is still forbidden.

Isserles: If a pagan utters blasphemies against an idol, it is considered deformed; but if his curses have been dictated by compulsion, the idol remains forbidden, unless he has been guilty of the depredations set out in article 7.

146:8 – When a pagan has sold an idol to an Israelite smelter or pawned it to the latter, the idol is not considered deformed. Some authors claim that the idol is deformed, and therefore permissible, when sold to the Israelite caster.

Isserles: Objects used in pagan worship are considered deformed when sold or pawned.

146:9 – If a landslide from a ruin falls on an idol and it is not cleared away, the idol is not considered deformed. The same applies to an idol that has been stolen and not reclaimed.

146:10 – When pagans have abandoned their idol in time of peace, it is permitted; but the false god abandoned by pagans in time of war is forbidden, when they were unable to retrace their steps to seek it; but if it was possible for them to retrace their steps and they did not come, the idol is permitted.

146:11 – When an idol breaks, it is permissible to take advantage of the pieces, provided the worshippers feel no regret and no longer think of their false god; but if they do, the pieces are forbidden; for this reason, an Israelite must not use idols, as it is not known whether the pagan has entirely abandoned his false god. When the various parts that make up an idol, and which a simple person can assemble or disassemble, come apart, it is permissible to take advantage of the pieces, if one is sure that the pagans will see all the members of the false god separated without regret; likewise, when the various parts of the idol cannot easily be restored in place and one of its members is missing, the various pieces are permitted.

146:12 – It is forbidden to take advantage of a chipped altar belonging to a pagan until it is half broken. In the case of a sacrificial stone, it is permissible to profit from it even when it is only chipped, because it consists of a single stone, whereas the altar is formed by the assembly of several stones.

146:13 – When a pagan despises his idols, it goes without saying that he also despises the objects used to worship them, and consequently it is permitted to profit from them.

Gloss: If the objects used for pagan worship are found in the home of an Israelite, it is permissible to take advantage of them, when the pagan to whom they belong utters blasphemies against his false gods. But although it is permissible to take advantage of objects used in idolatrous worship, when a pagan shows contempt for the sight of them, it does not follow that idols are permissible; for the pagan may respect them, while showing disrespect for the accessories of worship.

146:14 – A good work is done when an idol is destroyed; in this case, it must be ground to powder and then thrown away, or if it cannot be ground to powder, it must be thrown into the sea.

Gloss: All objects used to worship false gods must be treated in the same way.

146:15 – We must try to destroy as many idols as possible, explaining their error to pagans, until they in turn despise the objects of their veneration.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

147 – On the prohibition of swearing by idols and pronouncing their names

147:1 – Whoever vows before a false god or swears in its name is liable to fustigation. It is also forbidden to pronounce the name of a false god, whether it seems necessary or not.

147:2 – You can pronounce the name of a pagan feast borrowed from that of a man, but you must not affect in pronouncing it a respect equal to that of the pagan.

147:3 – You must not excite a heathen, nor incite him to swear by the name of his gods.

147:4 – It is permissible to pronounce the names of the false gods mentioned in the Pentateuch.

147:5 – In front of an idolater, you can talk ironically about the powerlessness of idols.

Isserles: You could, for example, wish that the false gods would make their wishes come true.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

148 – Pagan festivals

148:1 – During the three days preceding a pagan festival, it is forbidden to sell or buy from idolaters anything that can be used for any length of time, but it is permitted to sell them, up to the day of the festival, things that cannot be kept for long, such as vegetables or similar substances. It is also forbidden, during these three days, to lend or borrow utensils or money, or to pay or claim the amount of subscribed obligations; but if the existence of the debt is not established in writing, the Israelite can accept the payment that the pagan owes him, and today Israelites like others can pay what they owe.

148:2 – When an Israelite has lent money to a pagan and when he has been repaid on a feast day, he is forbidden to profit from the sum he has received; but if the fact took place three days before the feast, he is permitted to use the money he has cashed.

148:3 – When the pagan feast lasts several days, we act as if the feast lasted only twenty-four hours, and trade is suspended for the entire feast and the three days preceding the first of the feast.

148:4 – Only in Palestine is trade suspended for three days, but in other countries it is only forbidden for the duration of the festival itself.

148:5 – It is forbidden for an Israelite to send a gift to a pagan on the day of a festival celebrated by pagans, unless it is known that the pagan does not believe in idols or worship them. The same applies when a pagan sends a gift to an Israelite; but if the latter fears the sender's enmity as a result of his offering, he must accept it and not use it.

148:6 – A festival is the day when pagans gather to elect a notable and offer sacrifices as a sign of rejoicing.

148:7 – When a practising pagan celebrates a feast at home in honour of an intimate memory, such as the anniversary of a birth, or a release from prison, or the happy return from a trip, it is forbidden to trade with him for that day only.

148:8 – We're talking here only about pagans who religiously celebrate the feasts of their cult, but if we're talking about pagans who don't believe and who celebrate a feast only for fun or because they fear the punishments their government might inflict on them, it's permissible to lend or borrow money from them on that day, as if we were dealing with an Israelite.

148:9 – On a feast day, it's forbidden to go and greet a pagan in his home; however, when you meet him in the street, you can extend this courtesy, but with reserve.

148:10 – On a pagan feast day, an Israelite is forbidden to repeat the customary word in response to a greeting. To avoid this inconvenience, the Israelite must be the first to greet the pagan he meets.

148:11 – When pagans come from afar to celebrate a feast, it is forbidden to do business with them while they are on the march; but it may be done as soon as they have arrived, on condition, however, that the idolaters do not form a troop, lest, being in large numbers, they think only of turning back. When pagans are on the march and an Israelite is among them, it is permissible to trade with him before the halt, but it is forbidden to do so while he is returning. If among the pagans there is an apostate Israelite, it is forbidden to do any business with him even before the halt.

148:12 – Some authors declare that the above laws were in force only during the period of paganism; but, as this cult no longer exists today, it is permitted to do business, lend or borrow money even during festivals celebrated by people belonging to other cults, and to act with them as with Israelites.

Isserles: It is permissible to give to collections made by priests of other cults, because they do not use for idols the money they receive, and, as nowadays Israelites and other citizens live in intimacy, an Israelite who arrives in a town where a feast is celebrated, must rejoice with the inhabitants and may send them gifts the day before and even on the day of the feast, if he has not been able to do so before.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

154 – A pagan midwife and an Israelite midwife

154:1 – It is forbidden to take a pagan midwife for an Israelite, who must remain alone with her, even if the midwife is highly skilled. A child must not be nursed by a pagan woman, even if Israelites come to her house. However, it is permissible to take in an idolatrous midwife or nurse, provided she stays with an Israelite family whose various members are always present or come and go in the house. Above all, it is forbidden to leave an Israelite woman alone with a pagan midwife at night.

154:2 – An Israelite woman must not nurse the child of a pagan, even if the pagan wants to pay for her care.

Gloss: If the Israelite woman has too much milk and suffers from it, she may nurse the child of an idolater.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

155 – Cases in which it is permissible to be treated by a pagan

155:1 – In the case of any serious injury or dangerous illness for which it is permissible to break the Sabbath rest period, it is forbidden to allow oneself to be treated by a pagan physician who is not reputed to be very skilful, because it is feared that he will be violent towards the patient.

Gloss: Those who undertake to bleed are generally skilled in this kind of operation.

[Shulchan Aruch:] When a patient is in danger of death and there is still some hope of his recovery, he should not be treated by an idolatrous doctor; but if the patient's death is inevitable, an idolatrous doctor may be called in, because there is no longer any fear on his part and we hope to prolong the life of the dying patient as long as possible. When a pagan doctor boasts of the effectiveness of a herb in curing a sick person, you may believe what he says, but you must not buy the plant from him.

Gloss: Some authors say that it is forbidden to be treated by an idolatrous doctor who does not charge a fee; but if he does charge a fee, it is permissible to accept his services, as he will treat his patients well so as not to lose his clientele. It is permissible to take on a doctor who, in order to heal his patients, pronounces magical words on the wound, on condition, however, that you do not know whether he is talking about his idols; when it is known that he pronounces their name, it is forbidden to accept his care, even for a dying person. When the physician is a converted Israelite, it is always forbidden to take him in, as he will surely speak of the idols.

155:2 – When an idolatrous doctor tells an Israelite that, in order to heal, he must drink idol-worshipped water or take essence from a tree to which pagans worship, the Israelite is forbidden to use the prescribed medicine. But if the doctor orders water or essence without pronouncing the name of the idol, the patient may use the remedy, even if it is taken from something worshipped as an idol, because the pagan does not believe the false god capable of effecting healing. Some authors forbid the medicine prescribed by the doctor if he does not say that it comes from the idol.

155:3 – It is permissible to make a dangerously ill man take forbidden medicines, even when they have a pleasant taste that pleases the patient. This permission is not granted to a mildly ill person; however, when the remedy has an unpleasant taste it may be taken. Finally, the mixture of milk and meat, and of two kinds of wine, is permitted only for serious illnesses.

Isserles: For a patient who is not even dangerously ill, the rabbinical prohibitions may be infringed, when the prescriptions are made by a skilled physician; thus it is permitted to give wine or wine vapor baths belonging to a pagan, without however making him drink the liquid; it is also permitted to prepare a forbidden animal to cure a patient who is not even dangerously ill; but it is strictly forbidden to use anything that comes from a tree worshipped as an idol. What has been said above need not be taken into account in cases where no other permitted medicines are available; but when others can be obtained, even if obliged to wait, the former are forbidden.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

156 – When you can have your hair cut by a pagan

156:1 When you can have your hair cut by a pagan

A Gentile may only have his hair cut in a place frequented by Israelites, or when the barber is in the home of a prominent Jew.

Isserles: Some authors are more severe; when this operation is performed with a razor, even when the Israelite is in a place frequented by his co-religionists, they allow it only in the case where the Israelite always looks in a mirror; but it is customary to admit the first opinion.

156:2 – It is forbidden for a man to look at himself in a mirror, except in the case of seeing an evil, or when he is shaving his own hair, or when this operation is performed at a pagan barber's whose establishment is not very frequented, or when he is about to appear before a notable.

Isserles: Some authors claim that this prohibition should be observed only in places where women alone are accustomed to using a mirror; but in places where this custom extends to men as well, the Israelite may make use of it. Moreover, he is always allowed to look at himself in a mirror to see if there are any stains on his clothes.

156:3 – When an Israelite cuts a pagan's hair, he must come close to the parietal bones, passing his instrument lightly over the width of three fingers on each side. An Israelite is forbidden to have the middle of his head shaved, as pagan priests do.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

160 – On the formal prohibition of lending at interest and the need to distance oneself from this practice

160:1 – Lending at interest must be avoided, and many negative precepts flow from it. These negative precepts apply to lenders, borrowers, guarantors and witnesses.

Isserles: It makes no difference whether you lend to the rich or the poor. However, if the interest on the money is minimal, the borrower is free of all these negative precepts, but falls under the law of “Put no stone in the path of the blind.” (Lev. XIX, 14).

160:2 – The person who lends his money at interest is considered immoral: his goods and money will diminish and not benefit him; moreover, he is looked upon as if he had denied God and Moses' deliverance of the Israelites.

160:3 – When an Israelite, with money of his own, claims to hold the money of a pagan, and lends at interest to the other Israelites, for this imaginary character, then the Israelites, unable to intervene directly, since they cannot be sure of the fact, rely on heavenly vengeance.

160:4 – When the borrower, on returning the money, gives his creditor a sum greater than that which was lent to him, without it being by way of interest, and without saying anything about it to the lender, the latter is forbidden to accept.

Gloss: When an individual gives money to another, not to earn interest, but to trade, it is permissible for that individual to accept a profit from his partner.

160:5 – When a debtor, in paying his creditor, gives him a sum greater than that which was lent to him, as a gift, it is forbidden to accept; but if the lender accepts the surplus, saying that he will return it in some time, he must apologize, in handing over this sum, for not having given it immediately, so as not to violate the negative precept forbidding larceny.

Gloss: It is forbidden to accept a gift for a sum lent, even if the gift is returned.

160:6 – It is forbidden to accept interest either before or after lending a sum of money. So when one person gives a gift to another, and then borrows money from him, it is said to be interest given before the loan; when, on returning the money, the borrower, as compensation, gives a gift to his creditor, it is said to be interest provided after the loan. Both methods are forbidden, and when they are used, it is considered indirect interest.

160:7 – The creditor must never allow himself to take advantage of his debtor for the slightest thing without the latter's knowledge, even if he was already doing so before the other borrowed from him. But if the lender has a service to ask of his obligor, he may do so, if the debtor would have rendered this service before owing anything, and if it concerns something absolutely personal.

160:8 – It is forbidden to lend money at interest to one's children or to a member of one's family, even if they used to give gifts to the lender; from the moment one becomes a creditor, one must accept nothing more.

160:9 – It is always forbidden to do a work with the condition that the beneficiary will do another more difficult one in exchange. Similarly, one must not render a service on condition that a similar service will be rendered, but at a more difficult time. Thus, a farmer is forbidden to sort his neighbor's herbs on condition that his neighbor will help him cut his plants, even though the latter work is no more arduous than the former, because the cutting is done at a time when the season is pressing.

Isserles: Some say that it is forbidden to lend money without interest with the condition that the debtor, his debt discharged, will in turn lend a similar sum to his creditor (although this is permitted for work), because, in the case of money, this clause seems to involve a reward equivalent to interest on the sum lent. Others allow it, on condition that the ex-creditor will not retain the ex-debtor's money any longer than the latter retained his own. V. § 177.

160:10 – The debtor must not give lessons to his creditor, or his creditor's son, if he has not already done so.

160:11 – When the borrower was not in the habit of greeting his creditor first, he must not do so after incurring his debt.

160:12 – The creditor must not ask his debtor to tell him when such and such a person will arrive from such and such a place.

Isserles: It is forbidden for the lender to derive from his position the slightest advantage, even in words, vis-à-vis his borrower, as will be explained at the end of this paragraph. When a man lends a sum of money for a certain period of time to a lady he wishes to marry, it is forbidden for him to tell her to keep the loaned sum for a longer period of time.

160:13 – A man may give another a zouz so that the latter lends ten dinars to a third, provided that the first does not claim his zouz from the borrower; but it is forbidden for the borrower to say to the lender: such and such a person will give you a zouz so that you will lend me ten dinars. Some say that it is also forbidden for the borrower to ask a person to give a zouz in order to be lent ten dinars.

160:14 – It is forbidden to lend 100 zouz on condition that the debtor gives one zouz to another person, even if it is for alms or to some pagan unknown to the lender, because this is a kind of disguised interest.

Gloss: The case in which the lender pays the money on the condition indicated in article 13, and the case in which it is the debtor himself who wants to undertake to do so, are considered to be similar.

160:15 – Some say that it is forbidden for one person to tell another that he will lend him 100 dinars on condition that the latter goes and asks a third person for four.

160:16 – It is permissible to give a zuz to one person to go and beg another to lend you money; it is even permissible to use the son of the future creditor as an intermediary, provided he is of age, and not under the dependence of his parents.

Isserles: Some say that the lender should not accept the intermediary's zuz, because it would then be a kind of interest. Others declare that it is permissible for an Israelite to use a co-religionist as an intermediary, in order to obtain a loan, the interest on which would be paid to the intermediary who would pass it on to the lender; the intermediary does not fall under the negative precept concerning interest, since he is neither lender nor borrower; furthermore, it could be argued that the intermediary who represents the debtor, pays the interest and gives the debtor the sum borrowed, could be regarded as the borrower on the basis of the principle that “the user of a person is regarded as that person himself”. But no, we apply the rule: “when a man performs a forbidden action because he has been incited to do so, it is he who is at fault, and not the inspirer of the action, for he should have refused to act”; yet we must not use ignoramuses who cannot understand this nuance. There are many people who, being more severe, defend these business relationships. When one finds oneself in a bad situation, one can refer to the first opinion. It is forbidden for the borrower to collect the money himself from the lender, after the intermediary has paid the interest. It is forbidden for the intermediary to make a bill with the borrower in the name of the creditor, even when the creditor does not know it, because then the intermediary would be considered the creditor.

160:17 – When an Israelite scholar has borrowed food from another scholar and returned it to him with an increase, up to a fifth, this increase is permitted, because it is considered a gift and not interest.

Isserles: Some say that if it was agreed in advance between the two scholars that the borrower would return a little more, this is permissible, when only trivia is involved; yet they should not make a habit of such conditions, so as not to set a bad example for the ignorant.

160:18 – When it comes to money belonging to orphans, or intended for charity, the establishment of religious schools or the building of synagogues, it is permissible, despite the prohibition of traditional laws, to lend it against indirect interest.

Isserles: In the case of this money, it is customary to be lenient on the question of accepting interest, although others, being stricter, allow only judges to set the interest to be taken (for money belonging to orphans). In places where a guardian is appointed for orphans, he must not lend their money at interest, as this practice is open to criticism; but when he has done so, see Penal Code, § 34, if he is brought into disrepute. If traditional laws allow interest to be taken for an orphan, it is for a minor orphan, unable to support himself. If a borrower, when paying the sum he owes to an orphan, claims to have paid him interest and wants to deduct this interest from the sum he brings in, and if the orphan claims to have received nothing, the orphan will be taken at his word without having taken an oath.

160:19 – When a guardian has lent the assets of orphans at interest, if the borrower makes a profit equal to the stipulated interest, he must pay this profit.

160:20 – When a guardian has lent the assets of orphans in his care at interest, in order to bring up these orphans, the latter are not obliged, once they have reached the age of majority, to return the interest received by their tutor.

Isserles: Nor is the guardian obliged to return the interest referred to above. The same rule applies to money lent for charity or any other good work; but the lender, in order to be able to take interest, is obliged to have witnesses attesting that the money he lends belongs to philanthropic works. See § 169 whether it is permissible for a guardian to borrow money from a pagan for orphans.

160:21 – Borrowing 100 peroutahs with the condition of returning 120 (for example: if the price of a daneka is 100 peroutahs at the time of borrowing and must be 120 at the time of maturity), is an operation forbidden by biblical law. When the creditor lends and tells the debtor to return the same amount without worrying about the price, then if the value of the daneka, for example, has risen from 100 peroutahs to 120, traditional law requires the debtor to return only 100 peroutahs.

160:22 – It is permissible to borrow at interest when, being excessively hindered, one cannot do otherwise.

Isserles: See §§ 169 and 173. It is forbidden for a community to borrow at interest for its needs, even if the interest is not direct, and it is all the more forbidden for it to undertake to pay direct interest. It is forbidden to take the example of certain communities that lend and borrow at interest, in order to have the money they may need, as there is no law to support such actions; unless the notables declare that the community cannot subsist without it, or else that it needs funds for good works, and in case of compelling necessity, as will be explained in § 172.

160:23 – It is forbidden for a craftsman to lend money to a private individual, under the condition that the private individual will reserve for him all the work he has to have done.

Isserles: Since any profit is considered to be money, it is not surprising that the promise to commission work in return for the loan, should be regarded as interest promised in advance; moreover, if the borrower was not in the habit of making his creditor work, he must not do so either when he owes him money. When two men, before becoming creditor and debtor, were in the habit of doing each other favors, they can continue to do so after one of them has become debtor of the other.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

161 – Indirect and direct interest

161:1 – It is forbidden to borrow anything on the condition that more will be returned; even if this increase does not reach a perutah, it is forbidden to accept this interest; but if the debtor has paid, judges do not have to intervene to have this trifle returned.

Isserles: In general, anything paid for the time a sum is kept is interest; but a distinction must be made between commercial loans, whose interest is said to be indirect, a traditional prohibition, and loans made from one individual to another, whose rate is the interest itself, a biblical prohibition.

161:2 – When the lender has accepted an indirect interest, he cannot be made to return it by legal means: but if he wishes to be more conscientious, he must return it to his debtor.

Gloss: When a debtor has given a gift to his creditor, before or after the loan, the creditor, while conscientious, is not obliged to return it.

161:3 – When a borrower, having paid indirect interest, tries to take the value of that interest by borrowing it, he can be made to return it by legal action.

161:4 – When it is said that justice does not have the right to make the lender return the indirect interest he has already received, this refers only to the case where the creditor, with his debtor's authorization, has used up the interest received, and no longer possesses it; but when debtor begs the creditor not to waste the indirect interest, which the creditor has obtained thanks to a judicial, to have the interest he had paid returned.

161:5 – The actual interest forbidden by biblical law is that agreed between lender and borrower at the time of borrowing. Justice must use all possible means to force the creditor to repay this interest, but it cannot attack his property. Similarly, when the creditor lends to the debtor on condition that he does not pay rent, or that he does not pay the rent in full, the courts must force the lender to repay the rent.

161:6 – When a creditor, having accepted an interest, dies, his children are not obliged to return this interest, unless it is a well-characterized object, for example a cow or a garment when the repentant creditor would have wanted to return these goods, and his death has prevented restitution.

Gloss: It is probably assumed that it is not certain whether the money or object in question is a conditional interest, which is absolutely forbidden outside the case of orphans.

161:7 – When a creditor repents of having lent at interest, and wants to return what he has taken, then: if it is a well-characterized object, it may be accepted; but if the creditor was trading in the loan at interest, nothing must be taken back from him, so that he may always feel remorse; he who accepts from him the return of this interest shows baseness.

161:8 – When a creditor claims one dinar of interest from his debtor and the latter gives him instead five measures of wheat, four measures of which are worth one dinar, then if the lender wants to return the interest, he must give back five measures of wheat, or one and a quarter dinar, the value of the five measures of wheat.

161:9 – When a creditor claims a dinar of interest from his debtor, and the debtor gives a garment or some object instead, then: if the lender wants to return the interest, he must give back the garment or object, not money.

Gloss: Because they are well-characterized objects.

161:10 – When, for one dinar of interest, the lender rents to his debtor an object whose real value is only half a dinar, the creditor must still return one dinar.

161:11 – When a bill is handed over, with the face value and the interest, direct or indirect, written on it, the courts will only require the debtor to pay back the amount of the bill, without taking into account the interest, whatever it may be. But if the bill does not mention the value of the sum lent, and that of the interest, the judges do not claim anything from the debtor, and the bill has no value (see Penal Code, § 52).

Isserles: Justice knows the value of the sum lent, either because the bill mentions: “so much for the value of the money lent and so much for the interest”, or because the bill mentions only the sum due and there are witnesses to indicate the interest; and it is according to these indications that the debtor is made to return only the money received by him.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

162 – It is forbidden to lend a seah of wheat on condition that the same measure of wheat will be returned by the debtor to the creditor

162:1 –It is forbidden to lend a seah of wheat on condition that the borrower will return the same measure; the prohibition exists even if no condition has been made between the interested parties and if they have not fixed the day on which the loan will be returned. Because the value of the wheat is likely to change and become greater, the creditor would have an interest, so to speak, when his debt was paid. This loan is permitted only on condition that the debtor returns to the lender a sum equivalent to the price of the wheat at the time he borrowed it, if the value of the wheat has increased; if, on the contrary, this value has decreased, the borrower must return a measure of wheat, not a cash value. It is permitted to lend money whose price is not likely to change.

Isserles: One author says that it is also permissible to lend a gold coin, on condition that the same value will be returned by the debtor, because the value of gold nowadays is no more likely to change than that of silver. You can also lend a loaf of bread on condition that it will be returned, without worrying about whether the loaf will increase or decrease in value, the total value of the loaf being a trifle.

162:2 – A man in possession of a certain kind of grain, and unable to find the key to his barn, can borrow a measure of the same grain from another, since he has the power to return similar grain to him. When a person does not possess a particular kind of wheat and wants to have some, he can borrow a small quantity from another, then, having thus become possessor of that kind, he can borrow as much as he wants from the second person.

Isserles: When the borrower possesses a species of grain which he holds in any place, he is considered as if he had it in his home; but if he is owed this species of grain, he is not considered to be the possessor of this species until it is returned to him. The same idea is recounted in the Talmud, tractate Baba Metsia. The same law applies when the borrower has his grain in a place where the lender cannot go. When the borrower has a little grain of the same kind, he can declare it, without witnesses, to the lender, so that the latter may lend him some. This only applies to cases where there has been no commitment between the lender and the borrower concerning payment for the grain. But when the creditor wishes to agree with his debtor that the latter will return his loan in kind, if the value of the merchandise increases, and in cash according to the current value, if the value of the merchandise decreases, this is forbidden, because there is speculation tending to benefit the creditor.

162:3 – When the market price of a certain wheat is constant, not subject to change, and is known to both parties, one can lend a measure to the other on condition that the latter will return it.

Isserles: See § 175, what we call constant price. What we have said (that wheat may be lent when its value is not liable to change) is on condition that the borrower will be able to pay the lender when the latter wishes; but if it has been concluded that the debtor will repay when wheat rises, this is forbidden.

162:4 – It is permissible for a landowner to lend his gardener a seah of seed, either before or after the gardener has worked on his land, on condition that it is returned. This refers only to places where the gardener himself supplies the seed; but if the owner supplies it, he is forbidden to lend the seed as soon as the gardener has begun his work.

Gloss: It is understood that this refers to gardeners who receive a third or half of the produce from sowing.

162:5 – When, in lending two seahs of wheat, the creditor makes a bill without recording on it the price the wheat had at market, nor that his debtor possessed similar grain, then: if the latter swears that the price of the grain was not constant, and that he does not possess grain of the same kind, he must pay the lender the cash amount of the two seahs, taking into account only the value they had at the time of the loan.

Gloss: The lender has no right to defend his case by saying that he has placed part of his wheat with another person, as belonging to the borrower, without the borrower's knowledge.

[Shulchan Aruch:] When a person has borrowed wheat from another in a certain town, and reclaims it from him in another town, where the grain costs more, the debtor must only return a value equivalent to the price the wheat had in the place where it was lent.

Isserles: It is permissible to borrow a seah of wheat on condition of returning a seah of wheat, if the borrower has a little wheat at home; but it is forbidden to borrow a seah of wheat on condition of returning a seah of semolina, even if the two commodities have the same price.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

163 – Wheat given at the current price in payment of a debt

163:1 – Wheat given at the current price in payment of a debt

When a creditor demands his due from a debtor to buy wheat, and the latter tells the lender to inquire about the price of grain, as he is willing to be his debtor for an equivalent quantity of grain, then, if the borrower possesses the quantity of wheat necessary to pay his debt, it is permissible for him to so discharge even if the price has not been fixed; but if he does not have enough grain, it is forbidden.

Gloss: When the debtor, wishing to pay in grain, claims to possess the necessary quantity, he is believed without the aid of witnesses. V. § 162.

163:2 – When a lender claims a debt from a grain loan in order to buy wine, the borrower can ask him to find out the price of the wine, with a view to freeing himself by paying with this liquid; then, if the debtor has enough wine to repay his creditor, this is permitted, but if the borrower does not have enough, he cannot use this method of payment.

162:3 – A merchant comes to ask for a loan of one mine and the lender, not having that sum, gives instead for one mine of wheat, according to the value of the grain at the time of the loan; then he buys back from his debtor the same grains for only ninety dinars;

Gloss: As the grain is also worth a mine at the time of redemption,

[Shulchan Aruch:] the borrower must, at the time of maturity, pay in kind, i.e. with wheat, but he must not give a mine, which would seem to be a kind of interest for the creditor; however, if the lender, not heeding this prohibition, wants to be repaid in cash, he can be paid by legal means, as there is in this, in truth, neither direct nor indirect interest.

Isserles: Some say it's an indirect interest. But if the lender has agreed with his debtor that the latter will sell him his wheat for less, and then pay him his debt in cash, then this is formally forbidden, even if the debtor then wants to pay in grain, because there would be a direct interest.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

164 – Anyone who has a field as collateral for payment may not rent it out under a sharecropping contract.

164:1 – He who obtains a field as collateral for a debt may not rent it to its true owner. Another allows this, when the pledge contract has been made according to Assyrian custom.

Isserles: This refers only to the case where the creditor has set no conditions for the leasing of the field, and has taken possession of the land before leasing it; otherwise it is forbidden to lease it.

164:2 – When a field has been pledged according to Assyrian custom and a person has leased the land from the creditor, that person may in turn sublease it to the owner of the field.

164:3 – The seller of a field can agree with the buyer that the latter will rent it to him under a sharecropping contract.

Gloss: This means that the tenant of the field undertakes to cultivate it, and to give part of the produce to the owner, whether or not the field produces.

164:4 – If a person lends money on a field and says to his debtor: if you do not return the money in three years, the field belongs to me, and he does not say that these three years run from the moment the contract is made, he cannot benefit from the products of the field. If the creditor has fed off the produce of the field during the three years, this is regarded as interest, and the debtor can have the value of this produce returned to him by legal means.

Isserles: Some say that the products of the field during the fixed period of time are considered as indirect interest, as explained in § 172. However, the creditor is obliged to return what he would have taken beyond the three years.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

165 – From the creditor who lends money on condition that it will be repaid with the currency current at maturity

165:1 – When a creditor lends money on condition that it will be reimbursed with the currency current at maturity, if the weight of the precious metal has been increased in the alloy, and the price of the commodities has thereby fallen, the debtor must take this into account and pay only with these new coins a sum of value equal to the sum lent. If, on the other hand, the weight of the precious metal is increased in the alloy without any reduction in the price of foodstuffs, the debtor must not take this into account. This refers only to cases where the weight of the precious metal has been increased by a quarter; where it has been increased by more, the debtor must take this into account, even if the price of the foodstuffs has not fallen. The same applies if the weight of the precious metal has been reduced.

Isserles: See Penal Code, § 74, in which case a borrower may return to his creditor coins which the latter had lent him and which are no longer current. When the price of goods has decreased as a result of the issue of new money of the same weight, a debtor, committed as above, may pay exactly the amount due with the new coins. When it is not known whether the weight of the fine metal has changed, the coiner, even the payer, may be relied upon, provided he does not know the reason for the inquiry. When a royal or governmental edict prescribes that everyone must pay with the new currency, this edict must be obeyed without concern for anything else, according to the principle that “the law of the government is the law”.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

166 – The creditor must not claim the services of his debtor's servants, nor live in his yard.

166:1 – The creditor must not make his debtor's servant work, even when the servant has nothing to do. He is forbidden to stay free of charge in his debtor's home, or to rent him an apartment at a low price, even when the borrower does not rent to others, and consequently derives no profit from his home. If any person, staying free of charge in the house of an owner who does not rent, becomes the creditor of his host, he may continue to stay in that house as before, without paying rent, and is not liable to any reproach, even if the owner wants to rent but cannot find a tenant. Maimonides states that the creditor's presence in his debtor's home constitutes an indirect interest, even when the owner does not rent, and that the creditor must settle his rent if he wants to be in good standing with his conscience.

Gloss: According to all authors, houses for rent, inhabited by a creditor, constitute an indirect interest. (See Penal Code.)

166:2 – An owner makes a loan and allows his creditor to come and live in his house; then, if it is for rent, the fact that the creditor lives in it constitutes a direct interest; if it is not for rent, this fact is considered an indirect interest.

Isserles: This is only the case where the owner has made the proposal to his creditor unconditionally; but if he tells him: lend me money and, as a reward, you will live in my house, then, even if the property does not rent, there is a direct interest.

[Shulchan Aruch:] When the creditor wants to collect his money, and the debtor, not being able to pay, asks him to come and stay in his house, this is considered indirect interest by some, and direct interest by others. The author declares a direct interest to be the act of offering to stay in the house, as compensation for the extension of the debt.

Isserles: All profits attributed to the creditor by the debtor, without having been set as a condition, are open to discussion, and are considered direct or indirect interest, depending on the author.

166:3 – In the case of indirect interest, if the debtor asks for the interest to be deducted from his debt, but the loan has not yet been paid off, the lender cannot do so, according to some authors;

Isserles: The last opinion is the most serious. When a teacher instructs a child and becomes the creditor of the parents, it is forbidden to agree that the parents will provide for the teacher's needs (even if they had done so before the teacher became their creditor), to reward him for his care; this defense stems from the fact that it would be the same as if the creditor lived in the house of a debtor who never rented it. When a creditor has made a gift of money to his debtor, and the latter wishes to repay him, it is permissible for the donor to accept. It is permissible for a person, who has no money, to build a house and live in it until the first person reimburses him for the building costs. This is not called a loan, but a service rendered.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

167 – Loans made on condition that the creditor will share in the debtor's profits

167:1 – It is permissible to lend, for example, a mine, on condition that the creditor will have two-thirds of the profits from the business. As compensation for his work, the debtor will receive a certain sum. In addition, it is understood that the other income generated by the sum loaned will accrue to the debtor, and that in the event of loss, the creditor alone will bear the risks incurred by the capital committed.

Isserles: Conversely, in the event of a gain, the debtor first takes the profit for himself, and then works with the sum loaned, to the benefit of the creditor.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

168 – Interest from money negotiations with a pagan

168:1 – An Israelite who has borrowed money at interest from a pagan, and who is called on his debt, is forbidden to give the sum due to another Israelite, who will pay the interest to the pagan and become his debtor in the place of the first, even if the second Israelite writes a bill in which he declares that he owes the pagan the sum, and if he offers a pledge.

Gloss: If the Israelite accepts such a deal, he may be obliged to pay the Gentile the interest owed by the second debtor.

[Shulchan Aruch:] The same law applies to an Israelite who owes a pagan money and does not pay interest. It is also forbidden to operate in the following way: when an Israelite debtor and his co-religionist are in the home of the pagan creditor, the latter tells the debtor to give the amount of his debt to the second Israelite, who will pay the pagan the same sum with interest, and the first debtor will be released.

168:2 – It is permissible for a Gentile to collect a debt from an Israelite and then lend the same sum to another Israelite, with the latter passing on the interest to the creditor via the first debtor.

168:3 – When two Israelites are in the presence of a pagan, and the latter tells one of them, who is his debtor, to deposit the amount of his debt on the ground, and requests his companion to collect this money, it is permitted for the second Israelite to do so, and to pay interest to his creditor.

Isserles: Some say that it is permissible for the Israelite debtor, at the request of the pagan creditor, to give the amount of his debt to another Israelite who will then become the pagan's debtor. When an Israelite has no debt relationship with another Israelite who owes money to a pagan, and this pagan asks him to collect for him from the first Israelite, this second Israelite is considered a mere intermediary; he can hand over the money to his co-religionist, and receive the interest to give to the pagan.

168:4 – An Israelite is allowed to borrow money from a pagan, on condition that he pays the interest to a co-religionist.

168:5 – An Israelite is forbidden to accept interest on a sum he has lent to a pagan, if this sum has been lent again at interest by the debtor to another Israelite.

Isserles: We are dealing here only with the case where the pagan has lent to the second Israelite, thanks to the negotiations of his creditor, and according to the opinion of one author: that the work done by the pagan is equivalent to that of the Israelite at whose command he is acting. If we consider the opinion that the actions of the pagan are not confused with those of the Israelite, the prohibition will take place if the Israelite forces his debtor to pay him interest, knowing that this debtor will demand interest from the second Israelite to satisfy him, because then the interest is deemed to be direct interest. The Israelite creditor can accept the Gentile's interest according to either of these two opinions, if the Gentile has a pledge from his debtor, as he will not then force this debtor to pay an annuity, being insured for his money, as will be explained further on.

168:6 – If, after having lent a sum to a pagan for interest, the Israelite creditor claims the debt, and another Israelite comes to the debtor to ask for the money, promising to provide him with the interest he owes his creditor, the first Israelite may accept this interest. Similarly, the creditor is allowed to accept the interest if the second Israelite asks the Gentile for the money, telling him that he will pay it along with the annuity to his co-religionist, because this money is considered to have been given by the Gentile. When the Gentile hands over the amount of his debt to the second Israelite in the presence of the creditor, the latter is forbidden to accept interest, because it seems that the transaction was made possible thanks to the Israelite creditor.

Isserles: Some are easier, even if the remittance took place in the presence of the Israelite creditor. Basically, however, the first opinion should be adopted. However, in localities where it is customary to be easy, one may adopt the second.

168:7 – When an Israelite says to a pagan: “Go and borrow, in your name, from an Israelite, money at interest to give it to me”, he is going against the law; as for the lender, he is innocent since he did not know the ruse.

Gloss: Some people are very moderate and say that the pagan cannot be considered as an absolute substitute for the first Israelite. (See above.) However, moderation is only permitted in cases where it is customary to operate in this way.

168:8 – When an Israelite asks a Gentile to borrow money for him at interest from another Gentile, and the Gentile borrows the money from an Israelite, the transaction is permitted.

168:9 – When a pagan borrows money from an Israelite with a pledge and at interest, then: if, at the time of returning the pledge, an Israelite arrives declaring that the object belongs to him, the creditor need not believe him. What's more, the aforementioned Israelite cannot call witnesses to testify that the money given by the heathen came from an Israelite creditor, since the hypothesis can be accepted that the heathen kept the loan money for himself, and returned a sum belonging to him personally. But when the creditor knows for himself that the pledge belongs to an Israelite, he is forbidden to give money against this object, even if he only assumes the case.

Isserles: This refers only to the case where the operation performed by the pagan is considered equivalent to that which would have been performed by the Israelite, at whose command he is acting. When we separate the Israelite's operation from that of his agent, the thing previously forbidden is permitted. And this is why it was written, in the name of Rabbi Tham, that one may deliberately pawn money to a pagan while acknowledging that the pawn comes from an Israelite, because the pagan is the intermediary. It has already been said that it is permissible to be moderate where it is customary to operate in this way; and when a pagan brings in a pledge and an Israelite comes to claim it, the operation remains permissible. However, the creditor has the right to refuse to return the object to its Israelite owner.

168:10 – When a pagan, having a pledge of Israelite provenance, in turn goes to entrust it to another Israelite, to whom he borrows at interest, then: when the first Israelite comes to claim the object, it is forbidden for the creditor to accept the interest, if the money lent is just the value of the object; but if the value of the object is less than the money the creditor lent the pagan, it is permitted for the lender to accept the interest. When the Israelite who gave a pledge to the heathen did not know that the latter would take it to another Israelite for money, it is permissible for the creditor to receive from the Israelite who owns the pledged object, the interest on the sum lent to the heathen and the sum itself.

Isserles: An Israelite being indebted to a Gentile, for a sum lent at interest, if the Gentile passes the claim to another Israelite, the latter may accept the interest if it is brought to him by the Gentile, but he is forbidden to receive it from the hand of the first Israelite.

168:11 – If an Israelite has lent a pledge to a Gentile to enable the latter to borrow money at interest, and the Gentile approaches an Israelite, the latter may lend the sum requested and then recover principal and interest, even if the money is presented to him by the fellow Israelite who lent the pledge.

Isserles: A pledge must not be offered to a pagan through a third party. When a pagan, having force for himself, does not want to return to his rightful owner the pledge he had received from him, it is the duty of the Israelite lender, to whom this pledge had been entrusted, to return the object to his co-religionist, because the pagan is only a thief. But when the heathen is not strong enough to do harm, and the Israelite can compel him to return his property, then the Israelite who received the pledge from the heathen is not obliged to return the object to its possessor as seen above; he can hand it over to the heathen, or even to his co-religionist, if the latter is willing to repay him the heathen's debt. If, on the other hand, a heathen who has strength of his own comes to an Israelite to give him a pledge belonging to another Israelite, then if the heathen asks for a certain sum of money and refuses to pay any interest, the owner of the pledge is also free not to pay any, when he comes to claim the object that belongs to him. A pagan has brought an Israelite a pledge and borrowed, for its value, a certain sum at interest, then sold the object to another Israelite: then the new owner of the object, on going to withdraw the object and pay the pagan's debt, must at the same time repay the interest on the sum loaned.

168:12 – A pagan who has borrowed money at interest from an Israelite, with a pledge, tells the latter to sell the object to any Israelite, Reuben, who will then pay him his debt; the deal is concluded; but Reuben, after delivery of the object, keeps the money for a certain time, and the creditor claims interest from the pagan on the sum kept by Reuben; if the pagan refuses, and only wants to pay the interest on the money until the moment of sale, and if he goes to ask the buyer of the object for the remainder, the creditor is allowed to accept, as this step by the pagan does not concern him.

168:13 – A pagan comes to bring an object to an Israelite, and asks him to go to one of his co-religionists to borrow money for him, with the object as collateral. The lender is then allowed to accept payment of the sum and interest from the Israelite intermediary, provided that he, the creditor, has taken responsibility for the value of the object and the sum he is lending.

Isserles: If the Gentile has given the pledge to his Israelite intermediary before receiving from the lender the amount of the sum he wants to borrow, the lender can accept from the intermediary repayment of the sum and interest, even if the intermediary has responsibility for the object; it is then sufficient for the creditor to take responsibility for the sum he is lending. Similarly, when the intermediary comes to collect the pledge from the creditor, if the creditor tells him that the responsibility lies with the lender, as well as that of the sum loaned once the pagan has divested himself of it, it is pointless to make any conditions with the intermediary, such as, for example, that he will be obliged to send witnesses to affirm the veracity of what he claims, should he lose the money or the object. If the lender has fulfilled the prescribed formality at the time of borrowing, and if the intermediary, when taking back the pledge, declares that the object belongs to him, to the intermediary, and that the borrowed money was for himself, the lender may refuse to give credence to it. However, if he is in doubt, he can refuse to accept payment of the debt from the intermediary, and declare that he will only accept the money from the pagan, and that he will also hand over the pledge. The same applies if the intermediary wishes to swear an oath or bring witnesses; for if he has deceived others by saying he was borrowing for a pagan, he can no longer be trusted.

168:14 – When an Israelite intermediary concludes a contract with a pagan for an interest rate of so much per 100 and gives the lender, also an Israelite, a lower rate, the interest that the pagan wants to give is accepted, and the rest goes to the intermediary as commission. If the rate agreed with the lender is higher than the rate agreed with the borrower, the intermediary does not have to pay the creditor the excess.

Isserles: Some say that the intermediary must pay the difference if, in the deal, he has not mentioned the name of the pagan and has acted as if it were himself; if in the treaty he has spoken of the pagan, and of himself only as intermediary, he does not have to repay the excess interest to the creditor. However, it is forbidden to lend, deliberately, to the Israelite intermediary, against a pagan pledge, and to receive from this intermediary the sum lent and the interest, because this amounts to lending a sum to the intermediary who, in turn, would lend it to the pagan. The transaction must be formally undertaken in the name of the pagan; then, when the intermediary comes to claim the pledge, the lender can receive from him the sum due and the interest. This is only the case when the lender declares that the intermediary will himself come to claim the pledge; when the intermediary comes to take the pledge without having been previously invited, there is a tendency to accuse him of having carried out the operation on his own account. But when the intermediary refuses to remove the pledge, the lender has no right to force him to do so.

168:15 – When an Israelite intermediary comes to borrow, with a pagan pledge, from a co-religionist, money at interest for a pagan, and some time later the creditor wants to sell the object to recover the sum lent, he need not fear the power of the pagan, since he has done no business with him; as for the intermediary, if he fears the pagan, he can take back the pledge and pay the sum due to the lender.

168:16 – When an Israelite tells a co-religionist to lend to a pagan at interest, then: if the responsibility for the money lies with the intermediary, the lender should receive no interest; but if the intermediary has no responsibility, and his intervention takes place to render a service, or if he has received payment as a commission, the creditor may accept the sum lent and the interest from his hand.

168:17 – An Israelite asks a co-religionist to borrow money on his behalf at interest from a pagan. If the pagan receives a pledge to the value of the sum he is lending, and therefore does not need the Israelite intermediary to act as guarantor, the intermediary can receive the sum and the interest from his co-religionist, which he will remit to the pagan; if there is no pledge, the intermediary may receive neither the money nor the interest, to hand over to the creditor. If an Israelite tells his co-religionist to borrow, in his name, money from a pagan, then, if the pagan reports to the borrower, the intermediary may take from him the interest and the sum lent, to bring to the lender.

Isserles: See § 170, if it is permissible for the intermediary to act as guarantor. Some say that in a community where the Board of Directors allows itself to borrow money at interest from a pagan for common needs, then: although this Board is, so to speak, the intermediary of the community, it may receive from it the sums borrowed and the interest to pass them on to the pagan, because it is considered to be playing the role of a tutor vis-à-vis his ward. Such is the custom, to show moderation. However, once the pagan has been repaid, it is forbidden to beg from members of the community to replenish the common fund, as this would be like borrowing between Israelites at interest.

168:18 – An Israelite, having in his possession the pledge of a pagan, takes it to a co-religionist to get money; then: when the pagan comes to take back the object, his creditor can accept the interest of the sum lent during the time he kept the pledge, and the second Israelite takes the interest from the day he took the pledge and reimbursed the first lender. This is permitted on the sole condition that the pagan's creditor, in taking the pledge to his co-religionist, has told the co-religionist that he is surrendering it to him for its value in money, and thereby relinquishing all privileges over the object, and that he has no business with him; his personality being thus as it were destroyed, it seems that the pagan has now given the object to the second Israelite; then, when after some time the new holder of the object returns the pledge to the first creditor, he may receive from it the value of the sum lent and the interest on that sum.

Isserles: Some say that if the Israelite creditor, in taking the pledge to his co-religionist for money, tells him that the pledge belongs to his pagan debtor, but does not declare that he will have no dealings on the subject with the second Israelite, it is still permissible for the new holder of the object to accept the sum loaned and the interest from his co-religionist; for if the pagan's creditor did not speak the consecrated words, it is accepted as likely that he meant them and wished to act according to the law. When the pagan's first creditor comes to claim the pledge from his co-religionist, the latter can refuse him and hand it over only to the pagan, because in effect he is dealing only with the latter from the moment the other has placed the object in his hands. But if the first creditor has made a condition of taking back the pledge himself, the Israelite's creditor must keep his word and return it. Such is the custom. As for the interest, the first Israelite can fix it vis-à-vis the second as he sees fit; he can also decide that he will share every eight days in the interest paid by the pagan. When the two Israelites decide together that the pledge of the heathen will remain with his first creditor, the second creditor can accept the interest on the sum he lends on this pledge to his co-religionist, on condition that the second Israelite has responsibility for the pledge. When they have agreed that the first creditor will be responsible for the pledge ... Some say that the first and second creditors don't need to make any agreement about the Gentile pledge, because as long as the second Israelite gives the money to his co-religionist, this amounts, according to the Bible, to a treaty or any other condition. Then, if the Gentile's creditor has the reputation of being an honest man, he is taken at his word, without the need for witnesses, if he declares that he possesses the pledge of a Gentile, and money can be lent to him on that pledge. This only concerns the case where the first Israelite has not combined the money and the interest on the money, owed by the pagan, into a single sum; if he does combine them, his creditor cannot accept the interest, which then seems to come from the first Israelite himself.

[Shulchan Aruch:] A pagan has borrowed money from an Israelite and signed a bill; then: if the creditor is going to ask a co-religionist for a certain sum against this bill, the second Israelite must instruct the first to tell the pagan that this pagan, from now on, no longer has any business with his first creditor, but becomes the debtor of the new possessor of the draft. (V. § 173. Laws on the transmission of bills).

168:19 – If an Israelite goes to a co-religionist and borrows from him, with a pagan pledge, money for his personal use, so that the creditor cannot know that the money is for him, or if he sends to a co-religionist a pagan, armed with a pledge, to borrow money which he must give to him, also in such a way that the creditor does not suspect that the money is for the Israelite, the creditor cannot accept any interest on the sum lent, and the means employed to obtain this loan is a dishonest one.

168:20 – When a pagan, a creditor of an Israelite, has received a pledge from the latter, another Israelite can lend him money at interest against this pledge. Some people forbid this. But if the pagan's debtor tells his co-religionist to redeem his pledge from the creditor and that the object will belong to him definitively if, at a designated date, he does not repay him the sum he first owed the pagan, it is permissible for the Israelite to lend money at interest to the pagan against his co-religionist's pledge, even according to the strictest opinion.

Isserles: According to the first opinion, it is permissible for the second Israelite to accept from his co-religionist the interest on the sum he lends to the pagan. When an Israelite, a debtor of a pagan, undertakes certain obligations, such as the payment of an annuity or the delivery of the fruits of his harvest, etc., if the Israelite is unable to settle his debt, another Israelite may do so and receive from the first what the latter gave to the pagan; but if the debtor has enough to meet his debt, his co-religionist is forbidden to assume this debt.

168:21 – If a Gentile lends to an Israelite at interest, money deposited with him by another Israelite, then: interest is permitted for the depositor, if the Gentile is responsible for the money deposited with him: in case the responsibility lies with the Israelite, it is forbidden to take interest.

Gloss: When the Gentile lends money to an Israelite at interest, without notifying the rightful owner, the interest charged is permitted, because the Gentile's responsibility seems affirmed in this act.

168:22 – An Israelite, with whom a pagan's money is deposited, must not lend it at interest if the responsibility for the sum entrusted to him lies with him; if this responsibility remains with the owner of the money, he may lend at interest. However, it is preferable that he should not do so, because for those who do not know the Gentile's responsibility for the money deposited, the Israelite would seem to be lending on his own account at interest.

168:23 – If an Israelite, depositing money with a pagan, asks him to lend this sum at interest, and promises him half the interest or any other payment as a reward, this is forbidden, because the Israelite is responsible for the money he has entrusted to the pagan. If the heathen promises an Israelite a fixed payment to invest his money, the latter might accept, because he is then only the heathen's agent; however, it is better for him to refrain, because he could be accused of lending the sum in question on his own account.

Gloss: But if the matter is public, i.e. if everyone regards the Israelite as the pagan's agent, it is permissible for the Israelite to accept the deal.

168:24 – If a Gentile has entrusted an Israelite with the administration of his property, the latter may lend the Gentile's money at interest; if it is the Israelite who places his property in the hands of a Gentile, the latter may not lend the money values at interest. And this applies whether the responsibility for the money lies with one party or the other.

168:25 – One individual says to another, “You took an interest from me without using you as an intermediary”; then, if the other answers that he only took the interest through a pagan, he is believed without needing to take an oath. But in the case where he replies, “I don't even know if I accepted an interest from you”, he is forced to take an oath that he doesn't remember.

Isserles: In all other statements of the same kind, where the borrower accuses the lender of having accepted interest in an illicit manner, and the lender replies that he has indeed taken interest, but in a manner permitted by law, the lender is believed without his taking an oath. This is only the case where the borrower wishes to be reimbursed by his creditor for a pledge or a small sum; but in the case where it is the creditor who claims interest that has not been paid, it is sufficient for the debtor to swear that this interest was claimed in an illegal manner, and his word is believed. If the creditor has a bill on his debtor, the lender must swear that what he is claiming is legal for it to be believed (see §§ 160 and 177).

168:26 – An Israelite in possession of an object which is deposited with one of his co-religionists may ask the latter to take it as a pledge to a pagan and to borrow money on this pledge at interest, which the owner of the object undertakes to pay.

168:27 – An Israelite borrows money from another Israelite for a pagan, on collateral belonging to the latter, so: when the creditor claims the due from his co-religionist, the latter is not obliged to pay, but is forced to take the lender to the pagan and present him as the pagan's creditor.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

170 – It is forbidden for an Israelite to act as guarantor for a co-religionist who borrows money at interest from a pagan.

170:1 – It is forbidden for an Israelite to act as guarantor for a co-religionist who borrows money at interest from a pagan. For, according to pagan custom, the money is first demanded from the guarantor; the guarantor would then be obliged to be repaid by his co-religionist. But if the pagan promises not to claim the money from the guarantor first, an Israelite can be guarantor for another Israelite.

Isserles: Nowadays, where the pagan custom no longer exists, an Israelite can act as guarantor for one of his co-religionists who borrows money from a non-Israelite at interest.

[Shulchan Aruch:] Some say that the first law is in force, even in the case of Gentiles, only when the guarantor says he is willing to absolutely replace the debtor and pay him capital and interest, even if it means reclaiming them from him afterwards.

Isserles: If, in the latter case, an Israelite has answered for another, the latter must return the capital paid by the guarantor, but not the interest. If the debtor has returned the interest to his guarantor, he cannot recover it by legal action.

170:2 – Similarly, when a Gentile borrows at interest from an Israelite, another Israelite may not act as guarantor.

Isserles: But when the Gentile has stipulated to his creditor that on the day of payment the latter will not demand the sum from the guarantor, then the lender may accept from the guarantor the principal and interest in case the Gentile fails to pay them. It is permissible for an Israelite to act as guarantor for the capital, or only for the interest earned on capital lent by an Israelite to a pagan. But this is only permitted when the pagan takes the money from the hands of the lender himself; and it is forbidden when the guarantor takes the sum lent from the hands of his co-religionist, to hand it over to the pagan. The Israelite is forbidden to act as guarantor only when the pagan borrows without a pledge; but if he provides a pledge, the Israelite can act as guarantor, even if the guarantor takes the money from his co-religionist to give it to the pagan; for the claim now rests solely on the pledge. If the Israelite lender possessed a pledge from the Gentile or had another Gentile as guarantor, then: if another Israelite requests the creditor to return the pledge to the pagan, and to release the pagan guarantor whose place he takes, the second Israelite must pay the sum and interest on the sum up to the day the pagan was guarantor, but he pays no interest for the time he was guarantor; and this, if the pledge was of the same value as the sum lent to the pagan. When the pledge has a higher value, the Israelite must also pay interest for the time he himself was guarantor, or if he does not wish to pay this interest, he must ask the pagan to hand over the pledge to his former creditor. If the creditor has combined the principal and interest owed into a single sum, the Israelite, who becomes the Gentile's guarantor, must pay the entire interest, even if the Gentile's pledge was worth less than the sum loaned, or if there was no pledge at all.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

171 – The pagan who lent money at interest and then converted to Judaism

171:1 – When a Gentile has lent money at interest to an Israelite, who has signed a bill containing the face value of the sum plus interest, and the Gentile has subsequently converted, two cases arise: Case 1: if the bill was made before the Gentile's conversion, the Gentile can claim the sum plus interest from his debtor; Case 2: if the bill was signed after the conversion, the creditor can only claim the capital. If it is a pagan who has borrowed from an Israelite at interest, by making a bill, and this pagan converts to Judaism, then: whether the conversion took place before or after the bill was signed, the new Israelite must pay his creditor capital and interest, so that it cannot be said that he has embraced the Jewish religion in order to be free of interest on the sum due.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

172 – A house or field given as a pledge, and whose owner allows his creditor the usufruct during the time the house or field is in pledge.

172:1 – If a person has borrowed money for several years, and pledged a house or a field, granting the creditor the usufruct of this building while he has the building in pledge, if this contract is made according to Assyrian custom, i.e., at the fixed term, the creditor returns the house or field and holds his debtor even, the operation is permitted. For example, a private individual borrows a mine for ten years, and pledges a cottage or a small plot of land, of which he cedes the usufruct to his creditor; then, at the end of the ten years, the creditor returns the building and is even with his debtor, who does not give him back the mine. If, while holding the pledge, the creditor makes better use of it and makes a profit, he owes his debtor nothing either, because this is a kind of trade. Similarly, the law permits the following operation: if a borrower asks a capitalist for a certain sum, and pledges a house, for example, for ten years, on condition that he can repay when he wishes and take back the house, the creditor will be obliged to return the building, and he will take as repayment the sum lent, less the approximate value brought back by the house, because the lender would no longer be able to claim his money if he kept the house for ten years; if he kept it for only one or two years this would give the same result as if he had rented it.

Isserles: Some say: when the borrower pledges a house or a field for two years, under the condition of being able to take it back before the fixed time, if he repays the sum borrowed, less what the house or field has brought in, he can do so with the creditor's consent. But he is forbidden to borrow if the creditor does not agree to deduct from the sum loaned what he has earned from the property, because if the creditor does not want to deduct anything from the sum he has loaned, it is as if he were receiving indirect interest; when the borrower was not to be released before the set time, but wants to get his property back and pay the creditor what he owes him, the creditor is not obliged to deduct from the sum he has lent the money he has earned from the property. Some say: whether or not it has been agreed between creditor and debtor that the borrower has the right to be discharged before the set time, the creditor must only receive the sum due to him reduced by the sum brought back by the building. This law must be established according to local custom. In our countries, it is customary for the creditor to receive the amount due, less the amount brought in by the pledge (house, field or piece of furniture), if the debtor pays before the due date. You can lend at interest, when the interest is to be used for a good cause. However, it is better to be strict. But if the borrower takes responsibility for the pledge he gives, it is still absolutely forbidden to accept any interest. When the pledge given by the borrower yields a profit for the creditor, the debtor does not have the right, on the pretext that it is an indirect interest, to deduct from the sum he owes the sum that the pledge has yielded; for judges cannot sue for an indirect interest. But when the borrower has declared that he does not want the creditor to benefit from the pledge, then: if the lender does not take this declaration into account, the debtor has the right to return the sum borrowed to him only less the profit brought in by the pledge, from the day the debtor made the declaration until the day he paid up.

172:2 – If the pledge in question is a field, some say that the lender may lease it for a certain sum to his debtor; others forbid it, but if the creditor has leased the field to a third person, the debtor has the right to sublease it to that person. (V. § 164.)

172:3 – It is permissible for the creditor, the owner of the pledge, to give his debtor a sum of money from time to time, so that he will undertake to make any minor repairs the pledge may require. One author forbids the lender to give an agreed sum to his debtor so that the latter has full responsibility for the pledge should it be destroyed.

Isserles: A pledge cannot be released by returning part of the debt. Thus, if a debtor returns half or a third of a sum due, he cannot take back the object; and the creditor has the right to benefit from the pledge until the whole sum has been paid. This is the case if the pledge was given to him at the time of the loan; it's as if there were a trade, one giving money and the other an object. But if the debt is an old one, for which the debtor has provided a pledge, the creditor must not take advantage of the pledge. If there has been a loan by means of a pledge, without any agreement on the respective rights of the two parties concerned, they follow the custom of the country, which they are deemed to know (see Penal Code, detailed law on pledges).

172:4 – When the creditor is himself the owner, he can profit from the house or field given as a pledge; but he does not have the right to ask for the sale of the house or field against the money he has advanced, if the debtor wishes to dispose of the building. The creditor is allowed to ask to buy the immubie if, at the time of the loan, he has told his debtor, who intends to sell the pledge, to sell it to him in preference, withdrawing the same price he would have asked of another buyer.

172:5 – When a Gentile, borrowing money from an Israelite, gives him a house as collateral, and then sells the house to another Israelite, the creditor is not obliged to pay the rental of the house to his co-religionist until the Gentile has paid him.

172:6 – When the owner of a house asks a contractor to fit it out for him, and tells him to pay himself by staying in the house for a certain period of time, the contractor is allowed to do so, even if the owner lowers the rental price for him.

Isserles: The borrower may pay the contribution of the pledged field, when this contribution is requested in cash, but he must not do so if it is to consist of produce from the field. When the debtor pledges a house that does not belong to him, and the owner repossesses his house and claims the rent from the creditor, this rent must be repaid by the debtor.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

173 – The many details of the law on interest

173:1 – It is forbidden for the seller to charge more for an object with the intention of waiting longer for payment, even if the seller is rich, and if the value of the object is not to decrease in the future. We are talking here only about an object whose price is fixed and given by all merchants; but when an object is to be sold at a variable price, it is permissible to sell it at a slightly higher price for a forward sale. Moreover, it is not necessary for the seller to keep his customers informed of his commercial operations. It is, however, strictly forbidden to increase prices significantly.

Isserles: An item that is sold for ten zouz, for example, to all buyers, could be sold for twelve zouz when the lords usually come to visit the town, if their visit thus raises the price of things.

173:2 – A greengrocer can sell produce for twelve zouz to the buyer who comes to pick it, instead of ten zouz to the buyer who comes to the market.

173:3 – When a person buys goods on a forward basis for twelve zouz, the trader, once the deal has been concluded, can tell his customer that he would give him ten zouz if he wanted to pay immediately.

Isserles: Of course, the deal must already have been concluded. If the merchant were to tell the customer, before the sale, that he would let him have the merchandise for less if it were paid for in cash, he would then be obliged to let him have it at the same price in the future, at the request of the buyer who wants to pay in the future.

173:4 – If one person owns a promissory bill drawn on another, the drawer may sell his instrument for less than the bill's face value, without infringing the defence of interest, provided that the purchaser of the instrument is the only party interested in recovery. For example, if the drawee, having become poor, cannot meet his commitments, it is the new owner of the bill who must lose. If the non-recovery is due to the fault of the first owner of the bill, i.e. if, at the time of the loan, the borrower's property was already mortgaged, the first owner of the bill must reimburse the amount entered on the new drawer's account. When the owner of the bill has agreed with the buyer that the responsibility for collection will always rest with him, he will have to pay the drawer, if the drawee does not meet his commitments; if, on the other hand, there is a profit, this profit must also belong to the one who is responsible. What's more, since the owner of the bill can sell his instrument at a lower price for immediate cash, he can assign it to the drawee himself. The owner of a pledge, needing money, can sell it to someone else, and the seller is allowed to take responsibility for the pledge if he wishes.

Isserles: It is forbidden for a debtor to ask an intermediary to take charge of a debt, of twelve dinars for example, payable within a certain period of time, and for this to immediately give this intermediary ten dinars; this is a violation of the law.

173:5 – When a community needs money, its three trustees can go to a butcher, or a wine merchant, and make a contract with him obliging the Israelites to buy from him and not from anyone else, in return for which the seller undertakes to pay a certain sum per year to the community; and the trustees can sell this contract to a person who will immediately advance the said sum to the community. For their part, the trustees must promise in writing to buy from the butcher or wine merchant.

173:6 – When workers meet their boss and ask him for payment, the latter is allowed to go to a banker, ask him for money marked with the country's effigy, and promise him a sum in ingots greater than that which he is given, on condition that the boss has the promised sum at home.

Isserles: The author of the gloss states that it seems to him, from the commentaries of the Talmud, that the patron is not obliged to have at home the whole sum advanced by the banker, but that it is sufficient for him to possess a part of it. This is a case similar to that explained in § 162. The relationship between employer and banker referred to in article 6 is permitted because it is considered to constitute a commercial transaction. But it would be forbidden for the employer to ask the banker for any sum whatsoever, which he would return in the same and higher currency, because this would constitute a loan at interest.

173:7 – It is permissible for a merchant who wishes to be paid cash to sell an item for twelve zuz, ten zuz, on condition that he has the item at home, even if he cannot deliver it immediately because of some impediment. But if the object is not at home, for example if he has lent it, he is forbidden to sell it in this way.

Isserles: The seller is believed to be the possessor of the item. It is forbidden when the merchant says to his customer: “If you pay me now, the item will cost you ten zouz, and in time it will cost you twelve. This refers to an item whose price is known; if the price is not known, the merchant can sell the item, even if he doesn't have it at home at the moment.

173:8 – It is permissible to advance a farmer the sum of ten zouz in order to have squash of a certain size at a zouz a piece later on, even if the small squash are already worth a zouz a piece.

Gloss: The gourds grow on their own, at no cost to the grower, who therefore gives no interest to the creditor.

173:9 – It is forbidden for a farmer to ask another farmer to advance him a sum, for which he will sell him the milk from his goats at such and such a price, and the wool from his sheep at such and such a price, prices lower for him than for any other buyer; but he is allowed to ask the second farmer for a certain sum, for which he will give him the wool from his sheep and the milk from his goats, at a fixed price, in quantities equal to what these animals will produce; for the result of the deal is doubtful, and each of the farmers can lose as well as gain.

173:10 – It's forbidden to sell orchard fruit before it's ripe, because when it's ripe, its value is almost double, and the owner would be giving interest to someone who advanced him money for fruit that was still green.

Gloss: Orchard fruit is not comparable to squash, which grows on its own; moreover, it has never been customary to sell green fruit.

It is permissible to buy a calf at a lower price because it is very young, and to leave it with the seller; but if it subsequently withers or dies, it is the buyer who must lose.

173:11 – It is forbidden to advance money to a winegrower, to buy vine shoots from him, which the owner will then have to dry; for dry shoots cost more than sap-filled ones; however the deal is permitted, if the buyer has to help the owner cut and dry them, because the buyer then acts as if he were buying a tree to cut off its branches.

173:12 – In a property where the janitors are paid immediately after the harvest work, the owner is forbidden to promise them a gratuity, in addition to their salary, so that they wait for their payment until the day when the season's work is completely finished, unless they help the owner with this work.

173:13 – It is permissible to advance money during the grape harvest, on condition that the winemaker will deliver good wine in nissân for the sum given. Similarly, it is permissible to advance the price of a barrel of wine, to be delivered later, on condition that the increase or decrease in the price of the wine will be borne by the customer, and that, if the wine is damaged, it will be borne by the winemaker; but if the buyer does not wish to take responsibility for the price of the wine, this operation is forbidden.

173:14 – It is permissible for a wine merchant to pay a winemaker two dinars for a one-dinar barrel of wine, on condition that the responsibility for the wine will remain with the winemaker, until the merchant has in turn sold the liquid, and if it is stated in the contract that, should the wine be lost, the merchant will not have to pay anything, and that he will have the right to return the wine to the winemaker if he fails to sell it. Similarly, it is permissible for a winegrower to sell a barrel of wine to a merchant for two dinars and tell him that, if he sells it for more, the profit will be, for the merchant, a reward for the trouble he has taken, and that, if he cannot sell it as he would like, he will have the right to return it to the winegrower, even if the lost or damaged wine would be at the merchant's expense.

Isserles: All these conditions are necessary if the wine has a fixed price. But if the winegrower sells a certain number of barrels of wine, and asks the merchant to pay him for these barrels of wine at the price they will have at the time of delivery, he is allowed to be paid in this way, even if at the time of payment, the price of the wine has increased.

173:15 – When, having paid more for an item in one town than in another, someone comes to a merchant asking for it to be sold in the other town, telling him that he will first use the money from the sale for his own personal use, and that later he will give the merchant the price of the goods as he has obtained it, the deal is permitted, if the responsibility for damage during the journey lies with the merchant; otherwise, the deal is forbidden. In the first case, the merchant must even give his customer a gratuity for the trouble he has taken. But if the merchant has to pay for the goods to enter the second city, he need not give this gratuity.

173:16 – If, in town, one has four seahs of wheat for a selah and, in the country, six seahs for the same price, it is permissible to advance a selah to a merchant so that he can later bring six seahs of wheat from the country, on condition that the loss of the wheat during the journey is at the creditor's risk; however, a scrupulous man should not do this. But if it is a question of any goods, no one should do so, because any articles are not easily found like the products of the earth.

Isserles: When it comes to the products of the earth, some allow one to act as stated at the beginning of article 16, even if the responsibility for the products rests with the bearer, provided that the bearer receives a gratuity for his inconvenience.

173:17 – When a merchant carries fruit from town to town, and an inhabitant of a locality where this fruit sells for a higher price, asks the merchant to give it to him, promising to give him his own fruit in return later, this is permitted, if the inhabitant has the same produce; otherwise it is forbidden.

173:18 – When a man traveling by sea wants to borrow a gold dinar from a person, whose exchange rate in the country is twenty dinars, in order to return it to him after twenty-four dinars, this is forbidden, even if the responsibility for the money rests with the creditor.

Isserles: Some people allow you to lend twelve dinars to a fairground merchant to buy goods and to receive thirteen dinars from him, on condition that the creditor is liable for the damage to the goods; the creditor's profit is then presented as a share in the profit of a trade.

173:19 – It is permissible to lend someone a certain sum in order to receive a larger sum that belongs to him, but which is on board a ship.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

174 – The sale of a field on condition that the buyer may return the property to the seller at any time.

174:1 – When a person sells his field to another, under the condition that the latter will return his property to him, when the former owner gives him back the sum paid, then the fruits produced by the field, and from which the buyer has benefited, are considered as a direct interest; and at the time of returning the money, the former owner of the field can claim, by legal means, the price of the fruits from which the other has benefited.

Isserles: If the two parties have not made any conditions at the time of the sale of the field, and if it is customary in the country to return the property to its first owner, when the latter returns the money advanced, the buyer is deemed to be aware of this custom, and must not profit from the produce of the field, while it is in his possession.

[Shulchan Aruch:] This is only the case where it was the seller who set the condition; but when it is the buyer who himself tells the owner that he will return the field when the other is in a position to pay, the sale is considered real, and the new owner can enjoy the fruits of the field. If, however, at the time of the promise, the first owner does not allow the buyer to complete the sale, and sets the condition himself, the first case applies. If the buyer declares his intention to return the field at a later date and the owner does not respond, the second case applies.

Isserles: When an owner sells a field for cash, then is obliged to wait for payment, the buyer can enjoy the proceeds of the property before repaying him, but not the seller; for the latter would seem to enjoy the fruits of the field while his customer cannot pay him immediately.

174:2 – When, on selling his field, the seller makes a contract with the buyer, by which the latter undertakes to return the property when the seller is able to buy it back, there are several cases to consider: 1̊ if the seller has set his condition before the sale or during the sale, the field is not considered as sold, but as pledged against the sum received by the owner, and the latter is entitled to claim from his creditor the value of the products of the field which he enjoyed while he had it in his possession. 2̊ If, once the sale has been made, the seller sets his condition of being able to take back the field, the sale is considered real, and the buyer has full rights to the fruits.

174:3 – If a person asks an intermediary to buy a field for him from a landowner, and if the landowner tells the intermediary that he is selling his field, on condition that he will return it when he can pay the buyer back the price, then: if the intermediary replies that, as the two parties know each other, they need only agree on this, the field is not considered as sold, but as pledged; and the buyer cannot benefit from its produce. (See Penal Code, § 207, which conditions can annul the sale, and whether the seller can sue the buyer in the event of a fait accompli).

174:4 – A farmer, having bought a field, can only pay for part of it; so if the seller says to him: “Buy in the meantime a part of the land that is worth the sum you are giving”, they can both profit from the property; the buyer profits from the part he has bought and paid for, the seller from the remainder.

174:5 – If the seller of a field says to the buyer, who has paid him only part of the price of the property: “Promise me to bring the rest of the money the land is worth, and the whole field will be yours from now on”, neither of them will be able to enjoy the property, and the produce will have to be taken to a third party. If the buyer pays all the money he owes, the products of the field are his; if he does not remit the money he still owes, the fruits are given to the seller who, in turn, must remit to the buyer the incomplete sum he had paid at the time of the sale. If, at the time of the sale, the buyer, giving only part of the sum due, says to the seller: “I will enjoy the produce of the field, but if later the sale is cancelled or does not take place, you will deduct from me the price of the fruit I will have enjoyed”, it is permissible for him to act as he proposed. The same applies if the seller says to the buyer: “I will enjoy the products of the field and, if the deal goes through, I will deduct the value of these products from what you still owe me”.

Isserles: This refers only to the case where the seller says he will deduct the value of his profits from what he is owed; but if he says he will repay, he is forbidden to take the fruits of the field, as this would be tantamount to taking interest from a debt, and returning that interest when the debt is discharged.

174:6 – If the seller of a field has said to the buyer, who pays him only part of the sum: “As soon as you have repaid me in full, the property will be yours”, but if he has not said “from now on”, then the seller can enjoy the fruits of the field until the moment of payment; if it is the buyer who enjoys the produce, he must repay the value to the owner.

174:7 – If an owner sells a building, in order to have money which he then no longer needs, or if he sells the building in order to be able to go to Palestine, and if he then cannot or no longer wants to go there, the sale is considered null and void, and the buyer cannot benefit from the products of the land, until it has been proved that the sale is a real sale and that there is nothing to cancel it.

174:8 – When a person rents a house or field for a moderate price, and advances the landlord twenty years' rent, it is permissible for the landlord to make the following contract with his tenant: “If at the end of two years, for example, the landlord can repay the rent paid, less the time the tenant has occupied the house or field, he will take back the house or field. Responsibility for the property rests with the landlord.”

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

175 – The contract to sell wheat year-round at the price on the day of the contract

175:1 – You shouldn't sign a contract to sell wheat according to the price in small towns, because the price in a small town is too changeable: you can do it according to the price in a big town, which is more fixed. When the price at which a farmer undertakes to supply, for a certain sum advanced to him, wheat throughout the year, and at the same price as that which he had on the day of the contract. The buyer is also allowed to accept wheat at a constant price, even if the price has risen, or if the seller did not yet possess the products he undertook to deliver.

Isserles: Some say that it is also permissible to make the contract on the basis of small-town prices. We can be moderate, since this is a rabbinical defense.

175:2 – If four seahs of new wheat and three seahs of old wheat are given for a sela, no contract should be made until the price of the two kinds of grain has become the same.

175:3 – When gleaned wheat is sold for one sela every four seahs and owner's wheat for one sela every three seahs, a contract can be drawn up to buy the gleaned wheat, but a purchase contract for the owner's wheat must be drawn up only once the price has been fixed.

175:4 – When a grower owns a product, he is allowed to make a sales contract, even if the handling of the product has not been completed and its course has not been stopped; but he must make the contract for the quantity he owns. If the product has to undergo numerous manipulations before it can be delivered, the contract is valid when only two remain to be carried out; if there are still three, the owner is forbidden to make the contract.

175:5 – At the time of sale, the buyer must not seek to make a profit; for example, if a broker is used, and if the custom of the country is for the buyer to pay the broker, he must do so. When the buyer has the seller keep the product for a certain period of time, he cannot claim from him, at the time of delivery, a quantity absolutely equal to that which he should receive, because there is always some waste; moreover, this waste is fixed by regulations and proportional to the time during which the product has been kept.

175:6 – A person buys wheat to be delivered on a fixed date and gives the seller a deposit: if the wheat has risen in price by the due date, it is necessary to estimate how much wheat the seller could have given for the deposit at the time of purchase; the buyer is then allowed to take the quantity of wheat thus estimated, but the seller is forbidden to give back in money the current price of the wheat that the buyer would have had for the deposit at the time of purchase. Some allow the seller to give this sum of money.

Isserles: It is also permissible for the buyer not to take wheat for the down payment, but to buy another product, also deliverable on a fixed date; the down payment is then considered to have been given at the time of the new purchase. This change of product is only permitted if the buyer says to the seller: “You owe me so much wheat, give me wine or something else instead”. But the change of product would be forbidden, if the buyer said to the seller: “You owe me the sum I have paid you; pay me by giving me such and such a product”, as it would appear that the buyer had not given the seller a down payment, but had lent him money, and it is forbidden to make a contract affecting money lent.

175:7 – When at a certain time the price of wheat is fixed, and four seahs of wheat per sela are given, it is permissible to advance money to an owner to supply wheat on the day when the price has fallen. If, on the other hand, ten seahs of wheat are given for a sela, the seller must deliver at that time. But when the buyer advances money to the owner for wheat at a later date, and does not specify delivery of this wheat on the day when the price has fallen to ten seahs, the seller is only obliged to give his customer four seahs per sela. If one of the parties withdraws from the contract, he cannot be prosecuted, but he is blamed for breaking his word. When, in the second case, the deal has been made between the seller and an intermediary of the buyer, then: if this intermediary has not spoken of the delivery of the wheat at the time of the fall, the owner must still deliver to his customer ten séahs per séla, if the price has thus fallen, or else he must return a fraction of the money he holds from the intermediary. And neither the buyer nor his intermediary can be blamed for breaking their word.

175:8 – If, for a purchase, a contract has been drawn up which does not state the exact price, the contract is valid, provided that no interest results for either of the contracting parties. Furthermore, the contract is valid if the commitments have been made logically and in accordance with the law; but if they have been made in such a way that one of the parties can accuse the other of failing to keep his word, the whole thing is null and void.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

176 – Permitted and forbidden rentals

176:1 – It is forbidden to lend money under the condition of receiving interest, if the money is lent to be spent; but if local currencies are lent to a person who wants to learn about them and who must then return them to the lender, it is permissible to take interest.

Isserles: In the latter case, it is permissible to take interest if the borrower assumes responsibility for the money only in respect of theft and loss; but if he assumes responsibility for everything that may happen, the creditor must not take any interest. Finally, some say that if the creditor takes responsibility for everything that may happen, it is permissible for him to receive interest for the money he lends, even if this money has to be spent (V. § 177). But when the creditor takes only a share of responsibility, he is forbidden to accept interest for money he lends that is intended to be spent. So when, without having any responsibility, the lender takes interest, he is acting against a biblical defense; and if he has only a share of responsibility, he is acting against a traditional defense.

176:2 – When objects are lent, it is permissible to take a rent, even if the lender, having allowed his debtor to use them as he pleases, begs to return them as they were received.

176:3 – When it is customary to hire out ships for a rental price, it is permitted to do so; and also, when the ship deteriorates and is appraised, the owner may receive, along with the rent, the sum representing the difference in value between the new ship and the deteriorated ship. Similarly, a merchant can rent copper utensils for a fee, and be paid for the weight of copper missing from the utensil when it is returned.

Isserles: Some say that no remuneration is taken for the hire of utensils except because they necessarily spoil, but they also say that once broken, the price of the new object and its price as metal are assessed, and the difference is charged.

176:4 – It is permissible to rent a cow for a certain sum per month, and also to assess its price, which the borrower will have to repay if it dies at home.

Gloss: Some say that the price should be assessed at the time of the animal's death, and the borrower should be made to pay that price.

176:5 – If a farmer rents a field and wants to give ten khors of wheat as the annual rental price, it is permissible for the owner to say to the tenant: “Give me two hundred zouz, I'll use this sum to make the field produce and I'll give you twelve khors of wheat a year”. This deal is permissible, because the tenant does not take an interest, but finds, in his enterprise, a commercial profit. Similarly, when a landlord rents a store or a ship for ten dinars a year, it is permissible for him to say to his future tenant, “Give me two hundred zouz to finish the work and I'll pay you rent of twelve dinars a year.”

Gloss: Because the money the owner asks for is for making the ship or the store.

[Shulchan Aruch:] But if the owner asks for the two hundred zouz, in order to buy goods for the store or the ship, or to hire sailors, and if he promises his tenant to give him more rent than this tenant wanted to give him, this deal is forbidden.

176:6 – It is permissible for a landowner to request ten selas per year for the rental of his field, payable in a single term and immediately, or one sela payable per month, if this proposal was made before the contract was drawn up. The same applies to the payment of an employee.

Isserles: This refers only to the case where the landlord has agreed, prior to the contract, on both methods of payment; if the landlord has only asked for ten selas per year, he is forbidden, once the deal has been made, to tell his tenant that he is willing to take one sela per month, instead of receiving the entire rent in one lump sum. It is even more forbidden for a landlord to accept compensation from his tenant if, when the time comes to pay in one lump sum, the latter can no longer do so. It is also permissible for a father who has promised a dowry to his daughter to ask his son-in-law to pay him a certain sum per year, and to keep the promised dowry for a certain period of time; in this case he does not pay interest, but rather gives a dowry greater than the one he was supposed to give. This method of payment is authorized when the conditions have been laid down before the marriage; otherwise it is forbidden, as the father would seem to be giving interest in order to postpone the payment of the capital.

176:7 – It is forbidden to ask a person to do work worth one dinar today, only to have the debtor do work worth two dinars later.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

185 – Case where the wife, after saying she is indisposed, then says she is not.

185:1 – When the wife is indisposed, the husband is forbidden to approach her, until she has said that she has done her immersion.

Isserles: When the legal time, which allows the wife to do everything necessary after her epochs, has elapsed, if she tells her husband that intimate life can resume, she is believed, even if there are slight traces of blood on her clothes, which she explains by contact with a foreign body, such as meat, for example.

185:2 – When a woman has put on, if only for a laugh, the clothes she wears being indisposed, she is considered as such, and the husband is forbidden to approach her.

185:3 – When the wife, after having told her husband that she was indisposed, affirms the opposite, we don't believe her second assertion, unless she gives a plausible explanation for the first, saying, for example, that she found herself too tired to endure intimate life (or any other valid reason).

Isserles: It is, however, praiseworthy for a man to be very strict in this respect and to stop conjugal life, even after his wife has given a reason proving that she is not indisposed. But, according to the law, the wife must be believed, even if she says nothing. It is enough for her to approach the conjugal bed, and for the husband to know that she only gave the first version because she was angry in an argument.

[Shulchan Aruch:] However, if the husband has noticed that his wife put on the clothes she wears when she's indisposed indisposed, and if she then declares that she is not is not, the wife is not believed, even if she gives a plausible gives a plausible reason to explain her clothing.

Gloss: If a suspicious stain has been found, the woman says that a competent man has affirmed that there was nothing wrong with it, and if he, when questioned in turn and if he, in turn, replies that the woman has lied, it is the scholar who is believed, and it is considered that the wife has her times.

185:4 – If the husband is with his wife, and she tells him she is feeling symptoms of indisposition, he deserves to have his days cut off, even if he goes away from her immediately, unless he does penance.

Isserles: When the act has taken place without intention, and the husband has gone away immediately, he must fast for forty days, on Monday and Thursday of each week for example; on the eve of his fasting day, he must not eat meat or drink wine. If his physical strength does not allow him to fast, he must give alms, large if he is rich, smaller if he is poor. As for the wife, she is free of all penance. When the husband and wife have been together at a time when the wife should not have felt any symptoms of menstruation, and the next day the wife discovers a suspicious spot, this is considered a coincidence, and neither of them needs forgiveness, even if the wife did not inspect herself the day before.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

186 A woman that has a regular period cycle, does not need to check herself at all.

186:2 – When the wife does not have her epochs regularly, when intimate life resumes after the epochs, the spouses must inspect their linen three times, before and after intimate life, to ensure that no suspicious stains are visible. If nothing is found, married life can continue without further inspection. Maimonides states that in the case of irregular menstruation, the wife must inspect herself before and after intimacy, on a constant basis. He even adds that the husband, too, must inspect himself after moments of intimacy.

Isserles: If the woman, having inspected herself, has lost the linen she used, married life cannot resume until she has inspected herself again.

186:3 – Those that return exactly fifteen days after immersion are considered regular; those that return later are considered irregular.

186:4 – A wife is allowed to inspect her husband's linen at the same time as her own; if what she says about her own linen is to be believed, then what she says about her husband's linen must also be believed.

186:5 – If, three times in a row, the woman finds bloodstains after intimacy, it is absolutely forbidden to continue marital life. This will be explained in greater detail in the next paragraph.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

187 – Blood stains found by the wife and caused by married life.

187:1 – If, immediately after a period of intimacy, a woman inspects herself and finds a suspicious stain, she must repeat her inspection twice; if she finds stains three times immediately after a period of intimacy, she is forbidden to resume married life; she must divorce. If, after remarrying, the same phenomenon occurs again, she must be divorced a second time. If, having remarried for the second time, the same phenomenon occurs three more times, she must divorce again, and then she is forbidden to remarry, at least until she knows the exact cause of the phenomenon.

Isserles: Some say: as we cannot know with absolute accuracy the moment immediately following intimate intercourse, we consider as such the closest moment following such intercourse, when the woman proceeds with her inspection. Moreover, the suspect spots must have recurred three times consecutively; if there has been an interruption, the spouses may remain together; however, the wife must scrupulously continue her inspections. No distinction is made between women in whom this phenomenon occurs immediately after marriage and those in whom it occurs only later. But it is understood that all this is in force only when the stains are found immediately after intimate life.

187:2 – To carry out the careful inspection that will reveal the source of the suspect stains, the woman must take a small tube, pass a very thin cloth through it, so that the cloth protrudes slightly on one side, then place the other end of the tube exactly on the spot to be inspected, then push the cloth into the tube so that it grazes the spot, then remove the tube. If the linen is stained, the blood has indeed come from the source where it is sought; if not, the stains previously found on the intimate linen did not come from this source, but from next door, and intimate life need not be interrupted.

Gloss: Maimonides states that this inspection is still valid today.

187:3 – If, after three successive inspections, the woman has discovered suspicious stains, and still wants to resume married life and inspect herself a fourth time, she can. Some say: as long as she has found stains three times in a row, she should no longer wait, she should interrupt marital life.

Isserles: It is permissible to refer to the first opinion. If the wife feels pain when the stain forms, she does not have to separate from her husband, even according to the second opinion.

187:4 – When there has been intimate life shortly before the woman's periods, and then a stain is raised, it is said that this stain has no other cause than the forthcoming menstruation.

187:5 – When a woman has a small wound where she could pick up a suspicious stain, and she indeed finds a stain on her laundry, the stain comes from that small wound. However, if the blood has a particular coloration, it is not due to the wound, but to menstruation.

Isserles: We're talking here only about a well-adjusted woman. But in the case of a woman who is not exactly well regulated, we still have the right to attribute the stain to the wound, because there is a double doubt; in fact, without mentioning the wound, the blood could come from the sides and not from the exact place where the menstrual blood comes from: the stain can therefore be attributed either to these sides or to the wound. When, in a woman who is not exactly menstruating, it is scientifically recognized that the stain is of menstrual origin, it is not, of course, attributed to the wound. If, in the same woman, the stain is discovered after a period of intimacy, close to the time when the woman is due to menstruate, or if it happens to be the 30th of the month, we still attribute the stain to menstruation.

187:6 – We believe the woman, who says she has a wound where the stain may have come from, and attributes the stain to the wound.

187:7 – When a woman finds a spot in the same place every time she inspects herself, we can conclude that she has a small wound; even more so if she feels pain while inspecting herself; and she is then allowed to continue married life.

187:8 – When a woman, who has noticed a suspicious spot immediately after a moment of intimacy, seeks medical attention, she can continue her married life. If, on the other hand, she only sought medical attention after having noticed the spot three times in a row, we must ask ourselves whether science has really been able to remedy the patient's condition. However, if in such a case, the woman has sought treatment from an Israelite doctor who is aware of the strictness of Jewish law in this matter, and if he declares that there is nothing more to fear, she can resume married life. When a woman who has not had her periods notices a suspicious stain on her linen, if the doctor treating her, even if he is a pagan, declares that the stain is not menstrual in origin, she must rely on the doctor's opinion.

187:9 – When, after a sudden fright, a woman feels that she has lost a drop of coagulated blood, and she has immediately taken care of herself, she does not have to interrupt married life; But if, after a moment of intimacy, she immediately finds a suspicious stain, this proves that the care was not sufficient, and she must suspend conjugal life, but not divorce; unless after new care she still finds a stain following a moment of intimacy, which would prove that there is an abnormal condition.

187:10 – When a woman has found a suspect stain, after a period of intimate life, she may continue conjugal life, of course after the regulatory purifications, i.e. she must wait another seven days. However, she must take precautions; if, for example, she picked up this stain the night after immersion, she must not resume intimate life on the day of immersion, but wait until the following day.

Isserles: When, three times in a row, after immersion, she picks up a stain immediately after intimate life, we return to the case of article 1 of this paragraph; under these conditions, it is impossible for her to continue conjugal life. If, after the birth of a child, she picks up stains three times after immersion and intimacy, or if she picks up stains three times after each birth, these cases are assimilated to that of injury: the stains are attributed to the momentary weakness of the organ caused by the birth of the child. This, of course, is the case if the spots recur only three times. Should they recur a fourth time, the woman must make a thorough inspection with the tube (see article 2 of this paragraph). If the tube's linen is stained, married life can no longer exist and the couple must be divorced. If the linen remains immaculate, we conclude that the stains have another origin. If, however, after purification, the wife resumes intimate life and no longer finds any suspicious traces, she can remain with her husband.

187:11 – When a woman has discovered a suspicious stain immediately after intimacy, and the same phenomenon recurs after six months, she can, after the prescribed purifications, resume married life. In fact, the phenomenon has not recurred three times in a row, and six months is long enough for the two accidents not to be linked. However, after the second stain, precautions must be taken, and six months after the second accident, the spouses must interrupt their married life, lest the phenomenon recur for the third time. This case is considered an additional menstruation; the spouses can therefore remain together, but on condition that they separate every six months, on the date when they think the stain is due to recur. If, on three occasions, there has been no spotting at the end of the six-month period, this additional separation is no longer necessary.

187:12 – A woman who has seen a stain on her linen three times in a row, immediately after intimacy, must not live with her husband, even if the spouses have no intention of continuing conjugal life. If the husband wishes to visit her, he may do so, but only in the presence of a third party.

187:13 – A virgin who, after her marriage, sees a stain on her linen several times as a result of her intimate life should not divorce her husband for this reason, as the phenomenon is attributed to virginity. However, if this phenomenon starts up again after having ceased to occur, the young woman is treated like other women, and on the third time she must separate from her husband.

Isserles: Even if the phenomenon had occurred without interruption, if the woman felt no suffering at the time the stain occurred, she must separate from her husband, when this stain recurs for the third time. When the husband is weak and sometimes loses blood, the stain that the wife may pick up is attributed to the husband.

187:14 – When, because of her complexion, a woman cannot endure immersions, she must divorce her husband; for, not having the right to live intimately without these immersions, the spouses will not be able to have children.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

189 – Women with regular menstruation and those with irregular menstruation.

189:2 – A woman is said to have her periods regularly when, having been indisposed once on a certain date, she is then indisposed three times in a row on the same date, one month apart; for example, having had her periods once, she finds herself indisposed three times in a row, exactly on the evening of the 20th of the month. Whatever the moment when a woman is indisposed for the first time, and although we don't know if the second time she will be indisposed on the same date, since no rule can be drawn from a single occasion, it is nevertheless necessary that, the following month, intimate life ceases on the eve of that date. Similarly, if a wife is indisposed on a Thursday, Friday or any other day of the week, four weeks later, intimacy between the spouses must cease on the eve of that day. In short, regardless of when the wife becomes indisposed, in each case there must be a separation between the spouses before that time, unless there is an interruption in the epochs, which will be discussed later in this paragraph. When a woman has had her epochs on the 20th, and then has them the following month on the 28th, it is necessary to wait until the indisposition has returned three times in succession on the 28th, to take this date as the regular date of the new epochs; but, before the three times just mentioned, it is necessary to apprehend that the epochs will return on the 20th, and consequently one must take precautions the three times for the 20th and for the 28th.

189:3 – If a woman has once found herself indisposed by accident, or as a result of ablutions after a long walk, and if, the following month, the same case having arisen, she has not been indisposed, we need not concern ourselves with the date of accidental indisposition in the previous month.

189:4 – There's a distinction to be made between indisposition coming on a certain date, considered regular because it has occurred three times on that date, and indisposition that hasn't yet settled. When a woman has been indisposed three times in a row on the same date; if, on that date, the fourth month, she notices nothing, and does not even feel weary, there must nevertheless be a cessation of intimate life from the day before the presumed day; whereas a woman who has once been indisposed on the 20th, and who has not been indisposed on the 20th of the following month, can resume intimate life the day after that day. A woman who does not have her periods regularly must inspect herself at the end of each month, in addition to the inspection she must make on the presumed date of her period.

189:5 – When, four times in a row, the date of the epochs has moved back one day each time (e.g. the epochs take place today, then on the thirtieth day, then the third time on the thirty-first day, then the fourth time on the thirty-second day), we assume that the indisposition will regularly come one day later than the previous month, and the interruption of intimate life will take place accordingly. The same applies when the setback is of longer duration.

189:6 – In the same way that we consider as regular periods those which, three months in a row, fall on the same date, we also consider as regular those which fall, three times in a row, on the same day of the week, at intervals of four weeks.

189:7 – Regular periods, with a delay of one day, are those that occur on the 15th of one month, the 16th of the following month, the 17th of the third month, the 18th of the fourth, and so on. But when a woman, who was exactly regulated, begins to have a setback from one time to the next, you have to wait four successive setbacks before you can consider this setback phenomenon regular. Some say: when, after having her periods on the 14th of the month, a woman has them, for example, on the 15th in niçâne, the 16th in iiar and the 17th in sivâne, we can, in tamouz, count on the setback of one day, and so on.

189:8 – It may happen that a woman, for three months, experiences a delay of one day in her epochs, then is indisposed in the fourth month on the same date as the first month, then experiences again, for three months, a delay of one day, to return again to the initial date, and so on after periods of three months. She must then count successive one-day delays for three months to determine the cessation of intimate life, and then, in the fourth month, separate from her husband as if she were to have her epochs on the same date as the first month. For example, she counts on 15 niçâne, 16 iiar, 17 sivâne, 15 tamouz, 16 âb, 17 éloul, 15 ticheri, 16 hechevâne, 17 kislév.

189:9 – For a woman who is indisposed, for example, the 1st niçâne, the 1st sivâne, the 1st âb are considered regular times; but the 1st niçâne, the 1st iiar, then the 1st tamouz are not considered regular times for a woman who is indisposed.

189:10 – A woman is considered to have irregular periods if she is indisposed on the 15th of niçâne, then on the 16th of iiar, then on the 18th of sivâne. In fact, in sivâne, the delay is two days, whereas it is only one day in iiar.

189:11 – When a woman, after having been indisposed every month, is indisposed twice in a row after two months, her periods cannot yet be considered as regularly bi-monthly, and it's a good idea for her to take the usual precautions at the end of her month.

189:12 – When there is a change in the date of the epochs, we know that, in order to be able to consider this transformation as acquired, the change must have occurred three times. But in the case of epochs with a one-month delay, the first time the change occurs is counted as one of the three times. Thus, if a woman has her periods on 20 niçâne, she must take precautions on 20 iiar; if she is not indisposed on 20 iiar and has her periods on 20 sivâne, she must take precautions on 20 tamouz; if she is not indisposed on 20 tamouz and has her periods on 20 âb, she must still take precautions on 20 éloul. Once 20 elul has passed, if her periods only return on 20 ticheri, it is accepted that from that date she has bi-monthly periods.

189:13 – When a woman has had her periods three times during the new moon, these periods are only considered regular if they occurred at the same time. If she has been indisposed three times at the new moon, in the daytime, and the fourth time, at the new moon, in the night, or three times at night and the fourth time during the day, there is no regularity, so she must take her precautions on the day and night in question. But if she has been indisposed twice in succession during the day, then twice in succession during the night, or once during the day, then three times at night, or once at night, and the next three times during the day, or three times during the day, then three times at night, the last indisposition occurring three consecutive times at the same time will be taken as the basis for suspending intimate life.

Isserles: When the date of the epochs has varied, precautions must be taken until the variation has been repeated three times in the same way. For example, if a woman has had her epochs on June 1st, then on the 20th of the same month, she must take precautions for the 1st, because of the epochs of the 1st; if on this date she is not indisposed, she must take precautions for the 9th, because this is just twenty days after her epochs of the 20th, which had occurred themselves after this lapse of time; if nothing has happened on the 9th, she must take precautions for the 20th, i.e. one month after her last periods, which go back to the 20th, and so on, until three times she has had her period just after the same interval, which she will take as the basis for the fourth time. When a woman has had her periods on 15 niçâne, for example, she must expect them on 15 iiâr; if in iiâr she has her periods on 16, she must expect them on 16 sivâne; if in sivâne she has had her periods on 17, she must expect them the following month on 17 tamouz; but if she is indisposed on 17 tamouz, she may consider that she has a regular delay of one day in her periods, and expect them on 18 âb. Some people count the first delay on 16 iiâr among the three successive delays, and according to them, the delay is regular from 17 tamouz.

189:14 – When a woman, having been accustomed to being indisposed on the 20th, is then indisposed on the 30th of the following month, she must take her precautions on the 20th, then on the 30th, until her periods have returned three times in succession on the 30th, in which case this new date is considered to be the date of her periods. If, after having had her period twice on the 30th, she has it again on the 20th, the 20th is considered the regular date, because she used to be indisposed on the 20th of the month.

189:15 – When the date of the epochs is changed, and they fall, for example, on the 20th of one month, then on the 26th of the following month, then on the 28th of the following month, the indisposition cannot be said to be regular; if it then occurs on the 20th, the 20th is considered the regular date, and the epochs of the 26th, 28th and 30th are deemed accidental. However, when the same change occurs three times in succession, the date resulting from this change is considered the regular date. The same law applies to the moment of indisposition; for example, a woman is accustomed to having her epochs at noon: if she has them twice in succession in the evening, and the third time again at noon, it is noon that is considered the moment of the epochs; but if she is indisposed three times in succession in the evening, it is the evening that becomes the presumed moment of indisposition.

189:16 – The same rule applies to date changes. For example, if a woman usually has her epochs at the new moon, and if, three times in a row, at the new moon, the indisposition has not occurred, we think that the date of the epochs will be changed, and we need no longer concern ourselves with the old date. But if, on the fourth occasion, the indisposition still occurs at the new moon, we continue to consider the new moon as the date of the indisposition.

189:17 – When a woman has been indisposed because she has danced or made a violent movement, even if the accident recurs, this date cannot be considered regular, as the indisposition is due to an extraneous cause. However, the following case may arise: one Sunday, after dancing, a woman finds herself indisposed; twenty days later, she dances again on Sunday and the same phenomenon recurs; nineteen days later, she dances on Saturday, finds herself indisposed not on Saturday, but on the following Sunday. It is now accepted that this woman is regularly indisposed on Sundays, at twenty-day intervals, and the indisposition is no longer attributed to dancing.

189:18 – When, after walking or dancing on a Sunday or on the day of the new moon, a woman finds herself indisposed on that day, and then her epochs return three times in a row on that same date, that Sunday or the day of the new moon is considered the regular date of the epochs. If, on the fifth time, she is not indisposed on Sunday or the day of the new moon, and if she dances on the following day, there is no need to apprehend that she is indisposed as a result, as her epochs are attributed to walking or dancing only if they occur on Sunday.

189:19 – There are accidental times when precautions must be taken. For example, a woman may find herself indisposed after stretching, sneezing or coughing heavily, or after a bout of St Vitus dancing; if her indisposition recurs three times in a row after the same apparent cause, she must take all precautions in anticipation of indisposition the following times, when she has stretched, sneezed or coughed. If the accident occurred at regular intervals, for example, if several times in succession the woman made a violent movement on the day of the new moon or on the 20th of the month and found herself indisposed, this day is considered to be the date of the epochs; since the interval between the different epochs was regular, the indisposition may be thought to be regular, just as much as it may be attributed to the foreign cause in question. But if, on the usual date, the woman was no longer indisposed, and then a little later, after an accident similar to those mentioned above, she has her epochs, but not on the usual date, the epochs are no longer considered regular.

Isserles: Periods are considered regular when they occur after forced movement, but at regular intervals; but if, after being indisposed at the regular date, the woman dances or walks a lot, and finds herself indisposed again, she will have to take precautions as regards intimate life, and at the usual date and whenever she indulges in strenuous exercise.

189:20 – If, having stretched on the day of the new moon, two months in a row, and having found herself indisposed, a woman stretches ten days later and is indisposed again, we attribute this last indisposition to the movement she made; but if, having stretched after these ten days, she has not been indisposed, and is only indisposed on the day of the new moon, we conclude that it is the day of the new moon that is her date of indisposition, and that there is no need to worry about the movements she may make in the course of the month. A third case may arise: having stretched on the day of the new moon, at two successive new moons, she is indisposed both times; then the third time she stretches on the 29th of the month and is not indisposed immediately, but only the next day, the day of the new moon, we consider that the movement was the cause of the indisposition; it is indeed the movement of the day before that may have brought on the epochs the next day.

189:21 – When, having stretched on the day of the new moon, a woman finds herself indisposed, and having done the same movement again in the course of the month, she finds herself indisposed a second time, it is necessary that, each time she has made a violent movement, intimate life ceases for her, until she has inspected herself; for it must be feared that movement will provoke the arrival of the periods in her. If, having stretched herself, she discovers after inspection that she is not indisposed, the indispositions are not blamed on her movements, and she must then take her precautions for the day of the new moon.

189:22 – If, towards the end of the month, a woman aspirates strongly again, even if that day is not the one on which she should be indisposed, she should still inspect herself, lest this respiratory movement contribute to bringing on her epochs. If, in the course of the month, she has breathed in forcefully, and has not discovered a suspicious spot upon inspection, she no longer has to fear that her epoch may be brought on by forced movement. However, she must repeat her inspection at the end of the month, as well as exactly one month after the day on which she became indisposed as a result of forced movement; for it is thought that this must be the day of her indisposition.

189:23 – When epochs occur after a movement, in order to admit that the movement is the cause, the same accident must occur exactly three times. If, for example, a woman finds herself indisposed once after stretching, and then twice after sneezing, it cannot be said that the sneezing causes the epochs in her, because the first time they occurred after another movement; but if, three times, she is indisposed after sneezing, or three times after stretching, we admit that the sternutatory movement in the first case, the stretching movement in the second, is the cause of the epochs; likewise for the other movements.

Isserles: When, after eating garlic, a woman has her epochs, and the same thing happens after she has eaten onion or shallot, some say that an exciting food brings on the epochs for her; others think that the periods brought on by an exciting food can be likened to those brought on by dancing or walking, but that, in this case, they cannot be said to be regular periods, unless there is an exact coincidence of day. Still others consider such periods regular, if they occur three times in a row after the same cause, even though they do not occur at regular intervals.

189:24 – When periods occur by accident, only the moment of the accident is to be feared; if the accident has passed without having produced the expected effect, there is nothing more to fear. When, for example, a woman in this category aspires strongly a little before the moment of her periods, intimate life must be suspended from the moment of this painful aspiration; but if, once this moment has passed, the periods have not come, there is nothing more to fear. If the wife is accustomed to having her periods some time after a painful aspiration, she should separate from her husband, not at the moment of this awkward breathing, but afterwards, lest the indisposition occur a few hours later. We're only talking here about the case where the periods that occur after an uncomfortable breath coincide with the usual periods; but if this coincidence doesn't take place exactly, the woman must separate from her husband after feeling her uncomfortable breath, and wait for the moment of her regular periods.

189:25 – When, at certain intervals of time, movements or accidents cause menstruation, intimate life must cease a little before this moment, as if it were a regular menstruation.

189:26 – Just as a woman who has had her periods on the 20th of a month must be concerned about the 20th of the following month, so precautions must be taken immediately after a movement that caused menstruation the month before. For example, a woman who has found herself indisposed after a strong aspiration must be concerned to know whether she is not indisposed again, after the same movement, the following month. Just as we do not consider as regular periods those which, for example, occur twice on the 20th, then the third time on another date, so we do not consider as periods caused by a movement those which occur twice after this movement, but do not manifest themselves the third time, after the same movement. Just as it is necessary, in order to cancel a regular menstruation date, for this menstruation to have occurred three times on a date other than the usual one, so it is necessary, in order to no longer consider any movement or accident as a cause of menstruation, that this movement or accident, three times in a row, no longer have any effect. Furthermore, when a movement, performed on a regular date, causes menstruation, the same movement, performed three times in a row on the same date, must have had no effect, in order for this date to no longer be considered as the time of the periods.

189:27 – A girl aged 12 years minus one day who is not nubile, although she shows the signs of nubility, or a nubile girl without showing the signs of nubility, is considered a woman from the point of view of menstruation; i.e. she is considered to have regular menstruation if she has been indisposed three times in succession on the same date, and to have menstruation with a delay of one day if four times in succession there has been an extension of one day for the interval from one period to the next. However, a distinction is made between this girl and the woman, when menstruation stops. If, after having had her periods three times regularly, she is no longer indisposed for ninety days, she is said not to have menstruated and is still a little girl. If, at the end of the ninety days, she is indisposed again, on the same date as before the stoppage, she must be indisposed three more times on a regular date in order for menstruation to be considered regular; otherwise we say that the child was not fully formed, and that her first indispositions were due to chance. If, after the three-month break, she is regularly indisposed on a fixed date three times in a row, the child is considered to be formed and her first indispositions are retained. It is then accepted that the girl has her periods three times regularly, after stopping for three months. When, after the three-month break, she is indisposed, but not at exact intervals, for example on the 18th of a month, then on the 20th, then on the 22nd, or vice versa on the 22nd, then on the 20th, then on the 18th, the dates of menstruation prior to the three-month break are not taken into account; to consider the girl as having regular periods, she must wait for four successive normal indispositions.

189:28 – The same law applies to an elderly woman who, three times in a row, has not had her periods; it is concluded that the time of menstruation has passed for her, and she need not worry about the date of her previous periods.

Gloss: Irregular periods occurring before menstruation has stopped are disregarded in the case of elderly women and girls.

189:29 – A woman is said to be old when those around her give her the title of mother, without her being offended.

189:30 – An elderly woman, who has not had her periods for some time and who finds menstruation again, must follow the same law as the little girl in the same case. See art. 27 of this paragraph.

189:31 – An elderly woman who, after having stopped menstruating, becomes indisposed again, must take into account the dates on which she used to have her regular periods. When, for example, she was indisposed one day late at the time of her regular menstruation, she must take precautions to take account of this delay when resuming her periods. Thus, if she was indisposed on the 20th, she must take her precautions on the 21st of the following month; in addition, this one-day delay must have been repeated three times, for these periods to be considered regular. In the case of a person who, before the loss of her periods, had her menstruation on a fixed date every month, she must, on the resumption of menstruation and from the first indisposition, consider the date of this indisposition as her menstruation period; the time during which she did not have her periods is then considered an effect of chance. In the case of elderly women who was indisposed on a fixed date, we were less severe than in the case of a little girl, for whom we always waited three successive indispositions before making a decision.

189:32 – A woman can have two periods in a month. She has had one, for example, on the day of the new moon; after being indisposed three times on the day of the new moon, she is indisposed the fourth time, on the 20th, the fifth time on the new moon, the sixth time on the 20th; she must then take precautions on both dates.

189:33 – A woman three months pregnant, and a mother breast-feeding her child, have no periods. When the child dies, or when the mother does not breastfeed for twenty-four months from birth, the menstruation cannot be based on the dates of the periods prior to conception, as the birth has taken blood from the mother, and there may be a change in the menstruation. However, the woman must take precautions with regard to the dates of previous menstruations, as when irregular periods are involved.

189:34 – A woman who is certain of being pregnant, or a mother who is breast-feeding her child, need not concern herself in any way with menstruation. If, however, she finds herself indisposed, she must interrupt her intimate life for the time being; but this menstruation is regarded as an accident which should have no influence later on. Once the child has been weaned, the mother's menstruation should be based on the dates she had her periods before conception. For example, if she had them on the 20th of each month, or on the 30th, or on the day of the new moon, she must, after weaning, take her precautions on these same dates. If she was accustomed to a delay, she must take this into account at the second indisposition; similarly, she must take into account accidents which, before conception, determined menstruation in her: walking, dancing, strong aspiration, at a certain date in the month.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

190 – Rules for stains and inspections.

190:2 – The laws concerning stains do not apply to girls under 12 who do not have all the signs of nubility, nor even to those over 12 if they do not have all the signs of nubility, whether they are married or not. If, however, they have had their periods three times, the stains must be taken into account.

190:3 – When a young girl is indisposed and for several days feels blood flowing without interruption, or dripping without interruption, this indisposition is considered isolated, and the law on stains does not apply after this first menstruation. But if, after flowing, the blood stops, then starts again, then stops, then starts again, all within a single day, each of these repeated flows is counted as an individual indisposition; if the phenomenon is repeated three times, even if on the same day, it is said to have had three indispositions, and the law relating to stains applies. One author says that, even in the latter case, in order to apply the law relating to stains to the girl, she must be indisposed three times on different dates.

Gloss: It's better to be stricter and follow the first opinion.

190:4 – The law relating to stains does not apply to a girl who has not yet reached the age of menstruation, and who, after having been indisposed three times, remains indisposed three times, i.e. for 90 days; but the law becomes applicable if, after this lapse of time, the girl has been indisposed again three times.

190:5 – When should a stain lead to the suspension of married life? When it's a little wider than a crushed grain of wheat; a crushed grain of wheat is as wide as 9 lentils, and a lentil the width of 24 hairs. When the spot occupies less space, it is attributed to the crushing of an insect, even if the insect has not been seen or destroyed by the person himself. There are grains of wheat of various sizes; a grain of ordinary size is taken as the basis. Whether the stain is square or elongated, it leads to the cessation of conjugal life, if it has the required width.

190:6 – When the stain is of the aforementioned width, it doesn't matter whether it's found on the linen or on the body. Some say that a stain, even a much smaller one, if found on the body, and in a place where it could be the result of menstruation, should always lead to the suspension of conjugal life.

190:7 – If a woman has found a stain after crushing a bedbug, or if the stain has the particular smell of a bedbug, the stain is not to be taken into account, as long as it's no bigger than a pea.

190:8 – When the stain occupies no more space than a crushed grain of wheat, it does not lead to the cessation of married life. When this small stain is repeated on the linen, the various stains are not added together, but attributed to an insect, unless one of them is large enough to cause the cessation of conjugal life. Some say: when these stains, even very small ones, are found on the body, they are added together; they must stop intimate life, if, thus added together, they occupy more space than a crushed grain.

190:9 – If the stain is found on the body, if it is wide or elongated or droplet-shaped, if the direction of its length is the direction of the width of the thigh, or if the stain is seen to rise from the bottom to the top; if, moreover, this stain is in a place where it could come from menstruation, it entails cessation of conjugal life, and seven days are counted from the day after the day on which it was seen. We won't go into the various considerations that might lead one to believe that this stain is not due to menstruation.

190:10 – Any stain found in a woman's clothing, or on an object she approaches or touches, in a place where defilement cannot materially originate, is disregarded. Nor is a stain taken into consideration if it is found on a colored garment.

Gloss: In order to avoid all these unnecessary concerns, it would be quite wise according to this for a woman to dress in colored clothing, when her menstruation has passed.

190:11 – Any stain found on the body is not necessarily considered impure, unless it can be attributed to menstruation, given its location. For example, a stain on the thigh, on the heel, on the instep, on the inner side, on the big toe, can and should be attributed to menstruation; likewise a stain noticed on the hand, for the hands, always acting, can be soiled. Any stain found above the belt, on the outer thigh or leg, is also considered impure if the woman has been doing gymnastics and has placed her head down. Apart from this exceptional case, a stain found on the outer thigh, leg or heel does not count. When a woman notices a stain on herself, after having been to a slaughterhouse, or after having done any work that might leave traces with this appearance, this stain is taken into consideration, if it is found only on the body; if it is found at the same time on the clothes, it is attributed to an external cause. Similarly, when a woman has an open wound, and she finds a stain on it, whenever the stain, from its location, can only come from the wound, it is not considered impure. But if the wound is on the shoulder, the stains found on the body cannot be attributed to it.

190:12 – A stain on an undergarment, in the area of the waistband or below, even if it affects an external part of the body, is attributed to menstruation.

Gloss: No distinction is made between a stain found from the front or the back, as garments can rotate. If a woman finds a stain on her garment and on her body, while returning from a slaughterhouse, this stain, even if placed towards the internal side of the body, is attributed to an external cause and not to menstruation. When, without having been to the slaughterhouse, she finds a stain on her clothing only and above the waistband, this stain is not attributed to menstruation, even if the woman has made a gymnastic movement placing her feet above her head. Indeed, it is thought that if the stain were menstrual, there would also be one on the body.

190:13 – A stain found on the edge of a piece of clothing, if this edge can graze the menstrual source, even if only by bending down a lot, is attributed to menstruation. But if the garment cannot touch this source, the stain is not counted as impure.

190:14 – Any stain found on the bed cover, in any place whatsoever, as the cover is movable, is attributed to menstruation. Similarly, any stain found on a woman's belt or nightcap is considered menstrual. However, a stain discovered the next day on a bonnet that had been securely fastened the day before and remained attached to the head is disregarded.

190:15 – When two women have spent the night side by side, covered with the same blanket, and the next day they find a stain on that blanket, they must both consider themselves to have had their times. If only one of them has been covered, even if they have carried the blanket together, and wherever the stain is, only the woman who was covered has to purify herself.

190:16 – A woman, with a wound on her neck, has found a stain on a garment she uses to cover herself at night: even if this stain is on a part of this garment, placed below the waist, we attribute it to the wound, based on the fact that the garment may have been stained when it covered the wound, as it was not attached to the body and may have touched the neck in some movement.

190:17 – When a woman, who has not done any gymnastic movements, finds two spots on her, one above and the other below the waistband, they are not attributed to menstruation. Indeed, the one above the waistband cannot be menstrual, and must be attributed to an external cause; therefore, the same cause could have caused the second stain. This is only the case if the stain above the waist is larger than a grain of wheat, and cannot be due to the crushing of an insect; but if this stain occupies less space than a grain and can be attributed to the crushing of an insect, the stain below the waist, being larger, is then considered to be from menstruation.

190:18 – All stains found by a woman, when she feels absolutely nothing to make her attribute them to menstruation, fall under traditional defenses; so it's good to be fairly broad in these cases and not worry the woman, when you can avoid doing so. For example, if she discovers a stain on her outer garment on her way back from a slaughterhouse, or after cleaning stains, or after having passed by a place where stains were being cleaned and where she could get dirty, we don't attribute these stains to menstruation; it's the same when she finds, in these conditions, a stain on an undergarment, even if she wears two others over it; but the stain must not be allowed to end up on the body. When a woman finds a stain on her body, and she has a wound, even if the wound is slightly healed and covered with a film, but still bleeding when rubbed, the stain is attributed to the wound, provided, however, that according to the place, the stain may well have come from the blood of the wound.

190:19 – By analogy, when a woman's husband or child has been in one of the above situations and has been stained, and the woman also finds stains on her, we can say that, having approached her husband or child, she owes these stains to them; the same applies when the husband or child has a wound. But if the husband or child, having been in a place or having done work where they could have been stained, have nothing on them, and the woman, on the contrary, finds a stain, she should no longer attribute it to contact with her own, but to menstruation. However, when the husband engages in certain work, for example, kills an animal, blood may gush onto his wife, without himself being soiled; in this case, if the wife finds a stain on her, it is still attributed to the external cause.

Isserles: Similarly, a woman who has slept near another woman who had a wound may attribute a stain, which she finds, to her companion's wound.

190:21 – A stain found on the edge of linen touching the posterior part of the body is attributed to an existing wound, even if this wound is from the front; for the linen may have turned, when the person was sitting or lying down, and thus been soiled in one of its parts that does not usually touch the wound.

190:23 – A woman who cleans red stains and finds a black stain on her, or who cleans black stains and finds a red stain on her clothes, must attribute the stains she has discovered to menstruation. But if, while cleaning red or black stains, she discovers stains of the same coloring as those she washed, but in a different shade, we attribute the stains discovered to the work performed by the woman.

190:24 – When, after preparing a chicken, a woman finds a red, black or yellow stain on her dress, it is assumed that this stain comes from the chicken. This is because the blood that gushes out when the chicken's throat is cut is red, the blood that drips from the limbs when the chicken is prepared is black, and the blood from the viscera is yellowish.

190:26 – A woman who, after a culinary preparation in which she could only find a stain the size of a grain of wheat, finds one of twice its size, is not considered impure for this reason. Indeed, it is admitted that the spot was originally the width of a grain, and that it may have been enlarged by the crushing of an insect. But if the stain is larger than two grains of wheat, the woman is considered impure.

Gloss: Some are more severe and declare the woman impure, even in the first case; however, we can refer to art. 26 and be lenient, as it is better to be moderate in these matters of stains.

190:27 – When a woman, after a culinary preparation in which she could only find a stain smaller than a grain of wheat, finds one larger than the grain, she is pure. It is accepted that the spot, which was originally very small, has been increased by the crushing of an insect; the same is true if the spot found is the size of two grains of wheat.

Isserles: Some are more severe and declare the woman impure, unless it is not known exactly how large the stain from the preparation in question is.

190:28 – When a woman finds on her garment a stain the size of two grains of wheat, and the body of a crushed insect, she is pure; for it is accepted that the stain comes from the crushing of two insects, one of which has disappeared and the other has remained on the garment.

190:29 – When a woman has crushed a bedbug and finds a spot, even though the spot left by this insect is larger than the one left by another insect, we take this spot as unity.

190:30 – For any stain found on oneself after having handled a bloody food or object, it is not ordered to suspect it as to hue, unless however its color is really different from the color of the blood touched, for example that the stain is blackish when the blood touched was bright red.

190:31 – When a woman finds a stain on herself, without having touched anything bleeding, nor being able to attribute it to any external object, she must wash this stain in different liquids, seven in number and specially prepared; if the stain remains, it is from a tincture, as blood would have been dissolved by these washings. However, as we are no longer able to prepare these special liquids, the experiment can no longer be carried out, and the stain must be considered to be of menstrual origin.

190:32 – When, having inspected herself and found nothing on her, a woman engages in some work, and discovers a stain in a place that was untouched a moment before, she must go back to her work: if she finds a stain again on a second inspection, the stain is attributed to menstruation; if she discovers nothing, she is pure.

190:33 –If a woman inspects herself with a small cloth and finds a bloodstain on it, the stain is considered to be of menstrual origin, whether round or elongated. If, having inspected herself with the cloth, she finds a bloodstain and a crushed insect, the stain is also considered to be of menstrual origin, whatever its shape. Similarly, if a woman inspects herself with a cloth and then puts the cloth in a box and does not examine it until an hour after the inspection, if the cloth has a stain on it, the woman must consider herself impure, regardless of the form of the stain.

190:34 – When, after having inspected herself with the cloth according to the prescription (see § 187, art. 2), the woman puts her cloth under the pillow and does not look at it until the next morning, two cases must be considered: if she finds an elongated stain and if, on pulling the cloth when she makes the inspection, the stain extends in length, the stain is of menstrual origin; if, on the contrary, it is round and no bigger than a grain of wheat, it can be attributed to an insect.

Isserles: When the stain is round, we attribute it to an insect, even if it's slightly larger than a grain of wheat.

190:35 – When, having inspected herself with the help of a cloth, and according to the prescription, the woman, without looking at the cloth, ties it under her belt and does not examine it until the following day, it is accepted that, if she discovers a stain, however small, but elongated in shape, this stain comes from menstruation; but if the stain is round, and no larger than a grain of wheat, it is attributed to an external cause. Some say that, even in the latter case, it should be considered menstrual.

190:36 – When a woman inspects herself with a cloth that has never been used, places it carefully in a box and then finds a very small stain on it, smaller than a grain of wheat, the stain is not attributed to menstruation. If the stain is as large or slightly larger than a grain of wheat, it is considered menstrual.

Isserles: This is only an inspection made with a cloth that is being used for the first time. When the linen has already been used and may show a stain that existed before the inspection, if the woman finds on this linen a stain even the size of a grain of wheat, it is not attributed to menstruation.

190:37 – When a woman, after inspecting herself with a cloth that has never been used, places it on her thigh without looking at it, if she then finds a blood stain the size of a grain, the stain is not attributed to menstruation.

Isserles: She has even less to worry about, if she has placed her small cloth in a place where it could certainly be stained by the effect of an external cause; then the stain is ignored, even if it is bigger than a grain of wheat.

190:38 – A cloth is said to have been used, when the woman, after inspecting herself with it, has put it aside without looking at it, and then has not gone to a slaughterhouse, nor engaged in any work where it might have become stained, so that the staining of the cloth can be attributed to an external cause.

190:39 – If, before dressing, a woman inspects her garment and finds nothing, then later sees a stain, this is attributed to menstruation. But if she dresses without first inspecting her dress, it is assumed that the stain discovered was already there and has a completely different origin than menstruation.

190:40 – When, before putting on a garment, a woman inspects it and finds no stain, then takes it off and inspects it again, finding nothing suspicious, then lends it to another woman, who, after wearing it, finds a stain, the owner of the garment is deemed pure; but the second person must purify herself.

190:41 – When a woman, before putting on a garment, inspects it and finds it spotless, then does not look at it after leaving it, and lends it to an Israelite who has her times, or to a Kouthi; when, afterwards, the owner of the garment finds it stained, it is admitted that she is nevertheless pure, for the stain is attributed to the Israelite who was indisposed, or to the Kouthi woman who never inspects herself. Similarly, if, after inspecting herself and finding nothing suspicious, she lends her garment to an Israelite woman who has her periods, or to a Kuthi woman, and then puts the garment on again without inspecting it and finds a stain in it after she has left it, it is accepted that the stain came from the borrower, even if the owner of the garment was, while she was wearing it, within the period of the seven days of purity.

Gloss: V. § 196. In the latter case, however, it is good to be more severe for the owner of the garment, if she was, when she wore it, within the first three days of the week of purity.

190:42 – A woman has lent one of her garments to a woman not yet nubile, and the latter has worn it within twenty-four hours of her marriage; or she has lent it to a woman who has just married and who has worn the garment within four days of her marriage; or she has lent it to a woman who is in her days of purity (i.e. in the days preceding her purifying ablutions after the birth of a child): if she then discovers a stain in that garment, the stain is attributed to the borrower of the garment. The same applies if she has lent her dress to a woman who is in her seven days of purity before the purifying ablutions.

190:43 – If a woman has lent one of her garments to a person who often finds stains on herself, and if the borrower found a stain on herself before putting on the garment in question, or if she found one on another garment after putting on this one, when the owner finds a stain on the lent garment, it cannot be said that the stain came from the borrower, and both women will have to purify themselves. This double purification is even more necessary when the garment has been lent to a woman who was pure before putting it on, and then a stain is found on it.

190:44 – When a woman, after putting on a garment during her periods, puts it back on being pure, without having inspected it beforehand, and she sees a stain in it when she leaves it, we admit that this stain comes from the time when the woman was indisposed.

190:45 – A pregnant woman who finds a stain on a garment she wore before her pregnancy must attribute the stain to the time when she was not yet pregnant. Likewise a woman, nursing her child, who finds a stain on a dress she wore before conception, must attribute the stain to that earlier time.

Gloss: The same applies to a woman who has stopped menstruating and finds a stain on a garment she was wearing at the time she was still menstruating.

190:46 – When a woman gives a garment she has worn during her periods to be washed, puts it on after washing, and finds a stain on it when she leaves it, several cases arise:

1̊ The washerwoman is an Israelite, but is not present so that she can be asked whether the stain predated the washing and resisted it; the woman must then purify herself.

2̊ The Israelite washerwoman is there and, on the doctor's question, declares that she did not inspect the garment after washing it, and therefore does not know whether or not the stain predates the washing; in this case, it can be assumed that the stain predates the washing, and the woman does not have to purify herself.

3̊ If the washerwoman is not an Israelite, such as a Kuthi, even if she is not present for questioning, the stain is assumed to have been there before the washing. However, we can sometimes assign a date to the stain, based on its appearance. For example, if the stain appears very dark and as if it has penetrated the fabric, it is assumed that it predates laundering, and that laundering merely imprinted it further into the fabric; if, on the other hand, the stain appears superficial, it is assumed to have formed after laundering. If you can't tell from the appearance of the stain whether or not it was there before laundering, you must be severe and the woman must purify herself.

190:47 – When a woman puts on a garment after inspecting it and finding nothing in it, and then washes it after leaving it, and lends it, and then a stain is found after the borrower has returned it, there are two cases to consider:

1̊ The stain is superficial and appears recent; it is then attributed to the borrower, who will have to purify herself, while the owner of the garment need not worry about anything.

2̊ The stain appears dark and deep in the fabric; in this case, it is assumed to date from before the washing, and the owner of the garment will have to purify herself.

190:48 – When two women take turns wearing the same garment and a stain is found on it, they must both purify themselves if the stain is below the waist; they are both pure if the stain is above the waist. When one of the two women is much larger than the other, if the stain is below the belt for the larger woman, it is also necessarily below the belt for the smaller woman, and they must both purify themselves; but if the stain is below the belt for the smaller woman and above the belt for the larger woman, only the smaller of the two women must purify herself. This refers only to a garment that has been worn; but if this garment has been used as a covering, both women must purify themselves; if only one of them has covered herself with the garment, she alone must purify herself.

190:49 – Three women have worn the same garment and successively sat on the same bench, made of a material that absorbs impurities: if a stain is then found on this garment, all three must purify themselves. We're talking here about three women, each as likely to menstruate as the other; but if, among these three women, one is less likely to have a stain than the other two, for example if she's old or nursing a child or is pregnant, she's off the hook.

190:50 – If three women sleep entwined, so that their feet intertwine, and if a stain is found on their bed, all three must purify themselves. If they sleep without being entwined, they must nevertheless all purify themselves, if a stain is discovered under the woman who sleeps in the middle of the other two. If a stain is found in the space between the first and second woman, they are both impure, but the third woman is pure. If a stain is found in the space between the second woman and the third, the first woman is pure and the other two must purify themselves. It is assumed that they climbed into bed by the usual side; but if they climbed by the alleyway, all three must purify themselves, even if the stain was discovered near the third woman, near the one towards the alleyway; indeed, it can be thought that the drop of blood may have come from one of the first two, as they passed by to lie down. This is only a stain found on the bottom sheet. When the stain is on the top sheet, which is movable, all three must always purify themselves, regardless of where the stain is.

190:51 – The provisions of art. 50 apply if all three women have not inspected themselves before going to bed, or have inspected themselves and found that all three are pure. But if one or two of them inspected themselves when they got up and found themselves pure, we attribute the stain to the other two or the third; but if these other two or this third also inspected themselves and found themselves pure, we return to the first case of art. 50, i.e. all three women must purify themselves. If one of them has inspected herself and found herself indisposed, she is considered impure and those who have not inspected themselves are pure. When two inspect themselves and see that they are at the time of their periods, the third is pure; the stain is attributed to those who inspected themselves and saw that they had their periods, so as not to worry unnecessarily the one who did not inspect herself. When we say that, of the three women, those who inspected themselves and found themselves pure remain pure, it is clearly understood that the inspection was made immediately after the stain was discovered; if the women wait a little, their inspection is no longer of value and all three must purify themselves.

190:52 – The preceding prescriptions apply to women who lie side by side and are equally fit to have their periods. But if one of them is old, for example, and has not been indisposed for three months in a row, the stain cannot be attributed to her, and she does not have to purify herself; the same is true when one of the two women is in a visible state of pregnancy; the stain is not attributed to her either; likewise for the young girl not yet nubile or for the woman nursing her child; the stain is in these three cases attributed to the one of the two women who regularly has her periods. Just as the stain is not attributed to the woman who cannot have her periods, so when a woman finds a stain on a garment she wears while pregnant, but which she also wore before she was pregnant, the stain is said to predate the pregnancy. The same rule applies to an elderly woman, or a woman nursing her child, who puts on a garment she wore when she had periods. But if the two women are in a situation where they do not have periods, for example are both elderly, or breastfeeding their children, or are one elderly and the other breastfeeding her child, and if, having rested together, there has been a stain on their diaper, this stain being no more attributable to one than to the other, they must both purify themselves. When three women are next to each other on a bed or bench, but without clothes that can fly off and move around, and a stain is found under one of them, even under the woman in the middle, if the other two women can affirm that they have not moved from their respective places, these women remain pure. If the stain is between two of the women, those two women must purify themselves, not the third. If they have passed one after the other, to lie down or to sit down, through the bed alley or through the end of the bench, and the stain is found under the third woman, all three are considered impure (see above). If they passed as just described, and the stain found is under the middle person, the second and first are impure; but the third, who did not have to pass through the middle, is pure. If, finally, the stain is under the first person, the other two, the middle one and the third are equally pure. If all three women have been working, grinding for example, and a stain is found under the second, the first and second are impure, because the first, in a movement of her work, may have approached the place of the second. If the stain is found under the third person, that person alone is impure; he may, indeed, push the second, but the second, in the movement due to work, does not come towards the third.

190:53 – Art. 52 refers only to cases where none of the three women has engaged in work that could have stained her; otherwise, the stain is attributed to the work performed by one of them, and all three are pure.

190:54 – A stain found as we have seen above should not be considered as setting a menstruation date, and does not require any precautions to be taken at the same time for the following month. As we have also seen, these stains do not always necessitate purification. However, a stain found on the inspection linen always requires purification and demands that precautions be taken the following month on the same date.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

191 – Law concerning blood found by a woman in her urine.

191:1 – When a woman finds blood in her urine, she does not have to purify herself, whether she was sitting or standing during urination. The same applies if she felt pain or was sweating at the time; the organic disorder and the presence of blood are not attributed to menstruation, but to kidney disease or injury to the urethra.

Isserles: Some say that the blood comes from a lesion of the kidneys or urethra, when the woman urinates sitting down; if she has urinated standing up, they admit that the blood is not of menstrual origin, when the operation has been done very quickly and the blood is in the vase with the urine; But if, in this case (standing), the micturition is slow and the blood is close to the vase, these doctors presume that the blood is of menstrual origin; for, in slow micturition, the urine has time to return to the menstrual canal. Others declare that, in the case where the woman is seated to urinate, the blood is not attributed to menstruation, if the operation is done very quickly and the blood is in the middle of the vase; but that if the operation is done slowly and the blood is next to the vase, the blood must be given a menstrual origin; these same doctors always attribute to menstruation the blood found in the urine, when urination takes place standing up. Many commentators are also of this opinion. We are concerned here only with blood found in a vessel used exclusively by a woman; when others besides her use the same vessel, she is still deemed pure. The article and gloss are to be followed in their entirety, when a woman finds blood in her urine once by chance; but if she always finds it and experiences pain at every micturition, the blood is attributed to a disease of the kidneys or bladder; the pain experienced is an indication that the kidneys are in poor condition. Some doctors are more severe, and want the woman to inspect herself with the cloth before urinating; if three times the cloth has come out immaculate, and yet she has found blood in the urine, it is obvious that this blood is not from a menstrual source, and she need not inspect herself again. If she feels no pain when she urinates, then inspects herself, and finds a stain on the cloth and no blood in the urine, she must naturally purify herself. But if she finds blood in the urine and on the linen, some doctors demand purification; others declare that the blood that stained the linen is not from a menstrual source, but is part of the blood that is in the urine and comes from the kidneys. A woman does not need to inspect herself because she has found blood in her urine, even if she has noticed it very often; if she has inspected herself three times and found nothing on the cloth, she should not inspect herself at all. If she has found blood in her urine on certain dates of the month only, the blood is attributed to menstruation, and these dates are taken as periods. If, while inspecting, she sees sand-like granulations, roughness or fibers in the blood on the linen, and the same gravels or fibers are visible in the blood in the urine, the blood on the linen is no longer said to come from menstruation, but is considered to be the same as that in the urine and to come from a disease of the urinary system.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

192 – Laws concerning the girl who is to be married.

192:1 – When a young girl who has been asked to marry accepts this request, she must wait seven days between the time she accepts and the time the marriage is celebrated; the day of the request does not count towards the seven days. She must count these seven days even if she doesn't feel indisposed, as emotion may have brought on a stain without her noticing; she must also inspect herself during this time.

Gloss: When the girl has only inspected herself once during the seven days, there's no need to worry about the fait accompli; but she mustn't neglect these inspections on purpose.

192:2 – The bride counts the seven days from the moment she has decided to marry, and begins preparations for her change of life, whether or not the young man has pronounced the sacramental words that bind him to the girl.

Isserles: The celebration of marriage should not take place long after the purifying ablutions. It is customary for the maiden to be purified on Wednesday and to become a bride on Saturday evening. It is not necessary to wait any longer for the celebration. However, if the marriage has not been consummated by Saturday's close, the bride must inspect herself again. The husband must, before the beginning of intimate life, ask his wife if she has observed the law laid down in article 1.

192:3 – When, for whatever reason, the wedding is postponed, the seven days of inspection no longer count, and the girl must start inspecting herself again during the same period of time, from the moment the new date has been set.

Gloss: The seven days prior to the postponement of the wedding do not count, even if the bride inspected herself every day.

192:4 – When the marriage is celebrated before the end of the seven days, the newlyweds are not allowed to be together in the same room until the end of the prescribed time; the bride must sleep in a room with someone of her own sex; the groom does the same. This is also the case if, after the marriage has been celebrated, the bride finds herself indisposed on her wedding day.

Isserles: Some say that when a young woman has not felt anything at the time of the ceremony and is indisposed afterwards, she should not stay with her husband; but neither of them needs to be with a person of their own sex in their respective rooms. Heaven, however, blesses spouses who are strict about this principle. No distinction is made between spouses according to whether they were single, widowed or divorced before uniting. Others say: when the aforementioned case arises, the newlyweds must not be together either during the day or at night; they may remain alone, each in his or her own room; they have the right to be reunited in one room, where men and women are together. Still others declare that, in this case, each of the spouses must remain at night with a person of his or her own sex, who guards him or her, but that during the day the spouses have the right to occupy the same room alone. However, even during the day, it is customary for spouses to avoid staying alone and to keep a child with them.

192:5 – When, having divorced, two former spouses remarry, the woman must count the seven days in the same way as the young girl (v. article 1).

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

193 – Law concerning the blood of virginity

193:1 – Husbands and wives must separate immediately after the beginning of their intimate life, even if the young woman has not found any stains and has not yet had her periods before getting married. From then on, the wife must count five days, as in the case of menstruation, and then seven days during which she inspects herself. The only difference between the young bride and the married woman is that the husband has the right to sleep on the former's sheets once she has left the conjugal bed, whereas he cannot do so with the latter.

Isserles: Some say it's better to be less strict with a young woman who hasn't yet had her periods, while others say it's better to be very strict.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

196 – Laws concerning inspections and clothing of a woman during the seven days preceding immersion

196:11 – If, while counting her seven days, a woman loses a germ, for example after the fifth day, she cannot finish counting her seven days, but must wait three days, as in the case of menstruation, and then count seven days after these three days have elapsed. If, the day after a moment of intimacy, the woman has a loss, she must also count three days, then again seven days, before purification. For example, if the moment of intimacy took place on Saturday evening and the woman had a loss the following day, she should not start counting her seven days until the following Thursday; but if, after a moment of intimacy on Saturday evening, she had a loss the following Wednesday, she can start counting her seven days from the following day, i.e. from Thursday.

Isserles: Although according to art. 11, in the event of loss on Saturday evening or Sunday morning, the woman has the right to begin counting her seven days on the following Thursday, since Thursday is part of the seven days, according to some doctors, Thursday should be counted in the three days preceding the week of purification, and the seven days should not begin to be counted until Friday. This is because the woman does not know whether the moment of intimacy took place before or after sunset; but if it took place after sunset, she must count an extra twenty-four hours, and if in doubt, it is better to adopt the most severe rule. There are women who, being even stricter, wait seven days before counting the seven days preceding purification; they may act in this way, but it is better, when it is not necessary, not to force nature. When a woman has found a stain on herself, she must count five days before the seven days preceding purification; the day she saw the stain counts towards the five days.

196:12 – If a woman has made a mistake in counting her seven days, has made her immersion at the end of the sixth day, and has resumed intimate life, she must wait again for her seventy-two hours and then repeat her immersion. If she has indeed made her immersion at the end of the seventh day, but not in the prescribed manner, and has resumed conjugal life, she does not have to wait a certain amount of time, as in the previous case, but must repeat the immersion.

196:13 – If, after intimate life, the woman has had a loss and does not want to count five days, but begin the next day to count the seven days preceding purification, she may do so, provided she wipes the parts from which the loss came perfectly or washes them with hot water.

Isserles: Some say: since we are no longer perfectly fit to do inspections these days, when a woman notices a loss, she should always count five days before counting the seven days preceding purification. Those who do not follow this prescription incur the celestial curse.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

197 – A woman must not immerse during the day, i.e. before sunset.

197:1 – Any woman who has had her periods or given birth is considered impure until she has immersed herself. Women who fail to observe the laws concerning immersion will be punished by premature death (karet).

197:2 – When the husband is in town, the wife must not postpone the moment of immersion, as she must not hinder her fertility.

Isserles: Immersion must be performed after sunset; then, taking article 2 literally, the doctors allow the woman, whose husband is present, to perform her immersion on Friday after sunset, if immersion falls on that day, although Friday evening is as holy as Saturday. If the woman could perform the immersion on Thursday, but did not because her husband was absent, she must not do it on Friday after sunset either, because she did not take advantage of Thursday. Such is the custom in many places; in those where it is not customary to be so severe, immersion may be performed on Friday evening. In some countries, the Sabbath, after sunset, is very strict. A woman who could have purified herself earlier, but didn't, must not purify herself on the Sabbath after sunset. Before immersion, the woman must take a bath and wash her hair, and this operation must shortly precede purification. A widow who has remarried on a Friday may not purify herself on Friday after sunset, because she must not approach her husband for the first time on a Friday evening; nor may she purify herself on the Sabbath after sunset. Others, less strict, do not allow the remarried widow to purify herself on Friday, but give her the right to do so on the Sabbath, after sunset.

197:2 – Art. 2 - When the husband is in town, the wife must not the wife must not delay the moment of immersion, as she must not hinder his fertility.

Isserles: Immersion must take place after sunset. Then, taking article 2 literally, the authorities allow a woman whose husband is present, to perform her immersion on Friday after sunset, if the immersion falls on that day even though Friday evening is as holy as Saturday. If the woman could perform the immersion on Thursday, but did not do so because her her husband was absent, she must not do it on Friday after sunset, because she has not professed because she did not enjoy Thursday. Such is the custom in in many places. In those places where people don't have to be so severe, the immersion can be performed on Friday evening. In some countries they are very strict about the Sabbath, after sunset. A woman who could have purified herself earlier and did not do so, must not purify herself on the Sabbath after sunset. Before immersion, the woman must take a bath and wash her hair, and this operation must precede the purification by a short time. A widow who remarries on Friday must not purify herself should not purify herself on Friday after sunset because she must not approach her husband for the first time her husband for the first time on a Friday evening. Nor may she purify herself on the Sabbath, after sunset. Others, less severe do not allow the remarried widow to purify herself on Fridays, but do allow her to purify on the Sabbath, after sunset.

197:3 – It is forbidden to purify during the day; even if the woman has waited until the eighth or ninth day, she must not immerse before sunset, in order to set a good example for her daughter.

Isserles: Indeed, if the young girl knows that her mother is purifying herself before the prescribed time, she will later do the same; she will not wait for the eighth day, but will bathe on the seventh, and thus she will not have counted the full seven days that must precede purification. Bridegrooms alone may purify themselves during the day, but as soon as they have received the nuptial blessing they follow the same immersions as other women.

197:4 – In the case of force majeure, for example: the woman fears that the water, colder after sunset, could be dangerous to her health; or she lives in an unsafe place, where it's not safe to travel in the evening because of thieves; or she lives outside the city, where she must take her immersion baths, and when night comes the gates are closed - in all these cases, she has the right to purify herself on the day of the eighth, but never on the day of the seventh.

197:5 – If, however, the woman has immersed herself without just cause on the eighth day before sunset, this immersion still counts; it also counts if it is done on the seventh day before sunset.

Isserles: However, in the second case, the woman must not resume intimate life before the eighth day, sunset.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

198 – Laws governing immersion and the operations preceding purification

198:1 – At the moment of immersion, the whole body must be plunged into the water all at once, without any of its parts remaining covered. Although many people don't care if the woman has anything adhering to her body, the immersion is nullified by the fact that the woman will have kept anything on her.

Isserles: Deliberately, the woman should not even, at the moment of immersion, keep anything on her that does not form a separation between her and the water, because it would be feared, if this license were granted, that one would go further by keeping a body on oneself that forms a separation.

198:2 – During immersion, a woolen or linen thread, or a hair ribbon, is considered to form a separation between the body and the water; it's not even enough to loosen this ribbon, it must be removed completely. However, hair that falls to the nape of the neck can be tied, because it doesn't have to be tight, and doesn't float down the back. A tight, wide collar, applied to the neck and slightly revealing the flesh under the chin, should not be kept either.

198:3 – When the threads holding the headdress in place form a net, you can keep this fishnet on your head, because water passes easily through it.

198:4 – When the threads holding the coiffure in place are detached, they are not considered to form a screen between the body and the water.

Isserles: However, when they are gold threads, it is forbidden to keep them, even detached, during immersion. This is because the woman will want to avoid getting them wet if they are intact, and if they are a little dusty, she won't want the dust to form mud with the water; as a result, the water won't pass over her head.

198:5 – When two or more hairs are tied together, the knot is not considered to form a separation between the body and the water; the same is not true when a single hair is tied.

198:6 – The hair of the beard and that which sometimes grows on the chest form a separation between the body and the water, when they are stuck together by sweat; the case cannot arise for the hair of the head, through which the comb passes daily. If the hair on the parts that are always covered is stuck together, it is not considered to form a separation between body and water in the case of men and girls, but the same does not apply to married women.

Isserles: Hair braided during the day and unbraided at night does not form a separation between body and water.

198:7 – Chassis on the eyebrows is considered to form a separation between the body and the water, and a woman must not immerse in this state. Chassis that is still wet is not an obstacle, but dry chassis, i.e. that which has a greenish color, whether in the corners of the eyes or on the eyes, forms an obstacle to water.

198:8 – The makeup that some women put in their eyes doesn't form an obstacle to water, but the makeup they put on the edge of their eyelids does, unless it's a woman who opens and closes her eyes with a very frequent movement.

198:9 – When a woman has a wound and coagulated blood has remained on the wound for more than three days, the dried blood is considered to form an obstacle between the body and the water; the same does not apply to the humor outside the wound. When a woman has scabs, these prevent water from reaching the body, and before immersion they must be washed in hot water, which softens them.

198:10 – The crust formed over a wound scar is a barrier between water and the body.

198:11 – When a woman gets a splinter before immersing herself, the splinter is considered to form an obstacle to water if it protrudes, but not if it is completely under the skin.

198:12 – Sweat that has left a trace on the body does not prevent immersion from being valid; but when sweat, mixed with dust, forms a kind of crust, this crust is considered a screen preventing water from bathing the skin.

198:13 – A particle of dough which, during kneading, has stuck to the arm or another part of the body, is considered to be an obstacle to immersion water.

198:14 – A particle of Greek clay, modelling clay, potters' clay or the clay found on carriage wheels is also an obstacle to water; the same does not apply to other types of clay, which immediately disintegrate in water; however, when a parcel of mud has dried out on the body, it is still considered an obstacle to water.

Gloss: For extremely meticulous women, even undried mud is considered an obstacle.

198:15 – A stain of ink, milk, honey or candied fig juice is not an obstacle to water when the stain is fresh; any other stain, even fresh, is an obstacle.

198:16 – Fresh blood, which is starting to coagulate and form filaments, forms a barrier to water.

198:18 – The black deposit that can sometimes be found under the nails, or the paste that can become lodged there when the nail is kneaded, form an obstacle to water if they do not face the finger; they do not form an obstacle if they do. Black deposits are said to face the finger when the nail is very long. However, as we are no longer in a position to decide on this matter, it is simpler to cut the nails before immersion, and this has become customary among women.

198:19 – If there's a blister under the nail that prevents it from being cut and cleaned, and if the blister is large enough to make it impossible to see whether the nail has a black deposit or not, it's not considered an obstacle, and immersion is valid.

198:20 – It is the black deposit or paste that forms an obstacle to water, but the nail itself is never an obstacle, if it is clean, however long it may be.

Isserles: Fingernails, when clean, do not form an obstacle to water; but, since it is customary to cut one's fingernails before immersion, if the woman omits to cut one [nail], the immersion is no longer valid; it must be repeated.

198:21 – When a small part of the nail has become detached, the rest of the nail is considered an obstacle to water; when the detached part is the largest part of the nail, this is no longer the case.

198:22 – A detached part of the body, or a hanging piece of flesh, is considered an obstacle to water.

Gloss: A wart or an extra organ (a sixth finger, for example) does not form an obstacle when it is not detached from the body.

198:23 – Chains, earrings, rings and necklaces form a screen between the person and the water, if they are tight against the areas they adorn; they do not form a screen if they are loose. The same is true of a cloth wrapped around a wound, or a bandage around a fracture.

198:24 – Before purifying, teeth must be carefully brushed. If, after immersion, the woman finds anything attached to her body, the immersion is void. In some places, it's customary not to eat meat before immersion, because even if you clean your teeth, some meat filaments may remain. This practice is to be recommended.

Isserles: Don't eat between the simple bath and the purification bath. On the day of her immersion, a woman must not knead dough or make wax candles, lest any dough or wax stick to her.

198:25 – If, before immersion, the woman has omitted to wash the parts of the body that are always covered, as well as the joints, and if, after the purification bath, she finds anything on her that could have formed an obstacle to the water, the immersion is void. If she finds nothing, the bath is valid, even if she has not previously inspected the parts just mentioned. The omission of this inspection is less serious than that of carefully combing and untangling the hair and inspecting the body in general.

198:26 – A woman has not inspected her teeth before immersion, nor the parts of her body that are always covered, nor has she inspected herself immediately after bathing, and then engaged in certain tasks where she could have stained herself, such as preparing food; then having inspected herself after these tasks, she notices something on herself that could have impeded the water: the immersion remains valid, as it is accepted that what she found during her late inspection came from the occupations in which she had indulged.

198:27 – If, during the purification bath, she clenches a hair between her teeth, holds something between her lips, or clenches her fist, the immersion is void.

198:28 – During the bath, the purifying woman must not be held by the hand; however, if the companion, who is holding her hand, has previously dipped her hands in water, the immersion is valid, as the water that moistens her hands is one with the water of the purification bath.

198:29 – It is absolutely against all the rules for a woman, wanting to immerse herself in a miqvah that contains no more than forty seah of water, to ask her companion to weigh down on her so that the water covers her completely.

198:30 – When a woman immerses herself in a miqvah with a paved bottom, she doesn't have to lift her feet during purification; in fact, as she descended, her feet made contact with the water, before touching the stones at the bottom.

198:31 – It is forbidden to take the purification bath in a bathtub. When the floor of the miqvah is clayey, the woman must not stand on a wooden object or wooden benches, as wood absorbs impurities; the immersion would be null and void in this case. However, a mat made of branches can be placed at the bottom of the miqvah. Nor should a woman place a pottery object or shavings at the bottom of the miqvah in order to climb onto it; the doctors say that, as the bath is made dangerous in this case, the woman will be afraid of slipping and will not purify herself properly; however, in the event of a fait accompli, the immersion is valid. Nor, for the same reason, can a woman purify herself on the miqvah staircase if it is made of wood, even if the staircase is fixed. If she has purified herself on the staircase, the purification is void. For her to have the right to perform her immersion on the staircase, it must be made of stone, and the width of the steps must be four times the length of her foot, so that she has no fear of falling.

198:32 – When wicker has been placed in the bottom of the miqvah, the immersion can be performed, provided the wicker sticks have not been braided to form a kind of container.

198:33 – It is feared that the clay will cling to her and form an obstacle between part of her body and the water, so she should place branches or anything else that does not absorb impurities on the bottom. Some consider the purification null and void if the woman has not taken these precautions.

Gloss: Several doctors and commentators admit that purification is still valid.

198:34 – The woman should not perform her purification in a crowded place; it is feared that the fear of being seen will cause her to hurry, and that her purification will not be perfect; however, these immersions are valid in the event of a fait accompli.

198:35 – In purifying herself, a woman must not stand or bend excessively; she must maintain her usual posture, nor spread her upper or lower limbs too far apart. In the case of a fait accompli, however, purification is valid; for one commentator, it is null and void.

198:36 – The miqvah water must rise at least one zereth above the navel.

198:37 – One authority declares a miqvah where the water covers the body entirely good only if the person positions himself so that his body and face touch the ground.

Gloss: See § 201, art. 66, gloss.

198:38 – During purification, the mouth must not be opened in such a way that water can penetrate it; but if the lips are tightly pressed together, the immersion is invalid (see art. 27 above); the lips must be held slightly closed, as is customary.

198:39 – According to some authorities, you should neither open your eyes too much, nor close them completely, during purification, otherwise it will be null and void.

198:40 – The purification must take place in the presence of an Israelite woman, at least twelve years old, and in daylight, so that she can see whether the whole person, and even the hair, has been immersed in the water; for hair can sometimes float above the water. When there is no witness, or when the purification is done in the evening, the hair should be lightly but loosely tied, either with a ribbon, threads or a net; in this way, the hair will soak in the water at the same time as the head.

198:41 – When, undressed and ready to purify herself, a woman takes her child on her back, the purification is nullified by this fact. The child could indeed have clay or some other impurity on its feet, and this impurity could have fallen on its mother and attached itself to her; this impurity could, it's true, have come off in the water during immersion, but it had nevertheless formed an obstacle between the water and the body, without the person suspecting it.

198:42 – Impurities between the toes during immersion form an obstacle between the body and the water.

198:43 – When an impurity is found in a part of the body that is always covered, and where water only reaches with difficulty, this impurity is nevertheless considered an obstacle between the body and the water.

Isserles: Some require that before the purification bath, the woman urinates and makes sure that no impurity adheres to her body; she must even blow her nose.

198:44 – One or two hairs stuck to a head wound, two hairs stuck together by impurity or by humor from an eye, two eyelashes from the lower eyelid attached to the upper eyelid, are considered obstacles to water.

198:45 – It is forbidden to purify oneself with dust on the feet, as dust is considered an obstacle to water. However, when a woman has purified herself under these conditions, some consider this purification valid; others annul it, unless the woman has taken the care to wipe her feet before immersion or has purified herself in hot water.

198:46 – Immersion with bathrobe is valid.

199:47 – When certain insects are found on parts of the body that are always covered, and these insects have penetrated deep into the skin, they must be removed before purification, either by washing with hot water, or by scratching with the fingernail; however, they are not considered an obstacle to water, if they cannot be removed.

198:48 – Immersion without intention is valid. A fall into the water, or an immersion made for the purpose of refreshing oneself, are immersions without intention.

Isserles: Some are more severe and say that, for a purification to be valid, the woman must have prepared herself for it; the woman will therefore have to immerse herself again, when there has been immersion without intention. Some are strict only if there was deliberate intent. A woman must be modest and keep her purification a secret from those around her. Many women arrange to meet a friend on their way home; the woman who has just purified herself must not find, as her first object of sight, a filthy animal, nor meet a pagan at that moment. A very virtuous woman who happens to see an impure object on her way back from purification returns to purify herself again. See § 201, whether hot water may be poured into the miqvah and whether a woman may wash herself after purification.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

199 – Laws concerning immersions on weekdays and Saturdays, and inspection of secret parts of the body

199:1 – Before the purification bath, the woman must carefully wash the secret parts of the body, comb her hair so that there are no tangles, and inspect herself so that nothing impure remains on her; then she must take a hot bath and also wash her hair in hot water.

199:2 – Before the purification bath, she must wash the parts of her body where there is hair with hot water; water warmed by the summer sun is sufficient, but it is forbidden to use cold water, nitre or soap, as both cold water and soap tangle the hair.

Isserles: This has the force of law if there was a deliberate intention; in the case of a fait accompli, if the woman washed with cold water or with nitre or soap and saw that her hair was not matted for that reason, she does not have to repeat her washing. When the doctor forbids washing the head with hot water and recommends wine, the woman must ask him if this wine does not stick to the hair; if he says it doesn't, she must believe him; if he says he doesn't know the effect, she must give it a try.

199:3 – You can deliberately make preparations before sunset and then purify yourself at sunset. An excellent practice among most women, after the preparations, is to take a comb to the miqvah at sunset to use before the purification bath.

Isserles: If, due to force majeure, the woman can only make her preparations early in the day, or late at night, these preparations are valid, provided they are made conscientiously.

199:4 – When a woman has to go to the miqvah on Saturday evening, she can't make her preparations before sunset because of the sabbatical rest; she then makes them after sunset, immediately before the purification bath.

Isserles: In the latter case, however, it is customary to make all her preparations on Friday and comb her hair again on Saturday evening before the bath.

199:5 – When immersion falls on a Friday evening, preparations must be made on Friday during the day.

199:6 – If the bath falls on a Saturday evening, which is also a party night, preparations must still be made on Friday. Similarly, if the bath falls on a Friday evening, and Thursday and Friday are feast days, the preparations must be made on Wednesday, and care must be taken to tie up the hair so that it doesn't tangle at all.

Isserles: When preparations precede immersion by one or two days, the greatest care must be taken in the meantime to ensure that nothing attaches to the body, and not to cook or feed children. If the mother of the family has no one to perform these operations, and does everything herself, she must wash her hands carefully after each job, and check that nothing has attached itself to her. At the time of purification, she must inspect herself carefully, wash her secret parts with hot water, even if this water has been heated during the feast, detangle her hair well, even if she has already done so the day before or the day before, and clean her teeth.

199:7 – When a woman is afraid of immersing in the evening, and if this immersion falls on a Friday evening, she is not allowed to prepare on Friday with a view to immersing on Saturday during the day, as we must not be lenient twice on the same issue: allowing a woman to go to miqvah during the day is a first tolerance, but we cannot also allow her to prepare for immersion in advance, which would be the case if the woman were to purify herself on Saturday. See § 197, art. 3.

199:8 – When, having prepared herself one day, a woman goes to miqvah the next, the immersion is valid as a fait accompli, even if she did not inspect herself a second time at the time of purification. An unprepared purification is always null and void, even if the woman, having inspected herself afterwards and combed her hair, has found nothing to nullify it. If, before going to the miqvah, the woman washes only the parts where there is hair and omits to inspect and wash the rest, her purification is also void, for the care of the body is prescribed by the Pentateuch.

199:9 – However, if the woman's inspection includes only the secret parts of the body and does not reveal any abnormalities after immersion, the immersion remains valid.

199:10 – When, on leaving the miqvah, the woman finds on her person any object that might form an obstacle between the water and the body, two cases must be considered: 1̊ the preparations were made immediately before immersion: the purification is valid; 2̊ the preparations were made some time before: the purification is void, since it is then accepted that the foreign body may have attached itself before the woman entered the miqvah.

Isserles: Even when the preparations took place shortly beforehand (e.g., before sunset and the purification took place after sunset), the purification must be renewed; for it is considered that the two operations were performed at different times. According to Maimonides, purification must be renewed even if the immersion took place immediately after the preparations; he makes only this distinction between the two cases in art. 10: in the first case, the woman need only repeat the immersion, and in the second case she must comb her hair again and redo all her preparations.

199:11 – Art. 10 is applicable only when the woman has found some impurity on her person, without having touched anything; but if she has noticed on her person a bit of paste, for example, after kneading, or a stain from some foreign body she has touched, it is accepted that the object has attached itself to her after immersion, and she need not begin again. When she finds herself in the case in question, and has not made any preparations, the purification remains null and void.

199:12 – Art. 11 refers to the body in general; as for secret parts, even if they have not been inspected either before or after purification, if the woman finds a foreign element in them afterwards, which may have slipped in through work done after immersion, the purification remains valid.

199:13 – If, after having made all her preparations, a woman engages in work or feeds a child, which may leave a trace on her, her purification is void, if she does not inspect herself again before going down into the miqvah, even if she found nothing on her when she came out; for it is thought that if anything had attached itself to her, this impurity may only have detached itself from her body when she came out of the immersion.

Isserles: If she inspected herself before entering the water and didn't notice anything, the immersion is valid. She may, between the time she makes her preparations and the time she goes to the miqvah, wear the same garment she wore before the preparations, but she must not take a child with her.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

200 – When to pronounce the blessing of immersion

200:1 – After taking off her clothes, except for her shirt, the woman pronounces the following blessing: “Praise be to you, O Lord our God, Master of the universe, who has sanctified us with your commandments and commanded us to bathe in purification”. Then she finishes undressing and immerses herself. If she has gone down into the miqvah and forgotten to say the blessing, she should say it on the way back up, when she still has water up to her neck; but if the water is clear and transparent, she should shake the water with her legs, so as to hide her body in the eddy.

Isserles: Some say that when the prayer has been forgotten, it should only be said after immersion. Others say that while still in the water, the woman should cover herself with a cloth and say the prayer she has omitted before getting into the bath.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

202 – Bodies that block water when purifying vases or other utensils

202:1 – Pitch or gum, spread on the inside or outside of a glass vase to be purified, impedes the flow of water.

202:2 – Any material attached to the vase, which is not generally considered to be an obstacle between the vase and the water of purification, is not considered to be an obstacle, unless the material extends over more than half the vase.

Isserles: A deposit of lampblack on the outside of a utensil is not an obstacle to water, and is considered to be one with the utensil.

202:3 – When the vase is fitted with a movable handle, the purification is null and void if the handle has been improperly secured, or has been placed askew, or has not been pushed in as it should have been, or has broken during purification.

202:4 – When, in the course of purification, a tool has been damaged (for example, a knife has lost its handle or a saw its wooden frame), the purification has no value, as the object is now out of use.

202:5 – When a handsaw has an internal slot, i.e. running from the steel to the frame and stopping at the handle, this slot is not an obstacle to water, if the saw is still usable; the same is not true if the slot is external, i.e. running from the handle to the frame. A sticky plaster or a wicker strand, which would serve to hold back the parts separated by the split, form an obstacle to water. But if the crack has been mended with fire, the tool can be purified without inconvenience.

202:6 – The purification of a vase is null if the vase has been immersed in water with the opening downwards, and if care has not been taken to turn it upside down while it was still in the water; for it is feared that the liquid has not entered perfectly into the interior of the vase.

Isserles: You can purify an object by placing it in a vase and immersing the whole thing in water; but the vase you use must be large enough for the object to be mobile in it; the opening of the vase must also be as large as that of a wineskin, so that the water penetrates easily. Therefore, knives cannot be purified by pricking them in a container immersed in water, as this would render them immobile. Lastly, the object placed in the vase must not be heavy either, otherwise it would remain attached to the bottom by one of its sides, and this side would not be purified.

202:7 – To purify a vase that is bulging in the middle, narrow at the top and bottom, shake it in water and place it on its side, so that the water wets the entire surface of its walls.

202:8 – To purify a vase with an opening smaller than that of a wineskin, leave it in water long enough for it to fill completely, or fill it with water before immersing it.

202:9 – When purifying vases with very long handles, intended to be shortened, simply immerse them in water so that the handles only bathe up to the point where they will be sawed off.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

204 – Laws concerning vows

204:2 – If instead of saying: “May this object be forbidden to me as the offering is forbidden to me”, we say: “May this object be to me like the sheep of the burnt offering”, or “like the wood destined to consume the sacrifice”, or “like the altar”, or “like the Temple of Jerusalem”, or “like one of the utensils serving the altar”, we consider that the vow has been pronounced.

Isserles: When we say: “May this object be to me like the Temple table”, we have taken a vow. But if one says: “May this object be forbidden to me like the table” at all, there is no vow. However, if these last words have been pronounced by an ignorant person, he must have recourse to a rabbi to be relieved of what he believes to be a vow; otherwise he would imagine himself entitled to break all vows, even those referred to at the beginning of the gloss.

204:3 – When one person formulates a vow and is overheard by another, who replies: “I'm in the same situation as you”, the second person is obliged to observe the vow formulated by the first; if a third person immediately says: “I'm in the same situation as you”, he must also fulfill the same vow. If a hundred people hear the vow pronounced, and all declare that they are in the same situation as the person who formulated the vow, they are all considered to have formulated the vow, and must observe it.

204:4 – We can deny ourselves something that we don't yet possess, but that we will be able to possess.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

205 – The vow to forbid oneself an object by equating it with something forbidden by the Torah

205:1 – A man said: “May these fruits, or: this kind of fruit, or: meals eaten in the company of such and such a person, be to me like pork, or: like idolatry, or: like the meat of animals not slaughtered according to the rite”, or he said: “May my wife be to me like my mother, or: like my sister, or like the fruits of a young graft, or: like the mixture of various seeds”: All these vows are null and void. However, if such a vow has been taken by an ignorant person, he must have it delivered by a rabbi, whose duty it is then to let him think that what he has forbidden himself may well remain forbidden to him, and to seek a means of dispensing him from this vow, which in reality is not a vow at all. The rabbi must resort to this subterfuge, so that the ignorant man will be afraid of taking rash vows in the future.

Isserles: Some claim that most Israelites today, not studying the Law enough, should be considered ignorant. Others say that the ignoramus himself does not need a rabbi to have one of the vows just mentioned remitted to him, except when it comes to the vow concerning the woman.

205:2 – If a man says “May my wine be like the wine destined for idols, and my bread like the bread of the Kuthîm”, the vow is null and void. But if, in making his vow, he sets himself a condition, namely: “May my wine be to him like the wine destined for idols, and my bread like the bread of the Kuthîm, if he performs such and such an action, or if he commits such and such an offence”, and then commits the act in question, some consider bread and wine to be permissible for him, while others forbid them.

Isserles: If this vow was taken by an ignorant person, he must have it delivered by a rabbi. This refers only to the case where the person has forbidden bread and wine to himself alone; but if he has said that no one would enjoy these foods, they remain forbidden, to punish him for his imprudent vow (See § 229: What happens when one says: “If I do this, I will no longer be an Israelite.”

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

206 – Conjectured and unfinished vows

206:1 – A vow begun and not completed is considered a vow, if, however, from the words spoken it can be deduced that there is a vow. If, for example, one person says to another: “I vow not to eat with you”, or: “I separate from you, so as not to eat with you”, or: “I distance myself from you, so as not to eat with you”, he is forbidden to eat with that other person. But when a person says to another: “I will not eat with you”, without adding: “I vow to”, he is not considered to have made a vow. If, on the other hand, the person says: “I vow to you”, or: “I separate from you”, or: “I distance myself from you”, it is accepted that a vow has been made, and the following is inferred: If the person has said to his interlocutor: “I make a vow towards you”, he must no longer speak to him; if he has said: “I separate myself from you”, there must no longer be any commercial relationship between the two people; if the declaration has been: “I distance myself from you”, the person who has uttered these words must never be within four cubits of the other person.

Gloss: A vow begun is a vow, just as, when we grasp the handle of a utensil, that utensil is considered to have served us. Some say that it is enough to forbid eating together if one person says to the other, “If I eat with you...”.

206:2 – When one man says to another: “I vow about you that we will not eat together, nor enjoy each other's possessions”, the vow weighs on both people. But if one says: “I vow not to eat with you or enjoy your possessions”, the vow weighs only on the person who made it.

206:3 – If a person says to another: “May I be despised, or: excommunicated, if I eat with you”, the vow is void. When he has said only: “May I be despised, or: excommunicated”, and has not finished his sentence, he must stand at least four cubits away from the person to whom he has thus spoken. Finally, if she has said: “May I be far from you”, stopped, then finished: “So that I do not eat with you”, she is forbidden to eat together; but if she has said: “May I be far from you”, without later adding: “So that I do not eat with you”, she must not enjoy any of the goods of the person in question. *When we say: “I want to be far away from you”, we necessarily imply that we wish to cease all self-interested relations with the person in question.

Isserles: Some say: as long as the sentence remains unfinished, it cannot be given the force of a vow.

206:4 – If a man says: “May this bread be for me like the vow of a godless person”, or if he says, with a loaf of bread placed before him: “May the vow of a godless person be for me like...” and does not complete the sentence, there is a vow, and he must not touch that bread. But if he says: “May this bread be for me like the vow of a virtuous man”, or if, faced with a loaf of bread, he says: “May the vows of virtuous people be for me...” and does not finish his sentence, the bread is still permitted. Even if he says: “May this bread be forbidden to me as the vow of a virtuous man”, the vow is void. But if he says: “May this bread be to me as is to the virtuous man his voluntary gift”, or if he says, placed in front of a loaf of bread: “As are to the virtuous man his voluntary gifts...” and does not finish, we consider that a vow has been made.

206:5 – When a person promises not to eat with another person, or to eat with them, there is neither a vow nor even the beginning of a vow; rather, his words can be likened to the beginning of an oath. However, if a person promises to do a good deed, his promise is considered a vow. In today's world, where such promises are commonplace, we must be strict so that vows are not treated lightly, and we must insist on recourse to a rabbi. According to one author, when a man has taken a vow with an oath formula, or an oath with a vow formula, it is considered to be the beginning of a vow. A vow of humility or abstinence, even when taken in the form of an oath, remains a vow.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

208 – Equivocal vows and vows that include the word herem

208:1 – We must be very strict, when it comes to a vow whose meaning is equivocal. For example, if a man says: “May these fruits be to me like the salted meat, or: like the wine of the libations”, we can understand: “May these fruits be to me like the meat of the sacrifices offered in the Temple”, or: like the wine poured in libation, in the Temple”; the vow in this case would have value, since the fruits were assimilated to sacred things. But we could also understand: “May these fruits be to me like salted meat or wine offered to idols”, and the vow would then be null and void, since the person who pronounced it was assimilating the fruits to objects forbidden by their very nature. As both versions are plausible, only the first is accepted, unless the vow-taker declares that he was thinking of meat and wine for idols when he made the vow; in this case, he is taken at his word and his vow is null and void, without the need for a rabbi's help, even if he is ignorant. In countries where it is customary to use the names “salted meat” and “libation wine” to refer only to what was offered in the Temple, if the person making the vow says that he was thinking of offerings made to idols, his statement will not be believed, and he will have to fulfill his vow.

208:2 – When a man, after having said: “I vow that these objects be herem to me” (herem has both the meaning of “consecrated” and that of “net for fishing”), declares that in formulating his vow he was thinking of the net; or if he says: “May this object be sacred to me like that which is offered in sacrifice”, and then declares that he was thinking of the offerings made to the monarch; or if he says: ‘May I be like the burnt offering’, and then declares that he was thinking only of the bone of the burnt offering, his vow is void. If he vows that his wife will be sacred to him, and then says he thought of his first wife, with whom he has divorced, that vow is likewise nullified. It is annulled without the help of a rabbi, when it has been pronounced and interpreted by a talmudist, because a talmudist is trusted. If the vow was made by an ignorant person, he must seek the help of a rabbi; this is to prevent vows from being treated lightly. If the ignorant person tells the rabbi that he regrets his equivocal vow, this is sufficient to annul the vow. When an ignorant person has made a vow, has not fulfilled its clauses, and then has come a few days later to tell the rabbi about it, the rabbi must not punish him by making him observe the vow for a number of days equal to the number of days that have elapsed, when it is an equivocal vow. But if the vow is unequivocal, if it does indeed concern something forbidden by the Torah, the person who made it and did not keep it must be punished by the obligation to fulfill its clauses, for a time equal to the time elapsed between the day he made the vow and the day he reported it to the rabbi. When a man has taken a vow that is almost impossible to keep, such as not to eat any fruit of the earth other than rye, has not kept it and goes to the rabbi, the rabbi must forgive him in full and without punishment, so that he does not commit a greater sin by breaking his vow. One doctor declares that the rabbi should be more severe, not remitting the guilty party as soon as he says he regrets his imprudent vow, but looking for a provision in the law that can free him. Based on these principles, the following rule can be laid down: A person has vowed not to eat meat, not to drink wine, if he were guilty of a certain sin, and, not having fulfilled his vow, comes to a rabbi; the rabbi should absolve him, without imposing abstinence for a time equal to that of the transgression, in order to spare him the sin of breaking his vow.

Isserles: But if the rabbi sees that the person presenting himself to him is a virtuous man, capable of doing what he is commanded, he should impose as punishment not to eat meat, not to drink wine, for a time equal to that of the transgression.

208:3 – If a person has not observed a vow and is liable to punishment, the rabbi should make him fulfill the clauses of his vow for a time equal to that of the transgression, if it is a relatively short time; but if this time is long, the rule is to make him observe the vow for thirty days.

208:4 – When a vow has been made: “May I be despised and considered unclean if I commit such and such a sin”, and this sin has been committed and the vow has not been observed, - if the guilty party reports this to a rabbi some time later, he must not be punished as article 3 would require, because this is a vow forbidden only by rabbinic law.

208:5 – When a man has taken an oath such that it can be understood that he will not marry for three years, and in defiance of this oath he has contracted marriage, - if he then apologizes for this to a rabbi, the rabbi must remit his fault; for the case is identical to that where one has vowed not to eat bread, for example, and has eaten it. But if, from the formula of the oath, we understand that he has sworn not to marry a certain woman for three years, if he has not kept his word and goes to a rabbi, after consummation of the marriage, the rabbi will have to give him as punishment to live separated from his wife, for a time equal to the time elapsed from the vow until the moment he came to reveal this vow to the rabbi.

Gloss: If he was very late in revealing his vow, he must not be separated from his wife for more than thirty days (V. art. 3).

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

209 – From the person who has answered “amen” to the vow made by another person

209:1 – When a person has made a vow, he must fulfill it even if, at the time of the vow, another person present has answered: amen, yes, or some word expressing assent; the latter person is obliged to fulfill the clauses of the vow, just like the one who made it. When a person makes a vow that what belongs to him is forbidden to another person who is listening, and the latter has not protested, the second person must submit to the conditions of the vow.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

210 – Intention in vows

210:3 – When a person, after having made a vow, immediately withdraws it, either because he regrets it or to follow the advice of those present, his vow is cancelled, if he has made it clear that he is withdrawing it. But if that person says, some time after making the vow, that he or she had, in his or her heart of hearts, immediately withdrawn the vow, the vow remains real.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

211 – Denying the validity of vows

211:3 – A man promised himself that the vows he would make for certain things would be void, then he forgot the things he had mentioned (they were, for example, meat and wine), he made a vow saying, “If I remembered the conditions for annulling my vows, I would maintain them at this time”, and then he remembers those conditions: the vow he made is then void, he can eat the meat and drink the wine. But if he didn't say that he was taking his vow with the desire to maintain his former promise of annulment, the vow is real.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

212 – A vow made on an object that is likened to the Torah

212:1 – If you make a vow using the Torah as a point of comparison, for example, if you say: “I vow that these fruits will be for me like the Torah”, the vow is null and void. If the vow was made by a Talmudist, he does not need to consult a rabbi. If the vow was made by an ignoramus, he must seek the help of a rabbi, so that he does not become accustomed to treating matters relating to vows lightly. But if one has said: “May these fruits, or these foods, be for me like the things that are forbidden by the Torah”, then the vow is real, for there are foods that the Torah forbids. If, taking the Torah in hand, one says, “May these fruits be to me like this Torah,” the vow is real, just as if one had said, “May these fruits be as sacred to me as the very words of the Torah.”

Gloss: If, in order to forbid oneself something, one has made an oath on the Torah, one must, in order to annul such a vow, have recourse to a rabbi.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

213 – Vows on intangibles

213:2 – If a person says: “I vow to study such and such a chapter of the Law” the vow is real as if it were a vow to give alms.

213:3 – When a person says: “Let sleep be forbidden to my eyes today, if I sleep tomorrow”, he must watch that first night, because he might forget the condition he has set himself and sleep the next night; but if he has said: “Let sleep be forbidden to my eyes tomorrow, if I sleep today”, he can sleep the first night, and there is no fear that he will forget to watch the next night.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

214 – A rabbi must be consulted when dispensing with a local religious custom (minhag)

214:1 – When, in a country, people have acquired the habit of defending themselves from something that is nevertheless permitted by religious prescriptions, this amounts, for the inhabitants of that country, to having taken a vow to defend themselves from that thing. For this reason, a person who fasts on New Year's Eve, or between New Year's Day and the Day of Atonement, or does not eat meat or drink wine, from the first to the eleventh of Ab, or from 17 Tamuz to 11 AbThe abstinences at the beginning of Tisheri are not intended to mortify the body, but to prepare us to repent of our sins, by keeping us away from material pleasures that numb the conscience. The abstinences at the end of Tamuz and the beginning of Ab are to commemorate for us the sufferings of our fathers in their battles against the Assyrians and Romans, and anyone who no longer wishes to practice these abstinences, because they are no longer strong enough to endure them, must have the permission of three rabbis to dispense with them. This is necessary, if the person had thought at the beginning that he or she would always practice these abstinences. When you want to follow one of these customs (minhag) and have the right to abandon it at a certain point, you have to say, from the outset, that you are not vowing to always follow this minhag. If, in a country, something is considered forbidden that is permitted by religious prescriptions, a person who follows this custom, because he believes the thing is really forbidden, is not bound by this fact and, when he realizes his mistake, he has the right to no longer follow the minhag in question. One author says: If such a person discovers his mistake, he needs the assent of three rabbis to unbind himself, just as if he had made a vow. - When, knowing a thing to be permissible, a person makes it his duty to regard it as forbidden, no rabbi can release him from this vow.

Gloss: The custom is to follow the first opinion.

214:2 – When the notables of a community have instituted a custom forming a “hedge to the Law”, this custom subsists as a vow, and must be followed by posterity, even if it was established without the assent of the members of the community. When people from another town come to settle in a town where one of these prohibitions exists, they are obliged to abide by it. Conversely, if inhabitants of a town where one of these prohibitions exists move to another town where it is not in force, they must no longer obey the prohibition in question.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

215 – Any vow relating to the fulfillment of a precept of the Law is real

215:1 – A vow is real when it concerns a religious precept. For example, if a person says: “I vow not to stay in the tent of foliage (sukkah), or: not to grasp the palm branch (lulab)”, he is forbidden to stay in the sukkah, or to grasp the lulab, during the Festival of the Tents.

Isserles: Some say that a person who has made such a vow is liable to fustigation, because he has promised to violate a commandment. After the rabbi has remitted his vow, he may enter the sukkah and use the lulab. Other authors declare that one cannot punish with fustigation a vow made without utility, but that one can punish in this way for a false oath. The second opinion carries more weight.

215:2 – When a person has vowed to fast for a certain period of time, and that period of time includes a Saturday, a holiday or a neomenia, the rabbi will remit his vow, giving as his reason that if he had been thinking about the aforementioned days at the time he made his vow, he would not have made it.

215:3 – We're talking here only about the case where a person has taken a formal vow, for example: “May I be forbidden to eat for so many days”. But if the person has said, for example, “I want to fast for a certain number of days”, then when Saturdays, holidays, neomenias, Hanukkah or Purim come around, he may eat without the rabbi's permission; for his words are considered an oath and not a vow. And even if she says, “I want to fast on Saturdays and holidays,” she won't have to fast.

Gloss: See Orah Hayim, paragraph 418.

215:4 – When a person makes a formal vow to fast on Saturdays and feast days, his vow must be kept. Similarly, if a person vows to fast on Monday or Sunday for the rest of his or her life, and that day happens to be a holiday or the eve of Yom Kippur, the vow must be kept. It goes without saying that she must also fast on Monday or Sunday, if that day is Neomyen. However, if that day falls on Chanukah or Purim, one should not fast.

Gloss: See Orah Hayim, § 570.

215:5 – Vows made with regard to a positive religious precept are real, whether that precept is always positive, or whether it is positive if obeyed and negative otherwise; the same is true when one has set oneself a positive (non-religious) precept. But when vows are made concerning a negative precept, these vows are void in all cases. For example, if a person vows not to eat any animal that has not been slaughtered according to the rites (nebêlâh), the vow is void. The same applies if the vow is a negative precept, which is not religious, but has been established by the person making the vow; for example, he has vowed not to eat a loaf of bread, and then vows that this same loaf of bread is forbidden to him: the vow is null and void and, by eating the bread, one only commits a sin, that of not having kept the oath that preceded the vow. Similarly, if someone swears not to drink, and then vows not to drink strong liquor, he commits, by drinking, the sin of not fulfilling his oath, and the vow that followed the oath is void; but if he has obtained a remission of his oath, the vow becomes valid. Finally, if a person first swore to drink and sleep, and then made a vow not to drink and sleep, this vow will be real, although it applies to a negative precept that the person set for himself when pronouncing it (not to drink, not to sleep).

215:6 – Some say that when a person has made a vow relating to a biblical defense, for example not to eat an animal that has died without ritual slaughter (nebêlâh) or a forbidden animal (térêfâh), if he eats it, he commits the sin of having violated his vow, in addition to that of having eaten forbidden meat. When a person, in making a vow relating to a biblical defense, has included in that vow other things, which the Pentateuch does not defend, the vow exists only for biblical defenses. But if he has vowed not to eat certain things forbidden by traditional law, and has included in this vow other things that are permitted, the latter are encompassed by the vow.

Isserles: When a man vows or swears not to eat unleavened bread on Passover evening, unleavened egg bread is not included in his vow or oath; but if he vows not to eat unleavened bread throughout the year, unleavened egg bread may be included in that vow.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

216 – The difference between a vow formulated in this way: “May this fruit be forbidden to me”, and a vow formulated without the use of the demonstrative.

216:1 – The vow concerning cooked food When we say: “May this fruit be forbidden to me”, this fruit is forbidden in any form, and any fruit derived from its reproduction is also forbidden. It goes without saying that one must not drink any beverage made from the fruit in question. Second-generation fruit is also forbidden, but not fruit that has been prepared in a certain way and then given a new form. When the fruits are of such a kind that they reproduce only by putrefaction and annihilation of the seed, second reproduction is permitted. If a person, having fruits in front of him, vows that they are forbidden to him, it is as if he had used the word “these”.

Isserles: If we say: “May the fruits of such and such, or: may the fruits of such and such a place, be forbidden to me”, it's as if we were using the demonstrative “these”.

216:2 – When it is said: “If I eat or taste these fruits, let them be forbidden to me”, there are two cases to consider:

1̊ The seed of these fruits rots in the ground before reproducing, as happens with wheat; then the dishes prepared with these fruits are permitted, as are the fruits of reproduction;

2̊ If, on the other hand, the fruit does not reproduce by annihilating the seed, as is the case with garlic and onions, then the second reproduction is still forbidden, as are drinks made from these fruits. If a person says: “May these fruits be forbidden to so-and-so”, the fruits are forbidden for the second person, just as if that person had taken the vow himself.

216:3 – If a man says to his wife: “May the work of your hands be forbidden to me”, the fruits obtained by his wife's labor are forbidden to him in any form, as well as fruits by reproduction. But if he said: “May I be forbidden to taste or eat the product of your labor”, there are two cases to consider:

1̊ In the case of fruits that reproduce by annihilation of the seed, it is permissible to eat them, as well as the fruits of the first reproduction;

2̊ Reproduction takes place without destroying the seed; the second reproduction is still forbidden.

216:4 – When one person has said to another: “May your house be forbidden to me, if I enter it; may your field be forbidden to me, if I buy it”; if then the owner of the house or field dies, or sells the building, or gives the building to a third party, the person may buy the house or field from the new owner. but as long as the building remains in the possession of the first owner, it remains forbidden to the person who made the vow, even if the owner sells the building and then buys it back, or if, in place of his house which has collapsed, he builds another, changing the location.

Isserles: When one has said to someone: “May your father's house be forbidden to me, if I enter it”; if that father dies, one must not enter the house, even though it then belongs to the son, for the son is the natural possessor of his deceased father's property.

216:5 – When a person says: “May this house be forbidden to me, if I enter it”, the house is forbidden to him forever, even if the owner dies, or sells the house, or gives it away. But if the house has collapsed and another has been rebuilt, the new house is permitted, even if it is built on the same site as the old one and is similar to it.

216:6 – When one person says to another: “May this house of yours be forbidden to me, if I enter it”, the house will always be forbidden to him, whether the owner dies, sells it, or gives it away, or rebuilds another if the house has collapsed. One author says that the house becomes permissible if the owner dies, or gives it away, or sells it; but if the house has collapsed, the house rebuilt on the site of the first is forbidden. Another author permits the house that has been built in place of the first one that has fallen into ruin, and forbids the house, if the owner dies, gives the house away, or sells it to a third party.

Gloss: We will agree with the first of these three opinions, which is the opinion of the author of the Shulhan Arukh himself, Joseph Caro, for the following reasons. The two authors, whose opinions Caro recorded in article 6, were inspired by a certain passage in the Talmud (tractate Baba Metsia, michenah, page 102, 2), which reads: “If a landlord rents his house by the year, the embolismic years are to the tenant's advantage; if he rents it by the month, the embolismic years are to the landlord's advantage.” (We recall here that the Jewish embolismic year is a year of 13 months, instead of twelve. There are 7 of these years in a 19-year cycle, to make up for the difference in the number of days in the solar year and the lunar year, which is about 10). “The following fact happened in Sephoris. A person had rented a building from a landlord for twelve gold coins a year, at the rate of one gold dinar a month. A dispute arose over the two expressions used in the contract, and the matter came before Rabban Simeon, son of Gamaliel, and Rabbi José. They said: let the extra month in dispute (the 13th month of the embolismic years) be divided between the two contracting parties.” And here is the Gemara corresponding to this michenah: “Rab said: If I had been there, I would have decided that the entire extra month would be paid to the owner. And what does he mean by this? It's that he would have applied the second of the michenah rules (i.e., rent by the month, owner's benefit).” The two authors cited by Caro wanted to imitate the tanaïm (authors of the michenah) and the amoraïm (authors of the guemara), by deciding between the first and the second of the two expressions used by the person who pronounced the vow of art. 6. But can we equate questions of wishes with questions of money? Aren't the rules completely different in the two cases? Aren't wishes more serious than questions of interest? And then, are there really two different ideas in the subject phrase of the discussion: “that house of yours”? The demonstrative “this” only serves to emphasize the prohibition of the house in question. In the passage from Baba Metsia, the owner says: 12 gold coins per year, and then adds: one gold dinar per month. So there were two ways of understanding this: renting by the year or renting by the month, and the Doctors could decide one way or the other. In our vow question, on the other hand, how do the two expressions differ: “this house” and “the house that belongs to you”? Simply in that the former contains the demonstrative “this”, and thus renders absolute the prohibition pronounced on the house of the owner in question. So what does it matter if the owner dies, sells, donates or rebuilds the house? The house must remain forbidden in every way.

216:7 – When the owner of a house says to a person: “May this house be forbidden to you, if you enter it”, the house is forbidden to that person, even if the owner dies, or sells the house, or gives it away; for a man can forbid another man an object that belongs to him, and, even though the house is no longer in his possession, the word “this” which he used makes his defense subsist. If the owner has said to the person: “May my house be forbidden to you, if you enter it”, it is permissible for that person to go into the building, if the owner is dead, or has sold or given away his house. When a father vows or swears that his son will not benefit from him, the son may nevertheless inherit after the father's death, because this vow is likened to the following words: “May my property be forbidden to you”. But if a father forbids his son to benefit from him, and if he adds: “during my lifetime” or “after my death”, the son is forbidden to inherit; for it is as if the father had said: “I forbid you to benefit from these goods that belong to me”.

Isserles: When a community vows to donate the money from its collections to the synagogue and the rabbinical school, it must share this sum between the two institutions in question, even if the sum is insufficient for only one of them. When a father has adjured his son, a friend his friend, not to lend money without the assent of Reuben and Simeon; if Reuben or Simeon dies, the son, the friend may lend with the assent of the sole survivor. Indeed, when it is said that the permission of Reuben and Simeon is necessary, it is understood that in the absence of one of them, the other will suffice, unless the idea has been put forward that the permission of the two persons mentioned is absolutely necessary. If a fiancé swears that he will not take a wife other than his fiancée, and if the husband of his sister-in-law (his brother's wife) dies before the marriage, it is permissible for him to marry that sister-in-law; for it seems that his oath was made for the time following his union with his fiancée, and not for the time preceding that union. He may not, however, marry his sister-in-law until a rabbi has remitted his oath to him.

216:8 – When one person has said to another: “May this bread of mine be forbidden to you”, the bread is forbidden to the second person, even if the owner of the bread gives it to him or sells it to him; but if this owner dies, and the person inherits the bread, or if the owner gives his bread to a third person, who in turn gives it to the second person, the latter may accept it. This is because the owner of the bread has said: “My bread be forbidden to you”, and the bread is no longer his in the last two cases considered.

216:9 – When one makes a vow not to eat meat, broth and residue are permitted. If one vows not to eat meat, broth and residue are permitted, unless one has said, “May meat be forbidden to me, if I taste it, or: if I eat it.”

216:10 – When wine, which a person has forbidden himself by vow, is mixed with another wine, this mixture is forbidden, even if it tastes only slightly like the forbidden wine; for the person can go to a rabbi to ask for his vow to be lifted. It is then considered that the forbidden wine may become permitted in the mixture, although in reality such a mixture can never be disregarded, even if the food of the same kind and permitted, with which the forbidden food is mixed, is a thousand times greater in quantity than the forbidden food.

216:11 – When one has said: “May the wine of such and such a man, or: of such and such a place, be forbidden to me”, and this wine falls into broth, the broth is also forbidden, if it has taken on the taste of wine. Likewise, if after the vow the wine has been turned into vinegar, that vinegar is forbidden; but if the vinegar was made at the very moment the vow was made the vinegar is permitted.

Gloss: Because in the latter case, the vow obviously concerned wine and not vinegar.

216:12 – When a person says: “May olives or grapes be forbidden to me”, products made from these fruits, even fresh ones, are permitted. But if the vow was formulated as follows: “May the olives or grapes I taste be forbidden to me”, or: “May these olives or grapes be forbidden to me”, products made from the fruit in question are forbidden; the same applies to food cooked with the fruit, if it has taken on the taste of the fruit.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

217 – Rules concerning vows relating to boiled food, salted food and various kinds of cooked food. - How vows should be treated, taking into account the manner of speaking of those who have taken them.

217:1 – When a person vows, or swears, not to eat boiled food, and in that place and time, not only boiled food, but also roasted and grilled foods are referred to by that name, all such foods are forbidden to him. But if it is customary to call only meat cooked in water and vegetables boiled, it is permitted to eat meat that has been roasted or grilled, or smoked, or fried in fat, or scalded instantly in the water of the thermal springs of Tiberias. In a word, the formulas of the vow have the exact meaning given to them in the very city where the vow is taken.

217:2 – When a person vows not to eat a vegetable that has to be cooked, only such vegetables as wheat or linseed are forbidden. If she says: “May all cooked vegetables be forbidden to me”, any cooked vegetable will be forbidden. If a person vows not to eat “anything baked in an oven”, bread alone is forbidden; but if he says: “May anything baked in an oven be forbidden to me”, any food that has been baked in an oven is forbidden.

217:3 – When a person vows not to eat salted food, and it is customary to designate by this name any food put in salt, even if it remains in salt for only a short time in order to preserve itself better, all salted food is forbidden to that person. But if it is customary to call only fish “salty food”, fish alone is forbidden. When a person vows or swears not to eat canned food, and all canned food substances are referred to by this name, all canned food is forbidden. But if the word “conserve” is used only to designate preserved green vegetables, the person has the right to eat all preserves, except canned vegetables. If some of the town's inhabitants call all food substances prepared for preserving “preserves”, while the other inhabitants give this name only to preserved greens, we must not defer to the majority, but consider the case as one of doubt; yet, when it comes to a vow, we must be very severe in cases of doubt.

217:4 – If a person says: “Green vegetables are forbidden to me”, these vegetables are forbidden only if they are raw. If he says: “May green vegetables, which are put in the pot-au-feu, be forbidden to me”, the prohibition extends to preserved green vegetables. If she says: “May the green vegetable that is cooked in the stew be forbidden to me”, only the designated vegetable is forbidden. This prohibition would even apply to dilouïne, which would have been qualified as a green vegetable; indeed, two things between which there is hesitation are considered to be of the same species; for example, if one person instructs another to buy a green vegetable for him, and if the latter only finds dilouïne and if, after reflecting, he thinks that one will be satisfied with it for want of another green vegetable, then dilouïne is assimilated to a green vegetable. However, if a person vows not to eat dilouin, green vegetables are not forbidden for this reason.

217:5 – When a person vows not to eat green vegetables, dried vegetables that are not displayed on the barn floor are also forbidden. He is allowed to eat dried beans, a vegetable that is displayed on the threshing floor. Green vegetables are only those that are fresh.

217:6 – When a person has vowed not to eat green vegetables, the Jerusalem Talmud doubts that he is also forbidden to eat qulkase.

Gloss: The qulkase is a fruit that comes in a husk and contains numerous seeds.

217:7 – When a person has vowed not to eat meat, the sinews of meat are also forbidden to him; but if he has vowed not to eat sinews, meat is permitted to him.

217:8 – When a person vows, or swears, not to eat meat, and, in this country, fish flesh is also called meat (e.g.: a person sent to buy meat will believe he must, in the absence of meat, buy fish), fish and meat are also forbidden. In any country, the vow not to eat meat includes poultry, as well as the entrails, head, feet, arteries and heart of animals; but grasshoppers may be eaten. However, if the way in which the vow was formulated makes it clear that it concerns only butcher's meat, or butcher's meat and poultry flesh, it is permitted to eat fish, even in countries where fish may be referred to as meat.

Gloss: It is also permitted to eat poultry, if the formula of the vow clearly indicates that only butcher's meat is intended.

217:9 – When you vow not to eat the broth residue, the broth itself remains permitted. If the vow concerned the broth itself, the broth residue is permitted and the broth is forbidden. Likewise, if you vow not to eat meat, both broth and residue are permitted, unless you say: “Meat is forbidden to me, if I taste it, or: if I eat it”.

217:10 – When a person vows not to eat a certain kind of ear of corn, the vegetable made from the grains of that ear is forbidden. If he has vowed not to eat a vegetable made with certain grains, he is permitted to eat the ears themselves. If she vows not to eat a prepared vegetable, garlic is forbidden. If she vows not to eat garlic, a prepared vegetable is permitted. When one vows not to eat food-condiments, these foods are forbidden raw, but not cooked. But if a person says: “Let me not eat any food that I may taste”, such food is forbidden, both raw and cooked. If one vows not to eat a wheat called Karoub, it is also forbidden to eat aspargus; but if the vow is for aspargus, karoub may be eaten.

Gloss: The water in which the karoub has been cooked is called aspargouss.

[Shulchan Aruch:] If one vows not to eat the sainfoin seed, Kaphloütoth remains permitted. If one vows not to eat green vegetables, green field vegetables are permitted, because they carry a distinctive name.

Gloss: We usually call “green vegetables” those grown in vegetable gardens; when we want to talk about a green vegetable that grows in the fields, we add “of the fields”.

217:11 – When one has vowed not to drink milk, whey is permitted; if one has vowed not to drink whey, milk is permitted.

Gloss: According to some authors, when one is in the habit of giving clear whey the name that contains the word “milk”, milk and whey are forbidden in both cases. When one vows not to drink milk, it is permitted to eat cheese; if one vows not to eat cheese, it is permitted to drink milk, but it is forbidden to eat cheese, salted or not, fresh or dry.

217:12 – When you vow not to eat fish, fish broth is still permitted, as are dishes prepared with fish roe or milt.

217:13 – When you vow not to eat dates, date honey is permitted.

Isserles: Although the word “date” has remained in the name of the new product (date honey), the form has changed. The name “date” is added only to distinguish this honey from other honeys. The same was not true of whey, which does not change shape. If you vow not to eat date honey, you can eat the dates themselves. If one has vowed not to eat raisins with which vinegar is made, it is permissible to use the vinegar itself.

217:14 – If you have vowed not to eat honey, you may eat date honey. If one has vowed not to eat vinegar, it is permissible to use raisin vinegar.

217:15 – When you vow not to drink wine, cider is permitted, but cooked wine is forbidden. The drink obtained by mixing wine, honey and aromatics is also permitted; some forbid it.

217:16 – When one has taken a vow not to drink must, wine alone must be forbidden, according to the Doctors; all other unfermented drinks will remain permitted.

217:17 – If you have taken a vow not to consume oil, and you are in a country where olive oil is customarily used, olive oil alone is forbidden, but not other oils. If you are in a country where all kinds of oils are used, but not olive oil, the latter alone is permitted to the person who has taken the vow. If both olive oil and various other oils are used in the country, then all oils are forbidden, even if most people prefer a certain oil.

217:18 – When a person vows not to eat wheat, or not to eat the best wheat, all five kinds of wheat are forbidden. The same rule applies to the vow not to eat rye.

217:19 – If a person vows not to eat bread, only wheat bread and barley bread are forbidden. In a region where it is customary to bake bread with all kinds of flour, a person who vows to abstain from bread, or from the food par excellence, must eat neither bread nor flour from any of the five kinds of wheat. But if he says: “Let all foods be forbidden to me”, all foods except water and salt are forbidden.

217:20 – When a person vows to abstain from wheat products, he is forbidden to eat them, raw or cooked. If he says: “May I not eat wheat or its products”, then both flour and wheat bread are forbidden. If she said: “May the wheat I taste be forbidden to me”, she is forbidden to eat cooked wheat, but may eat raw wheat. When she says: “May the products of wheat, which I would taste, be forbidden to me”, she is allowed to eat these products cooked, but not raw. If she says: “May wheat and its products, which I would taste, be forbidden to me”, she may eat neither wheat nor its products, whether cooked or raw.

Isserles: When a person says: “I am forbidden to eat bread made from wheat, barley or spelt”, only these three types of bread are forbidden. The word “bread” applies to barley and spelt as well as wheat. Some are more severe, forbidding not only barley or spelt bread, but also barley and spelt themselves, unless the person was careful to specify that her vow related only to bread. The prohibition will still only apply to bread itself if, in the language of the town where the person lives, the majority of the inhabitants understand that the vow relates only to bread.

217:21 – When a person says: “May the grain I taste be forbidden to me”, he is forbidden to eat the grains cooked, but he may eat them raw. If he says: “May the grain I taste be forbidden to me”, he is allowed to eat it cooked, but not raw. Finally, if she says: “May the grain or grains I taste be forbidden to me”, she is forbidden to eat them, whether raw or cooked.

217:22 – When a person has vowed not to eat the fruits of the year, all the fruits of the year are forbidden to him; but he may eat kid, lamb, milk, eggs and squabs. If she says: “May the produce of the year be forbidden to me”, all the things just enumerated are forbidden to her.

217:23 – When a person has vowed not to eat the fruits of the earth, all fruits of the soil and trees are forbidden, except mushrooms. If he has said: “May the produce of the soil be forbidden to me”, all products of the soil and trees are forbidden to him without exception.

217:24 – When a person vows not to eat summer fruits, figs alone are forbidden.

217:25 – If you have taken a vow not to drink water from a certain source, water from rivers in communication with that source is forbidden, and obviously also water from rivers that come directly from that source, even if these rivers do not bear the name of the source in question. But if you have vowed not to drink water from a particular river or spring, only the water from that river or spring is forbidden.

217:26 – If a person has taken a vow not to use a spring, it is permissible to perform religious ablutions there in winter, but not in summer.

217:27 – A person who vows not to dress can wear a bag or a curtain.

217:28 – When one vows not to live in a house, it is forbidden to live in the attic of that house. But if you vow not to live in the attic, you may live in the house.

217:29 – He who has vowed not to enter a city must also not go forward into the suburb of that city, more than about seventy cubits.

217:30 – If a person has made a vow to ban himself from a house, he is only forbidden to cross the door leading into the vestibule; he is permitted to remain outside the threshold of the house.

217:31 – A person who has vowed not to stop in front of a house must not stop in front of the outer door of that house.

Isserles: When one has vowed to live in a Jewish quarter, one must live in a quarter where many Jews live, not just a few: for the expression “Jewish quarter” indicates a large area, where the Israelites live in large numbers.

217:32 – If one has made a vow not to have relations with the inhabitants of a city, one must not have relations with anyone who would live in that city for thirty days; if one has made a vow not to have relations with the citizens of a city, one is forbidden to have relations with anyone who would stay in that city for twelve months.

Isserles: A person who vows not to have relations with those who stay in a certain city would thereby be forbidding himself anyone who stays in that city, even for a very short time, with his family; for “stay” is generally understood to mean living for a certain fixed period of time. We must always refer to the intention of the person who formulated the vow, taking into account the language habits of the region.

217:33 – When one forbids oneself by vow the navigators of the sea, one thus forbids oneself even those who go from Acco to Jaffa, or who ride in boats for their pleasure; but it is permitted to have relations with people who remain on dry land.

217:34 – When we vow not to have relations with people who dwell on dry land, it is also forbidden to have relations with sailors on the sea, even if they make long voyages, for their destiny is always to return to land.

217:35 – When a person makes this vow: “In thirty days, I will forbid myself to sail the sea”, only those are forbidden who were at sea at the time of the vow, but not those who left after the vow, even if this departure took place after the thirty days following the vow.

217:36 – If a person forbids himself those who see the sun, he is also forbidden to have relations with the blind, because he intended to forbid himself all those whom the sun illuminates; fish and cattle fetuses will not be included in the prohibition.

Isserles: We do not rely on the explanation a person gives of the intentions he had at the time of his vow, when these intentions are perfectly apparent from the very way he formulated the vow; he will be permitted to enjoy all non-living things, although they are illuminated by the sun.

[Shulchan Aruch:] If she has forbidden herself those who see the sun, the prohibition will not apply to the blind.

217:37 – When a person takes a vow to forbid himself “black heads”, he is also forbidden to have relations with bald men and old men; but he is permitted to have relations with women and children, the qualification “black heads” applying only to men. But if one is in the habit of giving this name to everyone, intercourse is forbidden with anyone.

Gloss: When one has vowed not to enjoy anything red, it is also forbidden to look at the sun, whose glow is reddish.

217:38 – Those who vow not to have relations with people observing the Sabbath rest must not have relations with the Kutîm either.

217:39 – Those who forbid themselves “people going up to Jerusalem” are forbidden to have relations with the Israelites, but they are allowed to have relations with the Kutîm.

217:40 – If a person vows not to enjoy the children of Noah, he is forbidden to enjoy men of any nation except Israelites. If one has vowed not to enjoy the descendants of Abraham, it is forbidden to have relations with the Israelites and with proselytes of the Jewish religion, but it is permitted to have relations with all the other nations of the earth, even with the children of Ishmael or Esau.

217:41 – A person who vows not to have intercourse with the uncircumcised is forbidden to have intercourse with non-Israelites, even if they are circumcised; and he is permitted to have intercourse with Israelites, even if they are uncircumcised.

217:42 – If a person has vowed not to have anything to do with circumcised people, he is also forbidden to have relations with uncircumcised Israelites; but he is permitted to have relations with circumcised non-Israelites.

217:43 – If a person has vowed not to approach an Israelite, he is also forbidden to approach a proselyte; but if he has vowed not to have relations with proselytes, he is permitted to have them with an Israelite by birth.

217:44 – A person who has vowed not to have anything to do with an Israelite may not have relations with a Cohen or Levite either; but if he has vowed not to have relations with Cohanîm and Levites, it is permissible for him to have relations with an Israelite who is neither Cohen nor Levite.

217:45 – When a person vows not to have intercourse with the Cohanîm, he is permitted to have intercourse with the Levites; likewise, if he vows not to have intercourse with the Levites, he may have intercourse with the Cohanîm.

217:46 – If you vow not to have relations with your children, you are allowed to have relations with your grandchildren.

217:47– When a person vows, or swears, not to enjoy a certain thing except on holidays, and says that he has considered the days of Purim and Hanukkah as such, we give credence to his words.

Gloss: See Orah Hayim, § 570.

217:48 – When a person takes a vow or oath not to play any games, lotteries and games of chance are also forbidden, whether they are played directly or through an intermediary; betting is also forbidden.

Isserles: When, for whatever reason, a community has issued an anathema forbidding prayer in meetings of ten people, it is also forbidden to read the Pentateuch in such meetings, as this reading is considered prayer. - If one makes a vow not to accept a deposit, it is forbidden to pledge a loan to an Israelite; however, it seems that in this case one can refer to the intention that the person says he had in making the vow. - When a person vows, or swears, to fast for a certain number of days, and an obligatory fasting day falls among them, that day counts towards the number of fasting days set by the vow or oath. Similarly, if one has vowed to go to the cemetery or any other place, and if one happens to have to go there on business, the vow is considered fulfilled (V. § 239).

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

218 – When to consider the spirit rather than the letter of a vow

218:1 – We must not judge a vow or an oath by taking the words that were pronounced literally, but we must understand the meaning given to these words by the mind of the person who pronounced them. For example, if a person, bent under a burden of wool or linen, vows, or swears, never again to wear wool or linen, he will be forbidden to carry such a burden, but he will be permitted to wear a garment of wool or linen, or to take shelter in a blanket. In the same way, if a person, dressed in wool, finds himself embarrassed by his clothes and takes an oath, or pronounces a vow, never to wear wool again, woollen garments will be forbidden to him, but he will be permitted to carry a woollen burden and even to cover himself with a woollen blanket.

Isserles: This is only a vow concerning the very person who made it; but if in the vow another person is involved at the same time, the vow must be taken at face value, unless the person can, with serious evidence, show what the real meaning of his vow was.

218:2 – When a person, falsely accused of having sold wine to Muslims, swears that, if he makes wine, it will not be to sell it, he is also forbidden to sell the wine he would have made before this oath.

Isserles: Even though the person has sworn not to make any more wine, we must abide by the intention of his oath. Even more so, in the case of a community that has vowed not to sell a certain product, it is forbidden to sell the quantity of that product that it possessed before making its vow.

218:3 – A man is asked to marry his sister's daughter, and he answers: “I vow that she will never take advantage of me”; or a man repudiates his wife and pronounces this same formula: it is then permissible for these women to take advantage of what may be given to them by the man who pronounced the vow, since the intention of this man was only the marriage itself.

218:4 – When a person invites another to dine at his house and the latter replies, “I vow not to enter your house, nor to taste even a cold drink there”, it is permissible for the invited person to enter the house another time and accept a cold drink; for it is understood that his intention was only to forbid himself to enter and dine the time he was invited.

Gloss: For the case of a person who has vowed to perform a good work, or who has made any other vow, because he was seriously ill, and who then dies, see § 220, gloss on article 15.

218:5 – A farmer asks the owner of a cow to lend it to him to plough his land. The owner refuses, saying that the cow is in use, and the farmer vows never to plough his field again with the cow: if the farmer is in the habit of ploughing his land himself, he is forbidden to use the animal personally, but he may have his field ploughed by others, who will use the cow; if, on the other hand, he is in the habit of having his land ploughed by others, he is forbidden either to use the animal himself, or to let workers use it for him.

218:6 – When a person promises not to obey a steward, the promise has no value, because it cannot cancel the decision that created that steward.

Isserles: When a community has excommunicated a person and forbidden him to remain within its bosom; if that person then wishes to run a store within the community, the reasons that dictated the exclusion must be referred to: if it was only intended to forbid the person in question from living within the community with wife and children, that person will be allowed to have the store he desires; otherwise he will have to abandon the place altogether.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

219 – Rules concerning vows made without a set time

219:1 – Rules concerning vows made without a set time

When a man has vowed to marry, or to buy a house, without fixing a time for the marriage or purchase, he cannot be forced to marry or buy a house until he has found a suitable time.

219:2 – When a person has sworn to spend up to ten litra to pay for his son's teacher, he is released from his oath as soon as he has found a suitable teacher; but he must be careful not to thank that teacher until he has another to replace him.

Gloss: You must always keep the suitable teacher you have found, if no other of value comes along.

219:3 – If a person has forbidden himself a thing, without setting a time limit for this prohibition, that thing is forbidden to him forever.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

220 – Difference between the vow: “May wine be forbidden to me today” and the vow: “May wine be forbidden to me for so many days,” the vow with no time limit

220:1 – When we say: “May wine be forbidden to me, which I would taste, for one day, or: which I would taste, today”, we are forbidden to drink wine for twenty-four hours. But if one says: “May I not taste wine during the day”, it is forbidden to drink wine only until nightfall, whether the vow was made at the beginning or towards the end of the day; a rabbi should be consulted, however, because the person making the vow may not know the difference between the words day and day, and may drink wine during the night, for example, when it would be forbidden to do so. Some say: when the vow is for a good work, such as studying the Law, there's no need to consult a rabbi.

Gloss: If it's a fasting vow, it's always permitted to eat at night, without having to consult a rabbi.

220:2 – If it has been said: “I am forbidden to eat on the day I do such and such a thing”, it is forbidden to eat only during the day, just as if it had been said: “On the day I do...”. But if it was said: “I am forbidden to eat on this day and the next”, it is forbidden to eat on the first day, on the night between this day and the second, and on the second day until evening.

220:3 – When one vows, in the middle of the week, or before the middle, not to drink wine during that week, it is forbidden to drink wine until the end of the week, including the Sabbath.

Gloss: there's no need to consult a rabbi about this. But if one says: “I vow not to drink wine for a whole week, or: for one week”, wine is forbidden for seven whole days.

220:4 – When a person makes a vow in the middle of the month, or before the middle, saying “this month”, he must fulfill the conditions of his vow until the end of the month, and he is released at neomenia; if neomenia comprises two days (the first of which counts in the month that is ending), however, the person can consider himself released from his vow from the first day of neomenia; for this day is also called “new moon day”, and will be considered as belonging to the new month.

Gloss: When one has made a vow to accomplish something before the new moon, this vow must be fulfilled before the first day of the neomenia, when this neomenia includes two days.

220:5 – When you vow to forbid yourself something “for a whole month” or “for a month”, that thing remains forbidden for a whole month.

220:6 – If, in the middle of the year, or before the middle, a person forbids himself to do something, saying, “This year,” the thing is forbidden until the end of the year, and becomes permissible on Roche Hachânâh (New Year's Day). However, if the vow was taken on Elul 29, the prohibition will be lifted on the following day, Ticherî 1, the day of the New Year.

220:7 – If the person has said: “For a whole year” or “for a year”, the prohibition will last for a whole year, from the day the vow was made, and, if that year has thirteen months, that extra month will be included in the prohibition. If the person made the vow in winter, saying “this year”, and the year is an embolismic year, the prohibition also applies to the extra month and will only end on the first of ticherî; the extra month cannot replace the month of eloul.

220:8 – When we say: “until the neomenia of Adar”, the prohibition goes until the neomenia of the first month of Adar. If one says: “until the end of Adar”, it goes until the end of the second Adar. According to Maimonides, if the person who said “until the neomenia of Adar” knew that the year included an additional month of Adar, the prohibition would extend to the neomenia of the second Adar.

220:9 – When a person makes a vow in the middle of the six-year work period, or before that middle, and says: “May I be forbidden during this chemitâh...”, the prohibition runs until the end of the chemitâh and extends to the whole of the seventh year.

220:10 – If we say “a whole shemitâh” or “during a shemitâh”, the prohibition extends to a period of seven whole years.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah.

264 – Laws of circumcision

264:2 – Anything can be circumcised, even a stone, glass or any other sharp material, except a broken cane, since splinters can come out of it, causing serious injury. It is preferable to perform circumcision with iron, whether with a knife or scissors. And the custom is to do it with a knife.

264:4 – If he performed the circumcision but didn't remove the inner foreskin (the envelope), it's as if he hadn't performed the circumcision.

264:5 – Some excrescences prevent circumcision from being valid, while others do not. How so? If a portion of skin remains that covers the majority of the crown of the glans, even if it only covers one part, this prevents circumcision, and it's as if circumcision hadn't taken place. But if only a small portion of skin remains, and it doesn't cover the majority of the crown, this doesn't prevent circumcision. (However, even in this case, it is preferable to remove any significant growths, even if they are not a major obstacle to the validity of the circumcision).

264:6 – A child whose skin is soft and flabby, or who has so much skin that he looks as if he hasn't been circumcised, should be examined to see if, when the penis hardens, he looks circumcised. If so, it does not need to be circumcised again. However, for reasons of mara'it ayin (appearance), it is necessary to correct the excess skin on either side. If this does not appear to be circumcised when hardened, all loose skin must be cut away until it clearly appears to be circumcised when hardened.

Isserles: It is not necessary for the majority of the glans crown to be visible at the time of hardening, as long as it has been properly circumcised once, even if only a small part of the crown appears circumcised. It doesn't need to be circumcised again, but if it can be corrected, the skin should be pulled and pushed back, then fixed so that it stays in place and doesn't go back down.

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